MEDIJSKE STUDIJE

MEDIA STUDIES

SADRŽAJ

CONTENTS

Riječ koja je obilježila novinarstvo i medije posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća zasigurno je – promjena. Razvoj digitalnih tehnologija iz temelja je promijeno društvo u kojem živimo. Svijet kojeg smo znali više ne postoji, a McLuhanovo proročanstvo o medijima kao 'produžetku suvremenog čovjeka' pokazalo se zatrašujuće točnim. Pred istraživače i teoretičare medija postavljen je zahtjevan zadatak praćenja i razumijevanja promjena te definiranja novih koncepata i pojmova kojima se te promjene mogu adekvatno objasniti. Taj je zadatak nerijetko frustrirajuć jer su promjene u svijetu medija toliko brze, višeslojne i intenzivne da koncepti koji ih prate vrlo brzo zastarijevaju.

Svi radovi u ovom broju časopisa Medijske studije, na ovaj ili onaj način, bave se upravo 'promjenom'.

Prvi članak autorica Ive Nenadić i Aline Ostling bavi se novim poslovnim modelima plasiranja medijskih sadržaja u transformiranom medijskom okruženju. U potrazi za održivim modelom poslovanja, mediji preispituju svoj odnos prema korisnicima, tretirajući ih djelomično kao 'građane', a djelomično kao 'potrošače'. Na temelju podataka prikupljenih u okviru istraživačkog projekta Media Pluralism Monitor 2016, autorice zaključuju kako mediji kroz nove poslovne modele pristupaju publikama pretežno kao „plaćajućim potrošačima", a ne sudjelujućim građanima.

Drugi članak autorice Lane Ciboci bavi se utjecajem medijskih promjena na djecu, odnosno njihovim razumijevanjem medijske tehnologije i medijskih sadržaja. Autorica zaključuje kako učenici osmih razreda u Zagrebu posjeduju srednju razinu medijske pismenosti, pri čemu je najslabiji rezultat zabilježen u kategoriji kritičkog vrednovanja i stvaranja medijskog sadržaja.

Treći članak Laure Guimarães Corrêa obrađuje grad kao medij u kojem urbane intervencije, poput grafita, mogu postati „scene neslaganja". Međutim, kada korporativni subjekti prisvoje takve promjene u prostoru, one umjesto do „neslaganja" mogu dovesti do konsenzusa.

Četvrti i peti članak u broju bave se izbornim kampanjama. Tekst Gordana Struića jedan je od rijetkih pregleda uređenja izbornih kampanja u Hrvatskoj u kojem autor ukazuje na nekoherentnost zakonodavnog okvira. Za razliku od ostalih članaka u broju koji analiziraju prisustvo promjena, ovaj rad ukazuje na izostanak kvalitetne prilagodbe i zaziva promjene u smislu boljeg uređenja izbornih kampanja u Hrvatskoj.

Tekst Nichole D. Gutgold and Johnne Purcell bavi se izbornim kampanjama u SAD-u. Autorice analiziraju najavne videooglase kandidatkinje Hillary Clinton na izborima 2008. i 2016. u kontekstu rodnih stereotipa i zaključuju kako je Hillary Clinton 2016. promijenila strategiju kako bi u najavi svoje kampanje bila manje vidljiva, kako „pričljivost" ne bi ugrozila njezine izborne šanse.

Posljednji tekst u ovom broju donosi kritički osvrt Domagoja Bebića i Marije Volarević na Izvještaj Skupine stručnjaka visoke razine o lažnim vijestima i *online* dezinformacijama. Oni tvrde da izvještaj u nedovoljnoj mjeri uvažava promjene u medijskom okruženju te da nudi rješenja koja proizlaze iz tradicionalnog razumijevanja medija i novinarstva, umjesto da prijedloge medijskih politika temelji na novoj digitalnoj paradigmi.

Marijana Grbeša Zenzerović
Glavna urednica

The word that has marked journalism and media over the last few decades is certainly – change. The development of digital technologies has profoundly changed the society we live in. The world we have known no longer exists, and McLuhan's prophecy about the media as "the extensions of man" has proved to be shockingly exact. Researchers and media theorists have been faced with a demanding task of monitoring and understanding changes and defining new concepts that can adequately explain them. This task is often frustrating because changes in the media environment are so fast and intense that the concepts used to try to grasp them have a very short expiration date.

All papers in this issue of the Media Studies journal deal with 'change', in one way or another.

The first article by Iva Nenadić and Alina Ostling deals with new business models of media content distribution in a transformed media environment. In search of a viable business model, the media reconsider their relations to the users, treating them partly as 'citizens' and partly as 'consumers'. Based on the data gathered within the Media Pluralism Monitor 2016 research project, the authors conclude that the media use new business models to approach audiences predominantly as "paying consumers" rather than participating citizens.

Lana Ciboci's article deals with the influence of media changes on children and their understanding of media technology and media content. The author concludes that eighth grade students in Zagreb possess a medium level of media literacy, with the lowest score in the category of critical evaluation and creation of media content.

The third article by Laure Guimarães Corrêa treats the city as a medium in which urban interventions, such as graffiti, can become scenes of change and "dissensus". However, when corporate discourses appropriate urban interventions, contemporary urban expressions such as graffiti and street art might turn into consensus.

The fourth and fifth articles focus on electoral campaigns. Gordan Struić's text is one of the few reviews of election campaign regulation in Croatia. The author points to the incoherence of the legislative framework and, unlike other articles in the issue that focus on *the presence* of change, this paper warns about the *absence* of necessary changes and quality adjustments.

Text by Nichola D. Gutgold and Johnna Purcell deals with electoral campaigns in the United States. The authors analyze Hillary Clinton announcement videos in 2008 and 2016 in the context of gender stereotypes, concluding that Hillary Clinton changed her strategy in 2016 and made herself less visible, assuming that "volubility" may harm her political prospects.

The last text in this issue is a commentary by Domagoj Bebić and Marija Volarević who give a critical review of the Report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and On-line Disinformation. They argue that the report does not adequately acknowledge changes in the media environment and that it offers solutions that stem from traditional understanding of media and journalism, instead of suggesting media policies that would arise from the new digital paradigm.

Marijana Grbeša Zenzerović
Editor in Chief

MEDIJI I PUBLIKE

MEDIA AND AUDIENCES

MEDIA INNOVATION IN EUROPE AND REINVENTION OF AUDIENCES: BETWEEN CITIZENS AND CONSUMERS

Iva Nenadić :: Alina Ostling

ABSTRACT *Technological transformation has provided conditions for people to engage in different stages of news production, as never before. With this in mind, this paper explores whether the media and journalists across Europe in their attempt to innovate the news business model reconsider their relations to users. More specifically, we question whether this innovation seeks to address users primarily as citizens or as consumers. The analysis is based on the data collected by national research teams through the project Media Pluralism Monitor 2016, implemented in EU:28, Montenegro and Turkey. The results show that the most visible attempts of innovation are crowdfunding/crowdsourcing and paywalls, which can be seen as a turn to audiences to compensate for a loss in advertising revenues. At the same time, only a few initiatives re-invent their relationship with audiences by giving them more decision-making powers (be it related to content or to their business strategy). Audiences are to a great extent still treated simply as paying consumers, and the level of participation remains limited.*

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INTRODUCTION

Technological developments, broad use of internet and in particular the rise of content sharing platforms have immensely changed the conditions in which news organizations operate. This new information environment has provided an opportunity for people to interact more with the media, journalists and news, as well as to provide and share their own content. User-generated content (UGC) is getting more prominence, and the relationship between media organizations and their audiences calls for reconsideration. The way media organizations employ the concept of 'audience' evolves in response to environmental changes (Napoli, 2011: 4). Media organizations traditionally have a dual function: public service and commercial activity. This dual function reflects also in their approach to users – either as citizens or as consumers. If the audiences are becoming more engaged actors of public information exchange, should media organizations, in their attempt to (re)position in the digital environment, treat them more as citizens rather than consumers? Our paper examines this question while trying to assess the nature of media business innovation across Europe in relation to the audience.

Technological advancements and the shift online are not only offering new opportunities to citizens but have also deranged the traditional media business model. Media organizations and journalistic endeavors are urged to look for alternative sources of financing. Media companies traditionally operate as a two-sided market, mediating between users and advertisers while using both of them as sources of revenue. For example, the traditional business model of newspapers is based on selling the content to readers and selling the access to readers to advertisers. The changing environment seems to disrupt this business model but not its logic. Online advertising is highly dominated by few technological companies, such as *Facebook* and *Google* (Bond, 2017), which leaves media companies with a small share to compete for. Therefore, to ensure sustainability, they are also attempting to increase people's willingness to pay for news online, and some major outlets have shown that this can work in practice[1]. The recent Digital News Report (Newman *et al.,* 2017) showed that the tendency to pay for online news is growing in some countries. They found that the type of content that had most influence on the decision of people surveyed in 36 countries to pay, are breaking news (41%) and reporting on recent events (38%). This may point towards people's need to be informed, in order to be able to engage in peer-to-peer communication as well as in other actions. An exposure to informative content, as shown by Claes De Vreese and Hajo Boomgaarden (2006), has a positive effect on knowledge gains and participation, key elements of democratic citizenship.

Several authors in the areas of both innovation and media stress the importance of the changing relationship between companies and consumers or citizens (depending on the focus of the authors). According to Jay Rosen (2006), new media have unsettled the balance of power between the oligarchic media industry and the "people formerly known as the audience" and switched the focus to interactive, as opposed to one-

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[1] See for example the case of The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/business/new-york-times-company-earnings.html) and The Guardian (https://www.ft.com/content/9044ff9a-358b-11e7-99bd-13beb0903fa3) (03/05/2018).

way, communication. Digital transition has allowed people to become producers and participate at different levels of the global exchange of information. Henry Jenkins (2006) was one of the first to describe this as 'participatory culture', and to contrast it with 'consumer culture'. Even authors pertaining to a more business-oriented line of research, such as Mohanbir Sawhney *et al.* (2006), highlight the need for companies to reconsider the relations with their customers and recapture the value created in order to be able to innovate. In 2008, Lawrence Lessig predicted the emerging of a third type of economy. He confronted commercial economies that create value with money with sharing economies that focus primarily on value, and anticipated that an equally important hybrid economy, which builds upon both the sharing and commercial economies, would dominate, notably online (Lessig, 2008).

In an attempt to regulate the media market, media authorities, such as *Ofcom* in the United Kingdom, recognize interests of both citizens and consumers, as well as of the overlapping citizen-consumer (Livingston *et al.,* 2007). "In the classic model [...] individuals were defined through their roles as 'consumers' rather than being seen as producers of – or better yet, participants within – the surrounding culture", claim Henry Jenkins and Mark Deuze (2008: 5). They further note that "media companies can no longer be meaningfully studied in the absence of an understanding of how they relate to their consumers" (Jenkins and Deuze, 2008: 5).

To our knowledge, existing research on media business innovation does not raise the question as to whether the ongoing innovation considers people primarily as consumers or as citizens. With this paper we aim to add this perspective by offering an initial insight into the types of innovation that occur across Europe. We start from taking the note on the changing nature of audience that is now, more than ever, present in newsgathering, reporting, disseminating, and promoting the content online. We seek to explore whether the attempts of media organizations to innovate also reinvent their relationship with the audience: do they see them more as citizens or as consumers? While, on the one hand, exploring the potential of media innovations to promote inclusiveness and participation, on the other, we do not neglect a tendency of commercial practices to exploit participatory culture. As Denis McQuail (2010) argues, content decisions are market driven, which commodifies culture and relations with the audience.

FROM CITIZEN TO CONSUMER AND TO CITIZEN-CONSUMER

It is not uncommon to apply an audience perspective in studying the news media and journalism. Traditionally, the role of the media or journalism in society has been discussed in relation to whether the audience has been seen as citizens or as consumers (Lewis *et al.*, 2005; Mellado and van Dalen, 2017). Dan Jackson (2007: 142) highlights that until the 1980s, when there was little direct competition between media outlets and consumption patterns were relatively stable, it was more common to think about the news media as 'citizen-centred', with their main role being to provide citizens with relevant and accurate information. Over the last 40 years, with a technology driven transformation of

the media and information environment, commercialization, growing competition, and cultural changes, audiences are increasingly seen as consumers (Jackson, 2007: 143) - self-interested, less active and more interested in entertainment than in political information (Mellado and van Dalen, 2017; Scammell 2000). However, to see users only as citizens or only as consumers would be far from the complex reality in which both roles are played by individuals, sometimes even simultaneously. Moreover, with more recent developments in technology, media and society the role of citizens and consumers has changed, resulting in new ways of expressing citizenship (Mellado and van Dalen, 2017: 216). As Janelle Ward and Claes De Vreese (2011: 400) point out, citizenship is no longer exclusively about political participation but also about political consumption. This is linked with the notion that people today have more power (including political power) as consumers than as workers (Scammell, 2000). People are more aware of and knowledgeable about companies and their commercial practices, and "the act of consumption is becoming increasingly suffused with citizenship characteristics and considerations" (Scammell, 2000: 351). Scammell (2000: 354) also notes that the internet now provides unprecedented possibilities for citizen-consumers that can find and exchange information, organize, act and react, in ways different than before.

The point here is that, while citizen and/or consumer approaches can still be useful in understanding the relations between the media and the audience, these concepts should not be seen as strictly divided and mutually exclusive (Mellado and van Dalen, 2017; Scammell, 2000). Furthermore, the concept of 'citizen' should be altered to account for broader complexities of expressing civic engagement, including also through buying practices (Scammell, 2000). In this paper, we acknowledge these complexities. When assessing whether the innovation attempts of media organizations see their audiences primarily as citizens or as consumers, we do not exclude that they might see them as both. However, we are particularly interested in unveiling what general approach the media take, as we believe this can help us to get an initial notion of whether this innovation is revenue-oriented, or whether it has also to do with reinventing media-audience relations.

IS IT ABOUT DEMOCRACY?

The existing literature on media business innovation points towards a schizophrenic situation in which survival-related innovation drives journalism and the media in two opposite directions: turning to advertisers by offering them "native" content and promotion services which conflict with the traditional principle of separating news from advertisements (see Carlson, 2014; Küng, 2015; Laursen and Stone, 2016; Matteo and Zotto, 2015), and turning to audiences to preserve traditional standards and public interest journalism (see Aitamurto, 2011, 2015; Caravajal *et al.,* 2012; Jian and Shin, 2015; Zaripova, 2017). Crowdfunding, a model of financing based on micro-payments from a large crowd of people, is an expression of the latter (Aitamurto, 2015). Most scholars that explored crowdfunding as a new funding model for journalism, framed it with the changing relationship between journalists and their audiences (Aitamurto, 2011; Caravajal *et al.,* 2012; Zaripova, 2017). Tanja Aitamurto (2011) focused on one of the pioneering

platforms for crowdfunding in journalism - *Spot.Us*[2]. Even though Aitamurto's study was conducted in 2009/2010 in the United States, and *Spot.Us* ceased to exist in the meantime, her findings are still relevant as more recent crowdfunding platforms in Europe do not operate much differently from the pioneering ones. From the interviews she conducted with *Spot.Us* donors and reporters, Aitamurto (2011) noticed that journalists develop a sense of responsibility and connection to their donors, while donors do not feel the same. Instead, their motivation, as emerging from Aitamurto's interviews, is to contribute to social change. In the context of her findings, Aitamurto (2011: 433-434) discusses crowdfunding as a "manifestation of participatory culture", that "extends from the production level [commenting on a story] to the filtering level of the process, as the community decides what stories will be reported". However, as she finds, donors do not engage much with the story process, sometimes do not even read the final story. For them, "the act of participating in crowdfunding seems to be more important than the actual journalistic product" (Aitamurto 2011: 441). If a motivation for donors to support journalism stems from a desire for a broader contribution to democracy, rather than to just a piece of reporting, as found by Aitamurto (2011), then perhaps, in this case, we should rather talk about citizens, than about media users.

Lian Jian and Jieun Shin (2015) further explored the motivation of people to crowdfund journalism, together with their demographics and media consumption patterns. They found that their belief in freedom of content is one of the intrinsic motivators, together with altruism and a sense of belonging to their community, which re-confirmed Aitamurto's (2011) findings. This self-reported concern for one's community, the well-being of others, and media freedom, may also be related to democratic citizenship. At the same time, it is important to remember that participants are very different and take different perspectives with regard to participation. Victor Costello and Barbara Moore, who studied viewers participating in an online activity involving a television series, found that there were viewers who just wanted to share their experiences with other viewers, which permitted them to gain a more informed position as a consumer of a media product. These viewers were not interested in influencing a program or the media in general. Alongside, there were viewers who aimed at more decision-making power and were keen to "inform the production process and create their own, 'improved' versions of their favourite programme" (Costello and Moore, 2007 in Aslama and Napoli, 2010: 16).

In the past, participation in decisions about content was rarely possible within traditional media structures. In a crowdfunded media environment, the interaction between journalists and their donors has become more common. As showed by Adilya Zaripova (2017), readers can take more active part in the reporting process by becoming experts or even hosts. However, Zaripova (2017: 62) also notes that journalists perceive this new interaction as time-consuming and as adding psychological pressure to their daily job. All journalists interviewed in her study have reported to have experienced conflicts with readers who believe that being a donor gives them a right to control journalists. Some other authors (Aitamurto, 2011; Mitchelstein, 2011; Viscovi and Gustafsson, 2013)

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[2] Spot.Us ceased to exist in 2015: http://mediashift.org/2015/03/why-crowdfunded-journalism-pioneer-spot-us-died/ (05/05/2018).

as well suggested that journalists are reluctant to interact with the audience due to an increased workload or the fear of losing control, and even due to increasing harassment of journalists, especially online (Löfgren Nilsson and Örnebring, 2016).

Another line of studies, focusing on user-generated content in the newsroom and channels of participation offered by news organizations, explored how open journalists and media organizations are to this new type of interaction, and what approach they take towards their audiences. José Alberto García-Avilés's (2012) analysis of audience participation in Spanish television channels resulted in a classification of eight visions of the public and related strategies: consumers, players, followers, commentators, citizens, collaborators, benefactors and activists. "The strategy of citizens' involvement intends to involve viewers in communicative, cultural, social and political processes which strengthen their rights as individuals", explained García-Avilés (2012: 438), noting also that the audience gave high ratings to this approach. However, as his findings imply, broadcasters still tend to orient towards the most commercial strategy of seeing viewers primarily as consumers, despite a more interactive environment.

Our paper aims to continue with this line of thought by exploring how the media and journalists across Europe attempt to innovate the news business model, and whether this innovation seeks to address users primarily as citizens or as consumers. We have adopted a broad focus on innovative initiatives, by including both legacy media and completely new endeavors. The aim is to complement the existing research that, on the one hand, shows that some people who engage in crowdfunding platforms feel excitement for taking more active part in the reporting process, and have strong incentives to act as citizens by supporting media freedom, while, on the other hand, journalists and traditional media organizations still largely hold the stance towards the audience, not making the participation really open.

We are interested in initiatives undertaken by both traditional and new media organizations, and our understanding of innovation is in line with the framework provided by Tanja Storsul and Arne H. Krumsvik (2013). They argue that media innovation needs to be understood in relation to what is changing, as well as to what extent something needs to be new to be considered an innovation. To answer the latter, they distinguish "innovation" from "invention", highlighting that: "A key to understanding innovation is that existing knowledge is implemented in new contexts and that this opens up new possibilities" (Storsul and Krumsvik, 2013: 17). With regard to the question of what is changing, Storsul and Krumsvik (2013) advise to assess media innovation at the level of products, processes, positions and paradigms, but also at the level of social implications, interactions and user behavior. In the following sections, we will attempt to carry out a preliminary analysis of some instances of media innovation in Europe and assess how these consider users: as citizens or as consumers.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Two main research questions drive this study: (1) What kind of initiatives are media organizations developing in order to explore alternative sources of revenue? (2) Are these initiatives primarily oriented towards users-as-citizens, or users-as-consumers?

The analysis is largely based on the data collected through the 2016 implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor in EU:28, Montenegro and Turkey. The Monitor is a research project designed to regularly assess the state of play of media pluralism in the EU and its accession countries. The project is coordinated by the *Centre for Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF)*[3] at the *European University Institute*, while the data are collected by national media experts[4] who mainly relied on desk-based research, their expertise, and in some cases interviews with other country experts. The Monitor is composed of four areas, which represent the key parameters against which to measure risks to media pluralism in any given media landscape, namely: (1) Basic protection: including safeguards of freedom of expression, the right to information, and journalistic freedom; (2) Market plurality: focusing on media concentration, transparency of media ownership, commercial influence over editorial content, and media viability; (3) Political independence of media organizations; (4) Social inclusiveness: focusing on access to the media for different cultural and social groups, and on the level of media literacy for the population as a whole. The data used for this analysis were collected within the area of Market plurality, more specifically, within the variable of the indicator on media viability assessing whether traditional or new media organizations in the respective country develop initiatives that seek to explore alternative sources of revenue. National experts were instructed to report initiatives undertaken by both traditional and new media organizations. The data collected are by no means complete and do not contain all innovative initiatives in a specific country. It is, however, indicative, as it contains some of the most prominent examples identified by national media experts based on desk research and their sectoral expertise. To complement the Monitor data, the authors of this paper have also carried out additional desk-based research and examined academic literature, media reports and documents produced by international bodies.

The innovation radar as analytical framework

To make sense of the media innovation detected by the Monitor across 30 countries, we used the innovation radar (Sawhney *et al.*, 2006) as a conceptual framework. The innovation radar was initially developed to consider different dimensions through which organizations, in particular large industry players, can innovate. It was further applied by Florin Vladica and Charles Davis (2009) to study small to medium-sized firms and to analyze media innovations. Sawhney *et al.* (2006: 76) define business innovation as the "creation of substantial new value for customers and the firm by creatively changing one or more dimensions of the business system". The innovation radar has twelve different dimensions of innovation grouped under four business anchors: presence, offerings, processes and customers (Sawhney *et al.*, 2006: 77).

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[3] To which the two authors are affiliated.
[4] In all the countries covered, except in Italy and Malta, for which the data collection was carried out by CMPF centrally.

1. Presence that consists of the firm's channels of distribution, including network and the brand;
2. Offerings include the firm's products and services - platforms and solutions;
3. Processes refer to business activities that are used to conduct internal operations (organization and supply chain);
4. Customers refer to users or consumers (individuals and organizations), their needs, values and experiences.

Even though this categorization may have its limitations and in some cases innovation spills over several of these anchors, it informed initial analysis and brought our attention to the category of customers (referring also to users, to consumers and, in some cases, to citizens), which showed to be the most vivid line of innovation. Therefore, the second step of the analysis was to examine the level of participation offered by the initiatives categorized within that anchor.

Levels of participation

To understand if the public is conceived primarily as citizens or as consumers in the instances of media innovations detected by the Monitor, we examine the degree to which users are involved in production of content and even in management of media organizations. Public participation literature generally focuses on the extent of citizen involvement and empowerment through participation. At the same time, some authors stress that not only political participation but also consumption can be empowering (Scammell, 2000, Ward and De Vreese 2011). This is why we are looking at participation both from the point of view of practical involvement and control, and from the point of view of the empowerment deriving from social responsibility-driven purchasing power.

Models for assessing the extent of participation such as Sherry R. Arnstein's renowned ladder of public participation (1969: 217) stretch from non-participation such as "manipulation" of public opinion in order to gain support, to higher steps of participation such as "consultation", "partnership" and ultimately "citizen control". An evolution of Arnstein's ladder is the IAP2 spectrum, which is a simplified framework for assessing participation. The spectrum consists of four levels (IAP2, 2007):

1. "inform": is a one-way informing approach, where the organizers promise to keep people informed by providing balanced and objective information;
2. "consult": where organizers ask for public feedback on alternatives and/or decisions, listen to concerns, and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision;
3. "involve": where organizers work directly with the public to make sure that their concerns are understood and considered;
4. "empower": where citizens have the final decision-making power and where the organizers promise to implement what people decide.

The IAP2 framework is useful for explaining the levels of engagement, *i.e.* to what extent and how organizations engage stakeholders. At each rung, a different promise to the community is made and each level requires a different type of interaction. Moving

from level one to four (as per above) the spectrum indicates an increasing level of public impact, *i.e.* how much influence the community has on decision-making. Unlike Arnstein's ladder, the IAP2 spectrum is not meant to be a hierarchy but a continuum (Hardy, 2015). Depending on the types of issues at stake, the type of actors involved or the outcome expected, the optimal level might vary, also during the participation process itself. The organizers and stakeholders have to jointly find the appropriate level through negotiation (Hardy, 2015).

In the literature assessing participation in the field of communications, Anna Maria Jönsson and Henrik Örnebring (2011:129) discuss the concept of power over media content and examine if consumers are increasingly becoming "active consumers" and "media producers". In this paper, we also consider Jönsson and Örnebring's (2011) participation framework, which they used to analyze to what extent people are invited to participate in online newspapers and what this participation consists of. In their analysis, they distinguish between media features that require low, medium or high levels of participation and show that integration of user production in mainstream media largely results in users conceived as consumers, and that "to frame UGC as a democratic tool could be a branding strategy for creating and upholding a close relationship to the audience. Users are *identified* as consumers but *approached* as citizens" (Jönsson and Örnebring, 2011: 141). They further note that it is difficult to achieve empowerment within the traditional media logic, and that it is more likely for this shift from user-as-consumer to user-as-citizen to occur outside existing institutional and organizational media structures.

Building on both Jönsson and Örnebring's (2011) participation framework and the IAP2 spectrum (IAP2 2007), we carried out an assessment to determine if the Monitor cases of innovation involve a low, medium or high level of participation. To understand if the public is conceived primarily as citizens or as consumers in the instances of media innovations detected by the Monitor, we examine the degree to which users are involved in production of content and in management of media organizations. We assume that on the low end of the spectrum of participation - where there is only a requirement for a financial support - users are considered primarily as consumers, who (at most) have to be provided with balanced and objective information. At the medium and high ends - where organizers ask for feedback on alternatives and even delegate some of the decision-making power - users are increasingly seen as citizens. The overview of the participation features and the categorization resulting from our assessment is elaborated in the following chapter.

KEY MEDIA INNOVATIONS DETECTED BY THE MEDIA PLURALISM MONITOR

According to the Monitor results, the majority of the examined countries (28 of 30) have some examples of innovation and experimentation with alternative sources of funding, although the vast majority of media companies still earn money from traditional sources of revenues. Only two countries did not report any innovative initiative in the media

market (Luxembourg and Malta). According to the data reported, it is usually smaller or economically weaker markets that see less variety of innovation, such as Croatia, Cyprus and Estonia.

The categorization under the innovation radar (Sawhney *et al.*, 2006) suggests that most innovations are happening in relation to digital expansion, or within the anchor of 'presence'. The increasing access to and speed of the internet opens up significant opportunities for creation and distribution of media content. Digitization of content and interactive communication with audiences are changing the way media outputs are made (Vladica and Davies, 2009). A large majority of the innovations we observed – ranging from audio podcast versions of news to combined print and online subscriptions – use digital channels of distribution and exploit the increasing quest for on-demand and multi-platform consumption of digital content. Some of them, such as the social news agency *Storyful* in Ireland, that tracks and verifies social media content for their clients, would not even have existed before the digital age.

Many instances of innovations across Europe reflect in new 'offerings'. These are mainly focused on profitable services such as event organization, public relations and different marketing offers. For example, in Bulgaria, the dailies *Standart*, *24 Chasa* and *Bulgaria on Air TV* have developed different event management initiatives that provide them with additional sponsorship and advertising revenue. In Germany, in 2014 commercial radio broadcasters gained 2.1 percent of total revenue from events (Goldmedia, 2015).

It is also worth noting that certain innovations span over more than one dimension. For example, public relations/marketing and arrangement of music or journalism festivals often involve both 'offerings' and 'presence' since they offer a new service, but they also expanded to another market. In Turkey, the independent daily *Birgün* has leveraged its brand into a new domain by organizing the music event *Birgünlük Festival*. In Slovenia, the online media *Metina lista* runs media communication workshops and provides campaign management services. In Romania, the news agency *Mediafax* offers communication, marketing and media services to companies aiming at public debates on matters in the industry.

In terms of the anchor 'processes', the foremost instances of innovation are again happening online. An increasing digitization of content and interactive communication with audiences change the way media outputs are made (Vladica and Davies, 2009). One of the most common process innovations we detected is crowdsourcing. In Latvia, as an example, the investigative journalism project *RE:Baltica* has used crowdsourcing, *e.g.* to report on heating costs. Based on heating bills that people sent in, *RE:Baltica* created a map (www.karstierekini.lv) that generated countless stories in the Latvian press. The review of the cases shows that many crowdsourcing initiatives tend to be one-off campaigns, while many of the initially successful initiatives last for only a few years. A prominent example of media crowdsourcing (and crowdfunding) that have closed down is *Contributoria.com*[5].

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[5] In circa one and a half year of operation, *Contributoria*, run by the *Guardian Media Group*, published 787 articles and its writers earned over GPB 260,000. *Contributoria* closed in September 2015.

Insiders from the media industry emphasize that in order to sustain crowdsourcing, there is a need to invest a lot of effort into promotion, moderation of comments and dealing with challenging users, as well as ensuring that the published pieces are of high quality.[6]

The anchor 'customers', that relates to how media conceive their audiences, their needs, values and experiences, emerged as the most vivid line of the innovation radar within the scope of this research. The crowdfunding pointed out as the most common attempt of innovation, followed by various paywall models that aim to compensate for a loss in advertising revenues and the extinct business models. Further analysis gives a more detailed focus on paywalls and crowdfunding and the level of participation they provide, given that these are the most common innovations in the sample.

Paywalls: hard and soft

To monetize the digital content and create a viable business model, the media in Europe are also experimenting with different forms of paywall. This digital user payment scheme "acts as a barrier between an internet user and a news organization's online content" (Pickard and William, 2014: 195). Hard paywall means charging for all content on the site, while the soft paywall allows for more flexibility and free access to some content before charging (Carson, 2015; Pickard and Williams, 2014). Soft paywalls appear in various forms, such as the metered model - offering free access to a limited number of articles during the set period of time (Picard, 2014); or the premium model (also called 'freemium') - charging only for special content, like exclusive interviews, columns, deep analysis, *etc.* (Casero-Ripollés and Izquierdo-Castillo, 2013: 67); and micropayment - that allows readers to pay micro-amount to access individual articles within one publication or from a variety of publications, by their own choice.

The models we observed in Europe are diverse and relatively new, with many being introduced during the last two years. In the Czech Republic the business news website *iHned.cz*, part of the *Economia* publishing house, pioneered with charging for online content in 2014, allowing the free access up to 10 stories a month and some stories reported from news agencies. In 2016 they shifted from metered model to a hard paywall following disappointing results (Newman *et al.*, 2016). Hard paywall is also used by UK's *The Times* and the Irish *Sun*. However, it seems that soft paywalls, like metered or premium (freemium) model, in general are more common than the hard walls that leave no or very little content available for free. *The Irish Times* operates under the metered model, as well as the Italian *Corriere della Sera*. In Germany *Die Welt* recently moved from a metered paywall to a freemium one, and the latter is also utilized by German tabloid *Bild*, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* in France, and *Aftonbladet* in Sweden. Instead of paying for the content of an entire media outlet, people are also offered to buy a single piece from a digital newsstand. These initiatives are noted in Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia (*Piano*), Germany and Netherlands (*Blendle*), and Poland (*Webnalist*). They aggregate articles from a variety of newspapers and magazines and sell them on a pay-per-article basis (micro or

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[6] An interview with Matt McAlister, the *Guardian's* general manager of new digital businesses, published at: https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/contributoria-closes-but-its-team-still-sees-a-future-for-people-supported-journalism-/s2/a566305/ (12/03/2018).

nano-payments), or as a pay-per-day/month/year model. The Sweden-based magazine app for tablets and smartphones - *Readly* - is based on an all-you-can-read concept, that could also be described as a hardwall, allowing readers access unlimited magazines for a flat monthly fee.

Paywalls are trying to change the culture of "the free" that has consolidated on the web and makes users resistant to paying for online content (Casero-Ripollés and Izquierdo-Castillo, 2013; Goyanes, 2014). In an attempt to overcome this challenge, soft paywall models are offering their audiences personalized news and more quality content. However, it is hard to convince people to pay for online content, especially if they still have sufficient access to content for free. Also, it is hard to replicate seemingly successful models from one country to another, or even between media companies. For example, the *Piano Media*, which in Slovakia in 2011 introduced a paywall system for online media similar to those of the cable TV packages, and it seemed relatively promising model in its beginning[7], showed much less success when expanded in Slovenia. In 2012 this digital newsstand set up a metered paywall for a group of nine Slovenian publishers, requiring readers to pay EUR 4.89 per month for access to the majority of the country's journalism. With a population of two million and due to the fact the country has its own national language, Slovenia seemed as an ideal candidate for such an approach. However, *Piano* did not manage to attract all relevant media companies in the country to join this unified payable system, and to put enough content behind a paywall, which resulted in a low number of subscribers and consequently a low income for the media involved.

Table 1 provides an overview of the types of paywalls identified by the Monitor, categorized by the level of participation. We categorize hard paywalls on the low end of the participation spectrum since they treat users simply as paying consumers, without granting them any decision-making power regarding content. Some would also argue that these should not even be considered as innovation. Soft paywalls that allow readers to pay micro-amounts to access individual articles are put on the medium rung of participation since they give a certain extent of power to users to decide what media content to fund. The Dutch digital newsstand startup, *Blendle*, which enables users to purchase individual articles is also a case in point. The initiative started in 2014 and at first it was only possible to read Dutch newspapers and one magazine, but this increased rapidly. Since 2015 German newspapers are included and *Blendle* aims to offer more international newspapers in the future. The uniqueness of this approach, in comparison to other paywalls observed, is that it gives people more choice in deciding what content and from which media, or from which author they want to pay for. On the one hand, this can be seen as encouraging people in making more individual choices, but the general evidence suggest that paywalls still mainly divide audiences into those who can pay for more quality journalism and those who cannot (Pickard and Williams, 2014: 7).

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[7] The experiment ended in 2016.

Table 1. **Paywall initiatives identified by the Monitor categorized by the level of participation**

Low	Medium	High
Hard paywalls charging for all online content (*e.g. Readly*)	Soft paywalls allowing readers to pay micro-amounts to access individual articles (*e.g. Blendle*)	

Crowdfunding and crowdsourcing

Crowdfunding is the most common attempt of innovation. In 14 of 30 observed countries we identified the crowdfunding initiatives that are emerging and positioning themselves as an alternative not only to the traditional revenue sources for journalism, but also to the traditional model of conducting journalism. In some cases, crowdfunding even allows people to make decisions on which content should be backed. Most of the detected examples of crowdfunding, such as the French magazine *Médor* in Belgium, *Blank Spot Project* in Sweden, *Direct 36* in Hungary and *Pod črto* in Slovenia, offer long-form, analytical and/or investigative reporting.

According to the definition applied by the European Commission, crowdfunding is used for raising funds for a specific project from the public and is normally done online. The European Commission (2016: 8) distinguishes five different business models used by crowdfunding platforms: donation-based, investment-based, reward-based, lending-based, and invoice trading crowdfunding. The most widespread business model employed by the initiatives we detected through our research is the donation-based crowdfunding. Through donation-based crowdfunding individuals donate to meet the funding aim of a project without receiving any financial or material return (European Commission, 2016: 8).

We have found instances of two forms of donation-based crowdfunding: one-time campaigns used to acquire the start-up capital, create publicity and attract bigger investors; and crowdfunding with more continuity based on the interplay between journalists and the crowd. The Monitor data shows that one-time campaigns to raise money for specific causes are run both by smaller nonprofits focusing on investigative journalism and by established publishing companies. For example, in Slovenia, the *Pod črto* project ('The Bottom Line'), an independent and non-profit media outlet focusing on investigative reporting, ran a campaign in 2015 to raise 15,000 euros to finance six months of their activity. In the Czech Republic, the web-based channel *DVTV* in collaboration with the *Economia media house* launched a crowdfunding campaign in 2014 and raised over CZK 2 million (circa 74,000 euros).

There are also examples of initiatives that adopt crowdfunding as their *modus operandi*, as opposed to using it as an occasional fundraising tool. The German *Krautreporter* and the Dutch *De Correspondent* aim at developing a longer relationship with their users through fixed annual subscription fees and the *De Correspondent* news site claims to be created to cater to the needs of the reader, as opposed to pleasing advertisers and investors: "They wanted to make a newsroom that wouldn't rush to liveblog the aftermath

of a terrorist attack, but instead look at 'the bigger developments behind such an attack, such as social inequality'" (Bullard, 2016). Many of the initially successful crowdfunding initiatives last only for a few years, including some prominent examples like *Contributoria. com* and *Spot*.us. Insiders from the media industry emphasize that to make crowdfunding initiatives sustainable a lot of effort needs to be invested into promotion, moderation of commenting, and dealing with challenging users, as well as to ensure that the published pieces are of high quality.

In addition to donation-based crowdfunding, the Monitor also detects cases of investment-based crowdfunding, which means that a media organization issues equity instruments to crowd-investors through a platform. One of the prominent examples is the record-breaking *El Español*, the Spanish news site that raised 3,6 million euros through the sale of shares to over 5,600 shareholders. In this way readers, mostly small equity holders, have become investors. Pedro J Ramirez, the founder of *El Mundo*, one of the largest printed daily newspapers in Spain, is behind the *El Español*. Ramirez stated that he would listen to *El Espanol*'s small equity holders "who will have what he calls a 'shareholder button' so that they can comment directly on the site's output" (Badcock, 2015)[8]. From the financial point of view, the business model of *El Español*, relying on both advertising and subscriptions, can be seen as quite traditional. However, it is considered as innovation within the framework of this paper, as "existing knowledge is implemented in new contexts and (...) this opens up new possibilities" (Storsul and Krumsvik, 2013: 17).

The crowdfunding concept is closely related to crowdsourcing (see *e.g.* Carvajal *et al.,* 2012) and we have found several instances of innovations that combine both these tools. The Finnish crowdfunded *Rapport* enables readers to select which topics and journalists to fund, and to suggest future reporting themes. Likewise, *De Correspondent* is a crowdfunding platform and, at the same time, when its reporters are working on a story, they ask members to send in tips or ask questions. As the foregoing suggests, these media do not see their readers as simple consumers but rather as citizens with the right of expressing opinions and of contributing to the actual production of news. The *De Correspondent* manifesto asserts that the aim is to establish "a lasting and meaningful relationship with its readers. Seen as members of a community rather than simply consumers of content, readers will be asked to weigh in on the investment of new funds and encouraged to contribute their expertise on specific topics." (Bullard 2016; and *De Correspondent* undated).

In sum, we found many innovations in terms of crowdfunding and crowdsourcing. Table 2 provides an overview of the types of initiatives identified by the Monitor, categorized by the level of participation. Crowdfunding and crowdsourcing initiatives stretch across all levels of participation, from low, where users make donations without clear returns, to high, where users are empowered to decide which topics and journalists to fund. Some of the emerging innovations apply both crowdfunding and crowdsourcing tools, thereby contributing to redefining the role of the audience. These latter initiatives tend to establish a long-term relationship with their audience and involve them in the

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[8] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34416499 (27/03/2018).

news creation cycle, whereby it can be argued that people are perceived more as citizens than just consumers. It is worth noting that the most common types of crowdfunding identified by the Monitor are still donation-based crowdfunding, where users are involved to a very low degree. However, it should not be neglected that the vast majority of these crowdfunding initiatives offer analytical, investigative, and in general informative content that traditionally relates more with a citizen- than consumer-oriented approach.

Table 2. **Crowdfunding (CF) and crowdsourcing (CS) initiatives identified by the Monitor categorized by the level of participation**

Low	Medium	High
CF: Users make donations without clear returns (*e.g. DVTV*)	CF: users can become shareholders or 'crowd-investors' (*e.g. El Espanol*) CS: users can suggest reporting themes, send in tips or ask questions, contribute with their own expertise (*e.g. De Correspondent*)	CF: people can decide which topics and journalists to fund (*e.g. Rapport*)

CONCLUSION

The contribution of this paper is twofold: it maps media innovation across Europe, and represents a first attempt to understand whether media organizations seek to reinvent their relations with audiences through these innovations, or if they primarily look for a compensation for revenue loses. First, we analyzed both legacy media and completely new endeavors in thirty European countries with the support of the innovation radar (Sawhney *et al.*, 2006). The radar informed our initial analysis and helped us to identify the most vivid line of innovation in relation to 'customers'. Along this line of innovation, the most prominent cases were instances of crowdfunding and crowdsourcing, as well as paywalls.

Second, to understand if users are conceived primarily as citizens or as consumers in the instances of media innovation categorized mainly within the anchor of 'customers', we focused on the degree to which users are involved in production of content and in management of media organizations. We took inspiration in Jönsson and Örnebring's (2011) and IAP2 (2007) participation frameworks, distinguishing between media features that allow low, medium or high level of participation, and assumed that on the low end of the spectrum of participation users are considered as consumers, while on the medium and high ends users are increasingly seen as citizens.

Our analysis showed that crowdfunding and crowdsourcing innovations stretch across all levels of participation, from low, where users make donations without clear returns, to high, where users are empowered to decide which topics and journalists to fund. However, the most common types of crowdfunding detected were donation-based crowdfunding, where users are involved to a very low degree. From these findings we

conclude that although some of the innovations taking place in Europe are related to the civic values of media, they do not alter the relationship with audiences significantly, as in most cases they do not allow participation of users in the content- and business-related decision making. There are only a few cases of crowdfunding that strive for higher user engagement levels, *e.g.* involving users in decisions about topics, themes and personnel that would carry out journalistic work, while none of the observed paywall types qualifies for a higher level of participation.

Some study limitations need to be acknowledged. Our findings are based on the most prominent cases of innovation, noted and reported by national researchers. Furthermore, our simplified analytical framework allowed only for a basic understanding of the level of participation and empowerment of users. However, we hope that our findings can serve as a starting point for more in-depth research on media innovation and on relations between media and their users. In the future, a more nuanced assessment and more research into categorization and definition of different types of participation will be needed. Moreover, as pointed out by reviewers of this article, it would be interesting to examine what it means in practice to have news stories sponsored. Does crowdfunding allow audiences with most resources to control the news agenda? Is there a potential move towards an advertorial model? Or does crowdsourcing result in less special-interest influence on news?

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MEDIJSKA INOVACIJA U EUROPI I PREISPITIVANJE ODNOSA PREMA PUBLIKAMA: IZMEĐU GRAĐANA I POTROŠAČA

Iva Nenadić :: Alina Ostling

SAŽETAK *Razvoj i široka primjena novih tehnologija građanima je omogućila sudjelovanje u različitim fazama proizvodnje, distribucije i promocije vijesti i drugih sadržaja kao nikada ranije. Kako bi odgovorili na promjene u informacijskom okruženju, mediji i novinari pokušavaju uvesti inovacije u poslovni model. Stoga ovaj rad postavlja sljedeće pitanje : u pokušaju da preispitaju poslovni model, preispituju li mediji i novinari diljem Europe i svoj odnos s publikama? Preciznije, odnosi li se postojeća inovacija prema publikama prvenstveno kao prema građanima ili kao prema potrošačima? Analiza se temelji na podacima prikupljenima od nacionalnih istraživačkih timova kroz projekt* Media Pluralism Monitor 2016, *koji je proveden u 28 zemalja Europske unije, Crnoj Gori i Turskoj. Rezultati pokazuju kako su najvidljiviji pokušaji inovacije u obuhvaćenim državama* crowdfunding/crowdsourcing *i različite vrste* paywalla, *što se može tumačiti kao pokušaj da se od publike nadoknade smanjeni prihodi od oglašavanja. Istovremeno, tek nekoliko inicijativa značajnije preispituje svoj odnos s publikom, dajući im veću moć odlučivanja (bilo da se radi o odlučivanju o sadržaju ili o poslovnoj strategiji). Publike se u velikoj mjeri i dalje tretira primarno kao potrošače, a njihova razina participacije ostaje ograničena.*

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MEDIJSKA PISMENOST UČENIKA OSMIH RAZREDA U ZAGREBU

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SAŽETAK *Za kvalitetan suživot s medijima danas su osobito potrebne vještine medijske pismenosti. Pritom medijska pismenost podrazumijeva pristup medijima, analizu, vrednovanje i stvaranje medijskih sadržaja (Aufderheide, 1992). Za medijsko opismenjivanje djece ključno je medijsko obrazovanje. U hrvatskom se obrazovnom sustavu medijsko opismenjivanje ostvaruje kroz medijsku kulturu, jednu od sastavnica predmeta Hrvatski jezik, od prvog do osmog razreda. Iako je medijska kultura prisutna u nastavi Hrvatskoga jezika već dugi niz godina, ovo je tek prvo istraživanje o medijskoj pismenosti učenika osnovnih škola u Hrvatskoj. Istraživanje je provedeno na 1000 učenika osmih razreda na području grada Zagreba i pokazalo je da ti učenici posjeduju srednju razinu medijske pismenosti, pri čemu su najslabiji rezultati zabilježeni u području analiziranja i kritičkog vrednovanja te stvaranja medijskih sadržaja.*

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UVOD

Medijska pismenost, koja je rezultat medijskog obrazovanja (Pérez Tornero, 2008: 103), podrazumijeva pristup medijima te analizu, vrednovanje i stvaranje sadržaja (Aufderheide, 1992: 6) i danas se smatra jednim od ključnih oblika pismenosti 21. stoljeća. Svaka nova generacija djece „odrasta u okolini koja je bogatija medijima i pripadajućim sadržajima, zbog čega se mijenja i percepcija i potencijal medijskog utjecaja na djecu" (Ilišin, 2003: 10). Zbog toga se sve više ističe važnost medijskog obrazovanja čija je svrha „pomoći pojedincima svih dobnih skupina da razviju navike istraživanja i vještine izražavanja koje su im potrebne da bi bili kritični mislioci, učinkoviti komunikatori i aktivni građani u današnjem društvu" (Scheibe i Rogow, 2012: 36). Stoga Nada Zgrabljić Rotar (2005: 12) naglašava da medijska pismenost „mora biti promovirana kao najveći interes društva; djeci i mladima mora dati samopouzdanje i kreativnost u korištenju medija i razumijevanju simboličkih medijskih jezika, ekonomskih načela funkcioniranja medija i medijskog diskursa". Peter Krausz (2001, prema Covington, 2004: 121) ističe da će djeca koja neće biti medijski obrazovana zaostati u današnjem svijetu punom informacija pa se stoga „više ne postavlja pitanje je li nam potrebno podučavanje o medijima, već kako se ono može podučavati".

Kao i u mnogim državama Europske unije (vidi Pérez Tornero, 2014; ANR TRANSLIT COST, 2014) i u Hrvatskoj se medijsko obrazovanje djece ostvaruje primarno kroz medijsku kulturu, koja je jedna od sastavnica predmeta Hrvatski jezik, od prvog do osmog razreda. Glavne zadaće medijske kulture, prema Nastavnome planu i programu za osnovnu školu (Vican i Milanović Litre, 2006: 25), jesu: razvijanje sposobnosti komunikacije s medijima – kazalištem, filmom, televizijom, radijem, tiskom, stripom i računalom; recepcija kazališne predstave, filma, radijske i televizijske emisije te osposobljavanje učenika za vrednovanje radijskih i televizijskih emisija i filmskih ostvarenja. Navedeni model medijskog obrazovanja širi je od temeljne definicije medijske pismenosti jer osim masovnih medija podrazumijeva i učenje o kazalištu. Dosadašnja analiza nastavnih materijala o medijskoj kulturi iz Hrvatskoga jezika te dubinski intervjui provedeni s predavačima medijske kulture u školama – učiteljima razredne nastave i nastavnicima Hrvatskoga jezika (Ciboci, 2018) – pokazuje da je program medijske kulture, kao model medijskog obrazovanja u hrvatskim školama, zastario te da se kroz nastavne sadržaje učenike rijetko potiče na kritičko promišljanje i stvaranje vlastitih medijskih sadržaja. Istraživanje koje je 2013. godine provedeno među nastavnicima Hrvatskoga jezika u osnovnim školama (Ciboci i Osmančević, 2015) pokazalo je da čak 57,8 % nastavnika smatra da učenici nakon završetka osnovne škole nisu dovoljno medijski pismeni na temelju onoga što su naučili u sklopu nastave Hrvatskoga jezika. Međutim, do sada u Hrvatskoj nije postojalo istraživanje koje bi navedenu tvrdnju nastavnika zaista i potvrdilo. Naime, iako je medijska kultura prisutna u nastavi Hrvatskoga jezika već dugi niz godina, do danas nije provedeno ni jedno istraživanje kojim bi se testirala razina medijske pismenosti učenika. Upravo se zato ovaj rad usredotočuje na istraživanje medijske pismenosti učenika u hrvatskim školama, točnije u zagrebačkim školama.

Istraživanje je provedeno uz pomoć modificiranog upitnika[1] za vrednovanje medijske pismenosti koji je kreiran za potrebe istraživanja provedenog 2011. godine u svim državama članicama Europske unije. Navedeni je upitnik prilagođen hrvatskom modelu medijskog obrazovanja, a sve s ciljem utvrđivanja medijskih vještina koje učenici posjeduju na kraju obveznog osnovnoškolskog, a time i medijskog obrazovanja u Hrvatskoj. U istraživanju je sudjelovalo 1000 učenika osmih razreda na području grada Zagreba.

ISTRAŽIVANJA MEDIJSKE PISMENOSTI

Potreba za medijskim opismenjivanjem svih članova društva stvorila je također i potrebu za mjerenjem medijske pismenosti, što je nužno kako bi se utvrdio napredak u medijskom obrazovanju (Hobbs, 2010). Mjerenje medijske pismenosti prije svega podrazumijeva mjerenje tri ključna elementa: pristupa medijima, analize i kritičkog vrednovanja te stvaranja medijskih sadržaja. Navedeni su elementi proizašli iz jedne od najcitiranijih definicija medijske pismenosti prema kojoj ona podrazumijeva „sposobnost građanina da pristupi, analizira i stvara informacije za postizanje specifičnih rezultata" (Aufderheide, 1992: 6).

Na temelju brojnih ranije provedenih istraživanja Hadewijch Vanwynsberghe, Steve Paulussen i Pieter Verdegem (2011: 696) ističu da su za medijsku pismenost vrlo važni socioekonomski i sociodemografski čimbenici, pri čemu se pokazuje da „mladi, obrazovani i zdravi ljudi posjeduju višu razinu medijske pismenosti u usporedbi sa starijima, manje obrazovanima i ljudima lošijeg zdravlja". Navedena istraživanja pokazuju i da postoji snažna povezanost između razine medijske pismenosti i količine korištenja medija. Većina se dosadašnjih istraživanja kojima je mjerena medijska pismenost temeljila na anketnom upitniku (Vanwynsberghe i dr., 2011). Jedan od najvećih nedostataka takvih istraživanja jest taj da se rezultati temelje na samoprocjeni ispitanika, što ne mora uvijek odgovarati stvarnom znanju i vještinama ispitanika jer ljudi često precjenjuju vlastito znanje i vještine. Pozivajući se na Alexandera Van Deursena (2010), Vanwynsberghe i dr. (2011) ističu da se pri mjerenju medijske pismenosti preporučuje kombiniranje kvantitativnih i kvalitativnih istraživanja. Većina kvalitativnih istraživanja kojima je mjerena medijska pismenost uključuje promatranja i dubinske intervjue. Iako ona daju dublji uvid u stavove, razmišljanja, iskustva i samoprocjene ljudi, takva su istraživanja skupa, teško se primjenjuju na veliku skupinu ljudi te je ograničen broj pitanja zbog dužine provođenja istraživanja (Vanwynsberghe i dr., 2011).

Sonia Livingstone i Nancy Thumim (2003: 9) ističu kako je zbog različitih fokusa istraživanja, metoda i uzorka teško uspoređivati rezultate dosadašnjih istraživanja kojima je mjerena medijska pismenost. Većina je istraživanja usmjerena na samo jedan dio medijske pismenosti, „što onemogućuje stvaranje opće slike o medijskoj pismenosti" (Livingstone i Thumim, 2003: 9). Santiago Giraldo Luque i dr. (2014) naglašavaju kako je česti nedostatak istraživanja kojima se mjeri medijska pismenost to što isključuju tradicionalne medije te se

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[1] Originalni je upitnik bio namijenjen odrasloj populaciji, a u radu je korištena modificirana verzija upitnika prilagođena djeci, ali i hrvatskom obrazovnom sustavu, s naglaskom na sadržaje medijske kulture u nastavi Hrvatskoga jezika.

radije usredotočuju na tablete i mobitele, iako podaci ukazuju na to da ljudi i dalje u velikoj mjeri koriste tradicionalne medije, poput televizije.

Najviše dosadašnjih istraživanja bavilo se mjerenjem učestalosti korištenja medija i konzumiranja medijskih sadržaja, kao jednim dijelom medijske pismenosti, dok se ostali elementi najčešće ignoriraju. Sve veća količina vremena koju neka osoba provede uz medije može značiti da ta osoba s vremenom postaje sve iskusniji korisnik medijskih sadržaja, kao što i posjedovanje mobitela i drugih medijskih uređaja može podrazumijevati određene tehničke vještine – no to ipak, kako ističe Monica Bulger (2012), ne daje potpuni uvid u razinu medijske pismenosti građana neke države.

Mnogi su autori (primjerice, Arke i Primack, 2009; Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009a; Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009b; Dekelver, Nijs i De Maesschalck, 2014) pokušali izraditi metodološki alat za testiranje medijske pismenosti. Najobuhvatniji upitnik izrađen je u sklopu istraživanja kojim je mjerena razina medijske pismenosti odraslih u svim državama članicama Europske unije (Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009a: 4). Istraživanje je potaknula Europska komisija, a proveli su ga EAVI (European Association for Viewers Interests) i DTI (Danish Technological Institute). Studija sugerira da prilikom mjerenja medijske pismenosti u obzir treba uzeti individualne i društvene čimbenike. S jedne strane, medijska pismenost pojedinca ovisi o osobnoj sposobnosti analiziranja i kritičkog vrednovanja te stvaranja medijskih sadržaja, kao i o sposobnosti komuniciranja uz pomoć medija, dok se društveni čimbenici odnose na „dostupnost informacija, medijske politike, obrazovanje te ulogu i odgovornost dionika uključenih u medijsku zajednicu" (Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009a: 7). Paolo Celot i José Manuel Pérez Tornero (2009a: 8) navedene čimbenike prikazuju kroz model piramide na čijem su dnu grupirani dostupnost informacija iz različitih medija, pluralizam i sloboda izražavanja te medijski odgoj, politike medijske pismenosti, civilno društvo i medijska industrija. Indikatori medijskog odgoja podrazumijevaju prisutnost medijske pismenosti u školskom kurikulu, obrazovanje nastavnika o medijskoj pismenosti, aktivnosti medijske pismenosti te dostupnost didaktičkih nastavnih materijala o medijskoj pismenosti (*ibid*.: 48). Indikatori politika medijske pismenosti podrazumijevaju prisutnost regulatornih tijela u državi, njihove pravne ovlasti i zaduženja te aktivnosti na području medijske pismenosti (*ibid*.). Kada se govori o civilnom društvu, među indikatorima se nalaze organizacije koje su aktivne u području medijske pismenosti, zatim same aktivnosti medijske pismenosti koje su razvile te organizacije civilnog društva te na kraju njihova međusobna suradnja (*ibid*.). Indikatori medijske industrije podrazumijevaju prisutnost novina, televizijskih kanala, filmskih festivala, telefonskih kompanija, pružatelja internetskih usluga te drugih organizacija (*ibid*.). Na piramidi se potom nalaze individualne kompetencije koje prije svega podrazumijevaju tehničke vještine korištenja medija i medijskih sadržaja (računalne vještine i vještine korištenja interneta; učestalost korištenja medija; kupovanje na internetu, internetsko bankarstvo te čitanje vijesti na internetu). Te su vještine ključne za analizu i kritičko vrednovanje medijskih sadržaja, ali i za ono što se nalazi na samom vrhu piramide – korištenje medija za komunikaciju, odnosno održavanje i stvaranje društvenih odnosa te kreiranje vlastitih medijskih sadržaja (*ibid*.: 8). Dok korištenje medija podrazumijeva znanje o medijima i vještine korištenja medija,

kritičko se vrednovanje sastoji od tri ključne komponente: znanja o medijima i medijskoj regulaciji, korisničkog ponašanja (aktivno korištenje i pretraživanje informacija) te razumijevanja medijskog sadržaja.

Snažna je povezanost između individualnih i društvenih čimbenika, jer bez društvenih čimbenika, poput čvrstih temelja politike medijske pismenosti, ne može se očekivati ni visoka razina individualnih kompetencija medijske pismenosti (*ibid*.: 12). U istraživanju su društvene čimbenike procjenjivali stručnjaci iz svih država uključenih u istraživanje, nakon čega su kvalitativni podaci pretvoreni u kvantitativne (*ibid*.: 61-63).

Istraživanjem su predviđene tri razine medijske pismenosti: osnovna, srednja i napredna (Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009b: 14). Razine su određene prema rezultatima Eurostata o korištenju računala među građanima država članica Europske unije (Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009a: 57-58). Pod osnovnom se razinom medijske pismenosti podrazumijeva da društveno okruženje ne potiče razvoj medijske pismenosti, dok na individualnoj razini to znači da pojedinac posjeduje tek osnovne vještine korištenja medija i poznaje samo osnovne medijske funkcije, a pristup medijima je ograničen. Ograničena je i sposobnost pojedinca za kritičku analizu informacije, ali i korištenje medija u komunikacijske svrhe. Srednja razina medijske pismenosti podrazumijeva da u društvu postoje određeni poticaji za razvoj medijske pismenosti, ali su oni nepravilni i nedosljedni. Srednja razina medijske pismenosti na individualnoj razini pretpostavlja da pojedinac lako koristi medije, poznaje njihove funkcije i sposoban je uz pomoć medija odraditi i složenije radnje. U odnosu na prethodnu razinu, proširen je raspon korištenja medija, a pojedinac zna kako doći do informacije, ali i vrednovati je. Napredna razina medijske pismenosti pretpostavlja izvrsno društveno okruženje koje potiče razvoj medijske pismenosti. Pojedinac je vrlo aktivan u korištenju medija, dobro poznaje pravne preduvjete za njihovo korištenje te posjeduje veliko tehnološko i jezično znanje o korištenju medija te je sposoban maksimalno iskoristiti medije u komunikacijske svrhe (Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009b: 14).

Pilot-istraživanje pokazalo je da unutar Europe postoje velike razlike u razini medijske pismenosti, što je, između ostaloga, posljedica različitih medijskih kultura pojedinih država. Tako, primjerice, najvišu razinu medijskih kompetencija imaju građani skandinavskih država, građani država srednje Europe posjeduju srednju razinu medijske pismenosti, dok je najniži stupanj medijske pismenosti zabilježen u državama južne i istočne Europe. Autori zaključuju kako su najbolji rezultati postignuti u državama s visokim stupnjem demokracije, društvenog i ekonomskog blagostanja te s dobro razvijenom infrastrukturom (Celot i Pérez Tornero, 2009a: 12).

Iako je veliki broj istraživača prihvatio upitnik koji su kreirali EAVI i DTI, Bulger (2012) ga kritizira i navodi njegove nedostatke. Budući da se ocjena stanja politika medijske pismenosti te medijskog obrazovanja temelji na subjektivnoj procjeni stručnjaka među kojima ne mora postojati suglasnost, autorica smatra da se navedeni podaci ne mogu uspoređivati te da mogu ugroziti valjanost kvantitativnih podataka dobivenih upitnikom. Bulger (2012: 99) je stoga isključila parametre koji su se odnosili na politike medijske pismenosti

i medijsko obrazovanje te zaključila da bi za valjano kreiranje indikatora kojima se mjeri medijska pismenost trebalo pet godina uzastopno provoditi istraživanja u državama članicama Europske unije, nakon čega bi se kreirala sažeta lista indikatora za adekvatno mjerenje medijske pismenost (u izvornom upitniku ih je 58).

No, bez obzira na kritike, navedeni je upitnik još uvijek najobuhvatniji upitnik za testiranje medijske pismenosti, zbog čega je i korišten kao osnova za izradu upitnika u ovom istraživanju.

MJERENJE MEDIJSKE PISMENOSTI UČENIKA OSMIH RAZREDA NA PODRUČJU GRADA ZAGREBA

Glavni cilj istraživanja bio je utvrditi razinu medijske pismenosti učenika osmih razreda na kraju obveznog osnovnoškolskog, a time i medijskog obrazovanja, kako bi se utvrdila učinkovitost programa medijske kulture – tzv. hrvatskog modela medijskog obrazovanja, predviđenog planom i programom Hrvatskoga jezika – u medijskom opismenjivanju učenika u hrvatskim osnovnim školama. Sekundarni ciljevi bili su istražiti koliko učenici osmih razreda imaju pristup različitim vrstama medija, koliko često stvaraju svoje vlastite sadržaje te znaju li analizirati i kritički vrednovati medijske sadržaje. Pritom su postavljena dva ključna istraživačka pitanja:

1. Kakva je sposobnost kritičkog razumijevanja medijskih sadržaja učenika osmih razreda na području grada Zagreba?
2. Koliko često učenici osmih razreda na području grada Zagreba stvaraju vlastite medijske sadržaje?

U istraživanju je sudjelovalo 1000 učenika osmih razreda generacije 2014./2015. na području grada Zagreba, što je 13 % od ukupnog broja djece te dobi u gradu Zagrebu prema popisu stanovništva iz 2011. godine (Državni zavod za statistiku, 2013: 52).[2] U istraživanju je sudjelovalo 522 dječaka i 478 djevojčica, sukladno omjeru broja djevojčica i dječaka u toj generaciji prema popisu stanovništva iz 2011. godine (Državni zavod za statistiku, 2013: 672). U uzorku je podjednak broj učenika i učenica (χ^2 = 1.94, ss = 1, p > 0.05).

Istraživanje je provedeno u svih 17 gradskih četvrti grada Zagreba. Iz svake gradske četvrti uključen je reprezentativan broj učenika osmih razreda, odnosno udio učenika zastupljenih u uzorku proporcionalan je udjelima po gradskim četvrtima. Omjer učenika u svakoj gradskoj četvrti određen je na temelju popisa broja učenika i razrednih odjeljenja u svakoj četvrti grada Zagreba Gradskog ureda za obrazovanje, kulturu i šport iz 2014. U trenutku provedbe istraživanja u gradu Zagrebu postojalo je 108 javnih osnovnih škola. Sve su škole podijeljene po gradskim četvrtima i potom su metodom slučajnog odabira u svih 17 gradskih četvrti odabrane škole u kojima će se provesti istraživanje. U istraživanju su sudjelovali učenici iz 34 osnovne škole.

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[2] Prema zadnjem popisu stanovništva iz 2011. godine u Zagrebu živi najveći broj djece te dobi (17 % djece) u odnosu na čitavu Hrvatsku.

Za potrebe istraživanja provedena je univarijatna (frekvencije i postoci odgovora) i bivarijatna analiza (izračunavanje značajnosti razlika upotrebom χ^2-testa i t-testa).

Upitnik korišten u istraživanju

Upitnik korišten u ovom radu proizašao je iz spomenutog anketnog upitnika na temelju kojeg je provedeno istraživanje među svim državama članicama Europske unije (EAVI i DTI, 2011).[3] Budući da navedeni upitnik nije korišten u istraživanju medijske pismenosti djece, nego samo u istraživanju medijske pismenosti odraslih, bilo je potrebno unijeti određene izmjene. Osim što se upitnik nastojao prilagoditi djeci[4], bilo je važno i prilagoditi ga sadržajima medijske kulture u nastavi Hrvatskoga jezika kako bi se utvrdila usvojenost sadržaja iz medijske kulture[5] kao dijela nastave Hrvatskoga jezika u osnovnim školama kroz koji djeca stječu medijske kompetencije. Budući da se medijsko opismenjivanje u hrvatskome obrazovnom sustavu provodi isključivo kroz nastavu medijske kulture, ovim istraživanjem bilo je važno analizirati usvojenost navedenih sadržaja, kroz ključne sastavnice medijske pismenosti, sukladno već spomenutoj definiciji medijske pismenosti Patricije Aufderheide (1992).

Pristup medijima ključan je za ostvarenje ostalih elemenata medijske pismenosti – analize i kritičkog vrednovanja te stvaranja medijskih sadržaja. Stoga su prvi dio upitnika činila pitanja pomoću kojih je analizirano kojim medijima i uređajima učenici osmih razreda imaju pristup kod kuće i u svojoj sobi, posjeduju li pametni telefon te koliko često koriste pojedine uređaje i medije. Ovim je setom pitanja bilo važno odrediti i koliko vremena djeca provode uz pojedine medije. Drugi dio upitnika činila su pitanja pomoću kojih je analizirano poznavanje medija i medijskih sadržaja kako bi se, prije svega, utvrdila usvojenost sadržaja iz medijske kulture među učenicima osmih razreda. Dio je pitanja kreiran sukladno sadržajima medijske kulture, dok su dva pitanja preuzeta iz originalnog upitnika. Učenici su, između ostalog, morali pokazati prepoznaju li masovne medije, koliko su upoznati s načinom na koji zakoni reguliraju medije, ali i procijeniti koliko dobro poznaju određene medije. Treći dio upitnika činila su pitanja pomoću kojih je ispitana sposobnost analize i kritičkog vrednovanja medija i medijskih sadržaja među učenicima osmih razreda, što mnogi smatraju najvažnijim segmentom medijske pismenosti. Učenici su morali pokazati koliko vjeruju pojedinim medijima, razlikuju li stvarne i fiktivne sadržaje, ali i koliko često nasjedaju na manipulativne medijske sadržaje. Četvrti dio upitnika činila su pitanja pomoću kojih je analizirano koliko učenici osmih razreda stvaraju vlastite medijske sadržaje i na taj način ostvaruju vlastita komunikacijska prava. Cjeloviti upitnik donosi se u Dodatku ovog rada.

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3 Cjelovit upitnik nalazi se u Dodatku. Zvjezdicom (*) su označena pitanja koja su preuzeta iz originalnog upitnika.
4 Iz originalnog su upitnika uklonjeni dijelovi koji su se, primjerice, odnosili na političku participaciju.
5 Sadržaji medijske kulture detaljno su analizirani u sklopu doktorske disertacije *Vrjednovanje programa medijske kulture u medijskom opismenjivanju učenika osnovnih škola* Lane Ciboci (2018). Metodom analize sadržaja analizirane su sve nastavne jedinice o medijskoj kulturi u udžbenicima i dopunskim nastavnim materijalima iz Kataloga obveznih udžbenika i pripadajućih dopunskih nastavnih sredstava za Hrvatski jezik za šk. god. 2014./2015. od prvog do osmog razreda kako bi se utvrdio sadržaj medijske kulture u svim razredima u osnovnoj školi. Analizirana su 83 udžbenika i 46 radnih bilježnica nakladnih kuća Školska knjiga, Profil, Ljevak i Alfa, odnosno 1852 nastavne jedinice iz Hrvatskoga jezika.

REZULTATI ISTRAŽIVANJA I RASPRAVA

Pristup medijima

Većina zagrebačkih učenika osmih razreda ima pristup gotovo svim medijima u svojim kućanstvima (u prosjeku učenici kod kuće imaju 6.09 [SD = 0.91] od 7 navedenih uređaja), pri čemu su rezultati istraživanja pokazali da dječaci u odnosu na djevojčice u svojoj kući imaju više medija i uređaja (t = 8.28, ss = 998, p < 0.01). Naime, dok su dječaci naveli da u svojoj kući imaju 6.31 (SD = 0.84) uređaja, djevojčice su istaknule da imaju 5.85 (SD = 0.92) od sedam navedenih uređaja. Nema statistički značajne razlike u posjedovanju televizora (χ^2 = 0.30, ss = 1, p > 0.05), računala (χ^2 = 1.30, ss = 1, p > 0.05), interneta (χ^2 = 0.25, ss = 1, p > 0.05), mobitela (χ^2 = 0.92, ss = 1, p > 0.05), tableta (χ^2 = 3.34, ss = 1, p > 0.05) i radija (χ^2 = 0.86, ss = 1, p > 0.05) među djevojčicama i dječacima. Igraće konzole znatno su više prisutne u domovima dječaka nego u domovima djevojčica (χ^2 = 145.97, ss = 1, p < 0.01).

Tablica 1. **Pristup medijima u kućanstvu i u vlastitoj sobi (N = 1000)**

	Mediji u kućanstvu						Mediji u vlastitoj sobi					
	Dječaci		Djevojčice		Ukupno		Dječaci		Djevojčice		Ukupno	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Televizija	520	99,6	475	99,4	995	99,5	310	60,0	217	45,6	527	53,1
Računalo	515	98,7	467	97,7	982	98,2	357	69,1	267	56,1	624	62,8
Internet	520	99,6	477	99,8	997	99,7	458	88,6	416	87,4	874	88,0
Mobitel	521	99,8	478	100	999	99,9	506	97,9	472	99,2	978	98,5
Tablet	372	71,3	315	65,9	687	68,7	261	50,5	193	40,5	454	45,7
Radio	453	86,8	405	84,7	858	85,8	142	27,5	114	23,9	256	25,8
Igraća konzola	394	75,5	180	37,7	574	57,4	250	48,4	37	7,8	287	28,9

Rezultati ovog istraživanja pokazali su da mnogi učenici osmih razreda na području grada Zagreba posjeduju medije u vlastitim sobama, čime je i roditeljski nadzor nad korištenjem tih medija otežan, pri čemu dječaci u odnosu na djevojčice u svojoj sobi imaju više medija i uređaja (t = 8.38, ss = 998, p < 0.01). U prosjeku učenici u svojoj sobi imaju i koriste četiri (SD = 1.53) od sedam navedenih uređaja. Pritom dječaci u svojoj sobi posjeduju 4.38 (SD = 1.63), a djevojčice 3.59 (SD = 1.3), od sedam navedenih uređaja. Dječaci i djevojčice podjednako često posjeduju u svojim sobama mobitel (χ^2 = 3.80, ss = 1, p > 0.05) i pristup internetu (χ^2 = 0.11, ss = 1, p > 0.05). No, pokazalo se da televizor (χ^2 = 19.59, ss = 1, p < 0.01), računalo (χ^2 = 16.71, ss = 1, p < 0.01), tablet (χ^2 = 9.32, ss = 1, p < 0.01) i igraću konzolu (χ^2 = 196.58, ss = 1, p < 0.01) u sobama češće posjeduju dječaci nego djevojčice.

Većina učenika (91,2 %) osmih razreda u Zagrebu svakodnevno koristi mobitel. Pritom su rezultati pokazali da djevojčice statistički značajno češće koriste mobitel u odnosu na dječake (t = 2.95, ss = 998, p < 0.01). Svakodnevno televiziju gleda 77,9 % djece, a njih 75,6 % svakodnevno pretražuje internetske sadržaje na svojim mobitelima, pri čemu nije uočena statistički značajna razlika među djevojčicama i dječacima. Istraživanje je pokazalo i da

55,8 % učenika osmih razreda svakodnevno pretražuje internet na drugim uređajima, pri čemu je uočeno da dječaci statistički značajno češće koriste internet na nekom drugom uređaju (t = 3.72, ss = 998, p < 0.01) u odnosu na djevojčice.

Učenici osmih razreda redovito provode vrijeme i na društvenim mrežama. Čak 75,3 % učenika svakodnevno provodi vrijeme na društvenim mrežama. Na dnevnoj bazi djevojčice su statistički značajno aktivnije na društvenim mrežama od dječaka te su rezultati pokazali da djevojčice statistički značajno češće koriste društvene mreže (t = 5.72, ss = 998, p < 0.01). Osim što na mobitelu pretražuju internetske sadržaje, djeca vrlo često mobitel koriste za igranje igrica: 47,5 % učenika osmih razreda svakodnevno igra igrice na mobitelu. Uočeno je da u navikama igranja igrica na mobitelu među dječacima i djevojčicama postoje određene razlike, odnosno da dječaci statistički značajno češće igraju igrice na mobitelu (t = 7.70, ss = 998, p < 0.01) od djevojčica. Osim na mobitelu, djeca često igraju videoigre i računalne igre na drugim uređajima. Naime, 32,1 % učenika svakodnevno igra videoigre i računalne igre, pri čemu dječaci statistički značajno češće igraju računalne igre i videoigre (t = 15.29, ss = 998, p < 0.01) u odnosu na djevojčice.

Rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da su tradicionalni mediji puno manje zastupljeni u životima učenika osmih razreda od novih medija. Naime, svakodnevno radio sluša tek 27,6 % učenika osmih razreda, dok ih samo 8,8 % svakodnevno čita novine. Pritom dječaci statistički značajno češće čitaju novine u odnosu na djevojčice (t = 3.58, ss = 998, p < 0.01).

Tablica 2. *Koliko ste često u posljednjih mjesec dana radili sljedeće aktivnosti?* – usporedni prikaz djevojčica i dječaka

	Svaki dan		Nekoliko puta tjedno		Jednom tjedno		Nekoliko puta mjesečno		Ni jednom		Ne znam	
	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bili u kinu	0,8	0,0	0,4	0,2	5,6	1,3	48,5	44,1	30,1	34,1	14,8	20,3
Bili u kazalištu	0,6	0,2	0,0	0,4	1,0	1,7	14,0	17,8	63,9	55,8	20,5	23,3
Čitali knjigu	5,8	12,6	10,4	18,8	11,9	10,9	36,2	34,5	24,8	13,8	11,0	9,4
Gledali televiziju	79,8	75,9	14,0	17,6	2,3	3,4	2,5	2,3	1,0	0,6	0,4	0,2
Slušali radio	23,8	31,8	24,8	21,1	10,7	9,5	11,3	11,2	20,9	16,6	8,4	9,9
Čitali novine	11,6	5,7	16,1	10,9	17,6	15,4	15,3	16,4	30,2	38,7	9,3	12,8
Igrali videoigru ili računalnu igru	50,9	11,6	29,3	18,5	6,0	12,0	7,1	16,4	5,4	29,7	1,3	11,8
Koristili mobitel (poruke, glazba)	86,8	96,0	8,2	2,3	0,2	0,8	1,5	0,0	2,3	0,6	1,0	0,2
Igrali igre na mobitelu	59,8	34,1	19,2	21,1	7,1	7,6	5,0	12,4	8,0	19,2	1,0	5,7

	Svaki dan		Nekoliko puta tjedno		Jednom tjedno		Nekoliko puta mjesečno		Ni jednom		Ne znam	
	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Dječaci	Djevojčice
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Koristili internet na mobitelu za pretraživanje	76,6	74,4	14,3	14,9	2,1	4,6	1,9	2,5	4,2	1,7	0,8	1,9
Koristili internet na nekom drugom uređaju	64,8	45,9	20,8	22,9	4,8	12,6	4,2	10,5	2,5	4,6	2,9	3,6
Provodili vrijeme na društvenim mrežama	66,5	84,9	18,4	9,2	3,3	1,5	2,9	1,7	7,5	2,1	1,5	0,6

Iako su rezultati pokazali da učenici osmih razreda imaju pristup te često koriste medije, to nužno ne znači i da posjeduju visoku razinu znanja o medijima.

Znanje o medijima

Istraživanje je pokazalo da dječaci i djevojčice imaju podjednaka znanja o medijima (t = 1.16, df = 998, p > 0.05). Čak 92,5 % zagrebačkih učenika prepoznalo je televiziju, 77,3 % novine, 59 % radio, a 59,5 % internet kao masovni medij. No, jako puno učenika medijima smatra i uređaje pomoću kojih se pristupa pojedinim masovnim medijima. Tako je čak 62,3 % učenika navelo računalo kao masovni medij, 51,3 % mobitel, 31,5 % tablet, a bilo je čak i onih koji su među masovne medije uvrstili zvučnike, projektor i mikrofon. U prepoznavanju medija nije uočena statistički značajna razlika između dječaka i djevojčica (t = 0.56, df = 997, p > 0.05).

Učenici osmih razreda, prema vlastitoj procjeni, nedovoljno poznaju masovne medije. Naime, zagrebački učenici osmih razreda procjenjuju da najviše znaju o internetu (prosječna ocjena 4,41) i televiziji (4,17), dok najmanje poznaju radijski medij (2,79) i novine (2,80). Pritom dječaci svoje poznavanje medija ocjenjuju višim ocjenama u usporedbi s djevojčicama (t = 3.72, df = 998, p < 0.01). Rezultati su pokazali da dječaci i djevojčice podjednako procjenjuju da poznaju radio i televiziju, dok su dječaci procijenili da poznaju novine (t = 4.01, df = 998, p < 0.01) i internet (t = 3.18, df = 998, p < 0.01) bolje nego što su djevojčice procijenile da poznaju novine i internet.

Osim samoprocjene vlastitoga znanja, što je preuzeto iz originalnog upitnika, upitnikom je mjereno i stvarno znanje učenika. Analizirano je koliko učenici poznaju vrste i učestalost izlaženja medija, s naglaskom na novine i časopise, što detaljno uče u sklopu medijske kulture u osnovnoj školi. Rezultati su pokazali da većina učenika poznaje učesta-

lost izlaženja pojedinih medija te da djevojčice točnije prepoznaju vrstu medija (t = 10.64, df = 998, p < 0.01).

Tablica 3. **Poznavanje učestalosti izlaženja medijskih sadržaja (N = 984)**

	Dječaci (N = 506)		Djevojčice (N = 478)		Ukupno (N = 984)	
	f	%	f	%	f	%
Jutarnji list	475	93,9	469	98,1	**944**	**95,9**
Novi list	403	79,6	389	81,4	**792**	**80,5**
Globus	253	50,0	288	60,3	**541**	**55,0**
Story	291	57,5	304	63,6	**595**	**60,5**
Glorija	306	60,5	326	68,2	**632**	**64,2**
Ok!	339	67,0	461	96,4	**800**	**81,3**
Teen	318	62,8	453	94,8	**771**	**78,4**

Osim poznavanja vrsta medija s obzirom na učestalost njihova izlaženja, istraživanjem je analizirano i koliko učenici osmih razreda posjeduju znanja o različitim karakteristikama medija. Pritom su rezultati pokazali da dječaci i djevojčice imaju podjednaka znanja o medijima (t = 1.16, df = 998, p > 0.05). Razlike između djevojčica i dječaka uočene su na dvije tvrdnje. Pokazalo se da djevojčice češće znaju da prvi film nije snimio Nikola Tesla (t = 4.37, df = 998, p < 0.01), a dječaci češće prepoznaju filmske žanrove (t = 3.55, df = 998, p < 0.01). Nadalje, najviše je učenika znalo da informacije na Wikipediji nisu uvijek točne te da nije dobro dijeliti lozinke svojih profila na društvenim mrežama s najbližim prijateljima. Iako se u hrvatskim školama puno govori o *cyberbullyingu*, svaki četvrti učenik nije znao što taj termin znači. Pokazalo se i da učenici ne znaju razliku između javne i komercijalne televizije.

Tablica 4. **Poznavanje karakteristika medija (N = 1000)**

	Da			Ne			Ne znam		
	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
HRT je komercijalna televizija.	22,2	21,1	**21,7**	43,3	36,8	**40,2**	33,5	42,1	**38,1**
U medijima se ne smiju razotkrivati podaci djece mlađe od 14 godina kada se izvještava o nesrećama.	48,1	51,0	**49,5**	16,5	15,1	**15,8**	36,0	34,0	**35,0**
Prvi film u povijesti snimio je Nikola Tesla.	2,3	0	**1,2**	76,2	68,2	**72,4**	21,5	31,8	**26,4**

▶▶

	Da			Ne			Ne znam		
	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ako na društvenim mrežama uvrijedi prijatelja ili prijateljicu, moj prijatelj ne može biti kažnjen.	20,5	21,5	**21,0**	50,4	44,4	**47,5**	29,1	34,1	**31,5**
Svaka reklama na televiziji i radiju mora biti jasno označena da znamo da je to reklama.	44,4	47,3	**45,8**	36,8	28,2	**32,7**	18,8	24,5	**21,5**
Naklada ili tiraža je tiskani broj primjeraka nekih novina koji ovisi o broju kupaca.	23,6	18,8	**21,3**	11,9	11,5	**11,7**	64,6	69,5	**66,9**
Radio je besplatni medij.	65,3	69,9	**67,5**	17,6	11,1	**14,5**	17,0	19,0	**18,0**
Animirani, dokumentarni i igrani film su vrste filmskih rodova (žanrova).	79,3	88,1	**83,5**	7,1	4,0	**5,6**	13,6	7,9	**10,9**
Cyberbullying je pojam kojim se označava dobro poznavanje novih medija.	5,2	3,8	**4,5**	75,1	70,7	**73,0**	19,7	25,5	**22,5**
Informacije koje pronađem na internetu smijem koristiti bez navođenja izvora.	32,8	26,8	**29,9**	43,3	46,9	**45,0**	23,9	26,4	**25,1**
Informacije na Wikipediji su uvijek točne.	11,3	6,3	**8,9**	81,8	89,3	**85,4**	6,9	4,4	**5,7**
Dobro je dijeliti lozinke svojih profila na društvenim mrežama, *online* igrama itd. s najbližim prijateljima.	6,3	2,7	**4,6**	87,7	94,6	**91,0**	5,9	2,7	**4,4**

Istraživanje je također pokazalo da učenici osmih razreda na području Zagreba nisu dovoljno upoznati s osnovnim zakonskim propisima o sadržajima koji se objavljuju u medijima. Naime, svaki treći učenik, a na pojedina pitanja svaki četvrti učenik odgovorio je da ne zna što je zakonom dopušteno odnosno zabranjeno činiti u medijima. S druge strane, osim što mnogo učenika nije upoznato s navedenim sadržajima, puno je njih netočno odgovorilo na postavljena pitanja. Tako je 20,9 % učenika reklo da zakonom nije propisano što je dopušteno oglašavati, 12,6 % učenika smatra da je zakonom dopušteno u medijima prikazivati žene i muškarce na ponižavajući način, 23,3 % učenika je reklo da zakoni ne propisuju vrstu sadržaja koji se smiju odnosno ne smiju prikazivati u medijima (poput nasilnih sadržaja), dok 26,4 % učenika smatra da zakonom nije zabranjeno preuzimanje filmova i glazbe s interneta.

Analiza i kritičko vrednovanje medijskih sadržaja

Pri definiranju medijske pismenosti mnogi autori (Macedo i Steinberg, 2007; Potter, 2014; Pungente, 1996; Scheibe i Rogow, 2012; Silverblatt, 2001) naglašavaju važnost analiziranja i kritičkog promišljanja o medijskim sadržajima. Istraživanje je pokazalo da djevojčice više analiziraju i kritički vrednuju medije (t = 5.05, df = 998, p < 0.01). Poznavanje medija, odnosno povjerenje u informacije koje se prenose putem medija, jedan je od pokazatelja kritičkog promišljanja o medijima. Istraživanjem je analizirano koliko djeca vjeruju informacijama koje dobivaju iz medija, odnosno koliko smatraju da su informacije koje dobivaju iz različitih vrsta medija (ne)pouzdane. Prema istraživanju dječaci u odnosu na djevojčice više vjeruju u pouzdanost informacija iz medija (t = 2.28, df = 998, p < 0.05). Učenici osmih razreda na području grada Zagreba smatraju da su informacije s interneta (3,36) najmanje pouzdane, odnosno njihova je procjena da su one niti pouzdane niti nepouzdane, dok je povjerenje u ostale medije gotovo identično. Naime, učenici osmih razreda procjenjuju da su informacije koje donose radio (3,76), televizija (3,73) i novine (3,60) uglavnom pouzdane (vidi tablicu 5). Informacije u novinama, na radiju i na internetu dječaci i djevojčice smatraju podjednako pouzdanima. U odnosu na djevojčice dječaci više smatraju da su informacije na televiziji pouzdane (t = 2.77, df = 998, p < 0.01).

Tablica 5. **Pouzdanost informacija koje nude pojedini mediji – razlike između djevojčica i dječaka (N = 1000)**

	Spol	N	M	σ	t	df	p
Novine	Muški	522	3,64	,843	1,735	998	,083
	Ženski	478	3,55	,788			
Radio	Muški	522	3,77	,785	,581	998	,561
	Ženski	478	3,74	,712			
Televizija	Muški	522	3,80	,885	2,770	998	,006
	Ženski	478	3,65	,819			
Internet	Muški	522	3,39	1,034	1,160	998	,246
	Ženski	478	3,32	,938			

Posljednjih se godina više nego ikad govori o promoviranju lažnih ideala ljepote u medijima, zbog čega nerijetko žene i muškarci osjećaju pritisak da moraju dosegnuti određene ideale ljepote. Takvi prikazi utječu na djecu i adolescente (Dittmar, Halliwell i Ive, 2006; Hayes i Tantleff-Dunn, 2010). Rezultati ovog istraživanja pokazali su da je 79,7 % zagrebačkih učenika pomislilo da osoba koju, primjerice, gledaju na televizijskom ekranu ne izgleda tako i u stvarnom svijetu, što pokazuje da su učenici svjesni činjenice da se izgled neke osobe u medijima ne podudara uvijek s njezinim izgledom u stvarnosti. Pritom su rezultati pokazali da djevojčice češće u odnosu na dječake misle da osoba na televiziji ne izgleda tako u stvarnom svijetu (t = 4.51, ss = 998, p < 0.01).

Tablica 6. *Jesi li ikad pri korištenju medija (primjerice prilikom gledanja televizije) pomislio/pomislila sljedeće?* – usporedni prikaz djevojčica i dječaka (N = 1000)

	Da			Ne			Ne znam		
	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno	Dječaci	Djevojčice	Ukupno
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
„Ovo je napravljeno kako bih pomislio/pomislila da je pušenje *cool*."	25,1	25,5	**25,3**	57,3	51,9	**54,7**	17,6	22,6	**20,0**
„Ovo je zapravo oglas, iako je napravljen na način da ne izgleda tako."	54,2	47,7	**51,1**	21,8	27,0	**24,3**	23,9	25,3	**24,6**
„Ovako ta osoba ne izgleda u stvarnom svijetu."	74,9	84,9	**79,7**	14,8	6,3	**10,7**	10,3	8,8	**9,6**

Kritičko vrednovanje medijskih sadržaja podrazumijeva i svijest o manipulativnim tehnikama koje se koriste u medijima, poput prikrivenih oglasa. Istraživanje je pokazalo da je 51,1 % učenika svjesno tzv. prikrivenih oglasa, odnosno oglasa koji su napravljeni tako da ne izgledaju kao oglasi. Pritom dječaci češće misle da je nešto oglas, iako je napravljen tako da ne izgleda kao oglas (t = 2.23, df = 998, p < 0.05). Rezultati istraživanja pokazali su i da učenici osmih razreda nisu upoznati s mogućnošću da se kroz različite medijske sadržaje medijskim korisnicima nameću različite životne vrijednosti. Tako je tek 25,3 % učenika prilikom korištenja medija i medijskih sadržaja pomislilo da su neki sadržaji napravljeni tako da bi pomislili da je pušenje *cool*. Pritom nije uočena statistički značajna razlika u razmišljanjima između djevojčica i dječaka (t = -1.09, df = 998, p > 0,05).

Stvaranje medijskih sadržaja i komunikacija uz medije

Medijski pismene osobe aktivni su korisnici medija koji ujedno aktivno stvaraju medijski sadržaj. Rezultati ovog istraživanja pokazali su da mnogi učenici još uvijek nisu na najvišoj razini medijske pismenosti koja uključuje njihovo aktivno sudjelovanje u stvaranju svih vrsta medijskih sadržaja (pisanje vijesti, komentiranje medijskih objava, kreiranje vlastitog bloga, stvaranje audiosadržaja i videosadržaja itd.). Pritom nisu uočene razlike između dječaka i djevojčica (t = 1.85, df = 998, p > 0.05). Naime, tek je 14,6 % učenika osmih razreda u Zagrebu napisalo kratku vijest ili članak za novine, pri čemu su to češće činile djevojčice od dječaka (t = 3,47, df = 998, p < 0.01). Učenici su puno aktivniji kada je u pitanju stvaranje vlastitih videosadržaja ili audiosadržaja uz pomoć mobitela ili drugog uređaja. Istraživanje je pokazalo da je 57,3 % učenika snimilo videosnimku bilo koje vrste (film, crtani film i dr.), dok je 58,6 % učenika snimilo audiosnimku (glazbu, vijest, reportažu i dr.) uz pomoć mobitela ili drugog uređaja, pri čemu su u tome puno aktivnije djevojčice u odnosu na dječake (t = 5,91, df = 998, p < 0.01), što pokazuje da učenici u zagrebačkim školama istražuju i eksperimentiraju neovisno o predviđenom kurikulumu i nastavnim materijalima.

Medijski pismenog korisnika karakterizira i komentiranje, odnosno reagiranje na medijske sadržaje slanjem pisama medijima, telefonskim pozivima ili komentiranjem na internetskim portalima. Istraživanje je pokazalo da je 7,1 % učenika napisalo pismo medijima, dok je 59,4 % učenika objavilo komentar na internetskim portalima. Pritom su dječaci češće objavili komentar na internetskim portalima u odnosu na djevojčice (t = 3,10, df = 998, p < 0.01). Međutim, kad je u pitanju stvaranje medijskih sadržaja, 11,4 % učenika napravilo je vlastiti blog na internetu. Iako se pokazalo da učenici osmih razreda nisu aktivni u stvaranju medijskih sadržaja na internetu, čak 92,2 % učenika naglasilo je da sudjeluju na društvenim mrežama, dok je 60,4 % njih istaknulo da su kreirali profil, stranicu ili grupu na društvenim mrežama. Pritom su rezultati pokazali da su djevojčice u odnosu na dječake aktivnije na društvenim mrežama (t = 2,94, df = 998, p < 0.01).

Razine medijske pismenosti

Sukladno sastavnicama medijske pismenosti – pristup medijima, znanje o medijima, analiza i kritičko vrednovanje te stvaranje medijskih sadržaja – oblikovane su četiri skale. Svaka skala izračunata je kao jednostavna linearna kombinacija setova pitanja koja mjere različita područja medijske pismenosti. Svaka skala sastojala se od različitog broja pitanja. U tablici 7 prikazan je teoretski mogući raspon bodova za svaku skalu te izmjereni raspon odgovora. Pritom je učenicima dodijeljen -1 bod ukoliko su netočno odgovorili na pitanje, +1 bod za svaki točan odgovor te 0 bodova ukoliko su istaknuli da ne znaju odgovor na pitanje. Na pitanja kojima je mjeren pristup medijima i stvaranje medijskih sadržaja, učenicima je dodijeljen -1 bod ukoliko su istaknuli da nemaju pristup određenom mediju ili da nisu kreirali određeni medijski sadržaj, odnosno +1 bod za odgovore u kojima su istaknuli da koriste određene medije ili da su stvorili određeni medijski sadržaj. Na temelju takvog određivanja bodova, kreiran je teoretski raspon bodova za svaku sastavnicu medijske pismenosti (vidi tablicu 7).

Tablica 7. **Skale medijske pismenosti**

Skala	Teoretski raspon		Opaženi raspon	
	Min.	Max.	Min.	Max.
Pristup medijima	15	75	29	75
Znanje o medijima	-23	54	11	44
Analiza i kritičko vrednovanje medijskih sadržaja	-6	34	4	30
Stvaranje medijskih sadržaja	-12	12	-12	12

Potom su oblikovane granične vrijednosti za tri razine medijske pismenosti: osnovnu, srednju i naprednu. Razine su oblikovane s obzirom na empirijski kriterij, pri čemu 33,33 % najnižih mogućih odgovora u teoretskom rasponu spada u osnovnu razinu medijske pismenosti, idućih 33,33 % spada u srednju razinu, a 33,33 % najviših mogućih odgovora spada u naprednu razinu.

Sukladno razinama medijske pismenosti koje su razradili Celot i Pérez Tornero (2009b) pod osnovnom se razinom podrazumijeva da učenici imaju ograničen pristup medijima, da posjeduju osnovna znanja i vještine korištenja medija, ali i ograničenu sposobnost analize i kritičkog vrednovanja medijskih sadržaja te da sami rijetko stvaraju medijske sadržaje. Srednja razina medijske pismenosti pretpostavlja da pojedinac lako koristi medije, poznaje njihove funkcije i sposoban je uz pomoć medija odraditi i složenije radnje. Srednja razina medijske pismenosti podrazumijeva da u odnosu na osnovnu pojedinac ima pristup nešto većem broju medija, njegovo je znanje o medijima opsežnije, kao i mogućnost analiziranja, kritičkog vrednovanja i stvaranja medijskih sadržaja. Pod naprednom razinom medijske pismenosti podrazumijeva se da učenici imaju mogućnost pristupa različitim medijima i mogućnost korištenja različitih medija, da učenik posjeduje izvrsno znanje i vještine korištenja medijskih sadržaja te da je sposoban analizirati i kritički vrednovati medijske sadržaje, kao i proizvoditi vlastite sadržaje.

Rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da, ako se gleda ukupna razina medijske pismenosti učenika osmih razreda, njih 60,5 % posjeduje srednju razinu medijske pismenosti. Treba istaknuti i da se čak 39,5 % učenika nalazi na naprednoj razini. Tome osobito doprinose prve dvije sastavnice medijske pismenosti – pristup medijima te znanje o medijima. Analiziraju li se pojedinačni rezultati za djevojčice i dječake, istraživanje je pokazalo da 54,9 % dječaka posjeduje srednju razinu, a 44,9 % dječaka naprednu razinu medijske pismenosti. Istodobno, rezultati su pokazali da 66,5 % djevojčica posjeduje srednju razinu, a njih 33,5 % naprednu razinu medijske pismenosti. Detaljni rezultati za svaku sastavnicu medijske pismenosti nalaze se u tablici 8.

Tablica 8. **Razine medijske pismenosti (N = 1000)**

	Djevojčice		Dječaci		Ukupno	
	f	%	f	%	f	%
Pristup medijima						
Osnovna razina	6	1,3	5	1	11	1,1
Srednja razina	280	58,5	193	37	473	47,3
Napredna razina	192	40,2	324	62	516	51,6
Znanje o medijima						
Osnovna razina	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
Srednja razina	237	49,6	244	46,8	481	48,1
Napredna razina	241	50,4	277	53,2	518	51,9
Analiza i kritičko vrednovanje medijskih sadržaja						
Osnovna razina	5	1,0	6	1,1	11	1,1
Srednja razina	345	72,2	376	72,0	721	72,1
Napredna razina	128	26,8	140	26,9	268	26,8
Stvaranje medijskih sadržaja						
Osnovna razina	54	11,3	83	15,9	137	13,7
Srednja razina	312	65,3	324	62,1	636	63,6
Napredna razina	112	23,4	115	22,0	227	22,7

Istraživanje je pokazalo da se većina učenika nalazi na naprednoj razini kad je u pitanju pristup medijima i znanje o medijima te na srednjoj razini kad je u pitanju kritičko vrednovanje i stvaranje medijskih sadržaja.

ZAKLJUČAK

Posjedovanje medijskih kompetencija postalo je nužno u suvremenome društvu ispunjenom medijima i medijskim sadržajima. Zbog toga je važno kvalitetno medijsko obrazovanje koje će djecu pripremiti na suživot s medijima. Iako djeca u Hrvatskoj o medijima uče u sklopu nastave Hrvatskoga jezika, tzv. medijske kulture, do ovog istraživanja nije analizirana kvaliteta takvog načina obrazovanja, odnosno koliko navedeni program zaista medijski opismenjuje djecu tijekom osam godina školovanja. Upravo je to bio glavni cilj ovoga istraživanja u kojem je sudjelovalo 1000 učenika na području grada Zagreba. Upitnik koji je korišten u istraživanja, a koji su kreirali EAVI i DTI, prilagođen je dječjem uzrastu te sadržajima koji su dio programa medijske kulture unutar hrvatskoga obrazovnoga sustava. Najveća mana takvog načina mjerenja pismenosti jest njegova subjektivnost (Vanwynsberghe i dr., 2011), odnosno činjenica da su odgovori učenika na određena pitanja zapravo samoprocjena vlastitog znanja o medijima i poznavanja određenih medija. Iako se rezultati dobiveni ovim istraživanjem ne smiju generalizirati na cijelu Hrvatsku, oni daju dobar uvid u trenutačno stanje medijskog obrazovanja i medijske pismenosti u Hrvatskoj. U budućnosti je svakako potrebno provesti istraživanje u svim hrvatskim županijama, što je i glavna preporuka za buduća istraživanja jer tek na temelju cjelovite slike mogu se predlagati i donositi nove politike medijskog obrazovanja u Hrvatskoj. U budućim bi se istraživanjima trebalo prije svega posvetiti dvjema razinama medijske pismenosti – kritičkom vrednovanju i stvaranju medijskih sadržaja, s obzirom na to da rezultati pokazuju najslabije znanje djece upravo u tim područjima, ali i veći naglasak staviti na nove medije uz koje djeca provode najviše vremena.

U Zagrebu, kao glavnom gradu Republike Hrvatske, osobito unutar kućanstava, postoji temeljni preduvjet za razvoj medijske pismenosti, a to prije svega podrazumijeva pristup medijima. Naime, rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da učenici osmih razreda imaju pristup gotovo svim medijima u svojim kućanstvima, a većina njih čak i u svojoj sobi. Iako taj podatak, s jedne strane, otvara pitanje roditeljskog nadzora nad korištenjem medijskih sadržaja, što je u toj dobi itekako potrebno, to, s druge strane, nameće nužnost izrade kvalitetnog programa medijskog opismenjivanja u hrvatskim školama. Istraživanje provedeno u gradu Zagrebu pokazalo je da učenici osmih razreda posjeduju srednju razinu medijske pismenosti. Iako se većina zagrebačkih učenika, kad je u pitanju pristup medijima i znanje o medijima, nalazi na naprednoj razini, rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da većina učenika osmih razreda, na kraju obveznog medijskog obrazovanja, posjeduje srednju razinu kritičkog vrednovanja i stvaranja medijskih sadržaja. Budući da je u Hrvatskoj osnovno obrazovanje obvezno te da je medijsko obrazovanje dio osnovnog obrazovanja (u sklopu predmeta Hrvatski jezik), većinu znanja o medijima koje će učenici steći, ako izuzmemo samoobrazovanje, usvojit će upravo u osnovnoj školi. Stoga je važno da program medijskog obrazovanja bude kvalitetan i da djecu u potpunosti pripremi na cjeloživotno korištenje

medija i medijskih sadržaja kako bi znala kritički vrednovati sadržaje, ali i stvarati svoje vlastite te tako aktivno sudjelovati u građanskom i političkom životu te u potpunosti ostvariti svoja komunikacijska prava. Važno je da djeca na kraju obveznog osnovnoškolskog obrazovanja iz svih dijelova medijske pismenosti (pristup medijima, znanje o medijima, analiza i kritičko vrednovanje medijskih sadržaja te stvaranje medijskih sadržaja) posjeduju visoku razinu i znanja i vještina.

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Dodatak: Upitnik korišten u istraživanju

1. Spol:

Muško / Žensko

2. Zaokruži na što sve pomisliš kada netko kaže „masovni mediji“:

Novine / Knjiga / Računalo / Televizija / Film / Mikrofon / Internet / Tablet / Mobitel / Igraća konzola

Plakat / Radio / Projektor / Zvučnici

3. Koliko ste često u posljednjih mjesec dana radili sljedeće aktivnosti (u svakom redu znakom X označi samo jedan ponuđeni odgovor):*

	Svaki dan	Nekoliko puta tjedno	Jednom tjedno	Nekoliko puta mjesečno	Niti jednom	Ne znam
Bili u kinu						
Bili u kazalištu						
Čitali knjigu						
Gledali televiziju						
Slušali radio						
Čitali novine						
Igrali videoigru ili računalnu igru						
Koristili mobitel (poruke, glazba)						
Igrali igre na mobitelu						
Koristili internet na mobitelu za pretraživanje						
Koristili internet na nekom drugom uređaju						
Provodili vrijeme na društvenim mrežama						

4. Zaokruži sve medije i uređaje koje imaš kod kuće:

Televizor / Računalo / Internet / Mobitel / Tablet / Radio / Uređaj za igranje videoigara (konzola)

5. Zaokruži sve medije i uređaje koje imaš i koristiš u svojoj sobi:

Televizor / Računalo / Internet / Mobitel / Tablet / Radio / Uređaj za igranje videoigara (konzola)

6. Imaš li pametni telefon, tzv. *smartphone*?

Da / Ne

7. Koliko su po tvom mišljenju pouzdane informacije koje nude pojedini mediji (u svakom redu znakom X označi samo jedan ponuđeni odgovor):*

	U potpunosti nepouzdane	Uglavnom nepouzdane	Niti pouzdane niti nepouzdane	Uglavnom pouzdane	U potpunosti pouzdane
Novine					
Radio					
Televizija					
Internet					

8. Jesi li ikad pri korištenju medija (primjerice prilikom gledanja televizije) pomislio/pomislila sljedeće (uz svaku tvrdnju znakom X označi samo jedan odgovor):*

	Da	Ne	Ne znam
„Ovo je napravljeno kako bih pomislio/pomislila da je pušenje *cool*.“			
„Ovo je zapravo oglas, iako je napravljen na način da ne izgleda tako.“			
„Ovako ta osoba ne izgleda u stvarnom svijetu.“			

9. Koliko si upoznat s načinom na koji zakoni reguliraju medije? Uz svako pitanje znakom X označi samo jedan odgovor:*

	Da	Ne	Ne znam
Je li zakonom propisano što je sve dopušteno oglašavati?			
Je li zakonom propisano kada mediji moraju zaštititi identitet djece?			
Je li zakonom dopušteno prikazivati žene i muškarce na ponižavajući način?			
Propisuju li zakoni vrstu sadržaja koje se smije, odnosno ne smije prikazivati u medijima (poput nasilnih sadržaja)?			
Je li zakonom zabranjeno preuzimanje („skidanje“) filmova i glazbe s interneta?			
Je li zabranjeno otvaranje profila na društvenim mrežama pod tuđim imenom?			

10. Ocjenom od 1 do 5 procijeni koliko dobro poznaješ sljedeće medije (njihovu povijest, karakteristike, korištenje, stvaranje sadržaja). Uz svaki medij znakom X označi samo jedan ponuđeni odgovor.*

	1 Nedovoljno	2 Dovoljno	3 Dobro	4 Vrlo dobro	5 Izvrsno
Novine					
Radio					
Televizija					
Internet					

11. U svakom redu znakom X označi samo jedan ponuđeni odgovor (slaganje ili neslaganje s tvrdnjom):

	Da	Ne	Ne znam
Današnja se djeca bolje služe internetom od odraslih.			
HRT je komercijalna televizija.			

▶▶

U medijima se ne smiju razotkrivati podaci djece mlađe od 14 godina kada se izvještava o nesrećama.
Prvi film u povijesti snimio je Nikola Tesla.
Ako na društvenim mrežama uvrijedi prijatelja ili prijateljicu, moj prijatelj ne može biti kažnjen.
Svaka reklama na televiziji i radiju mora biti jasno označena da znamo da je to reklama.
Naklada ili tiraža je tiskani broj primjeraka nekih novina koji ovisi o broju kupaca.
Radio je besplatni medij.
Animirani, dokumentarni i igrani film su vrste filmskih rodova (žanrova).
Cyberbullying je pojam kojim se označava dobro poznavanje novih medija.
Informacije koje pronađem na internetu smijem koristiti bez navođenja izvora.
Informacije na Wikipediji su uvijek točne.
Dobro je dijeliti lozinke svojih profila na društvenim mrežama, u *online* igrama itd. s najbližim prijateljima.

12. Poveži ilustracije s tipom novina. Uz svake novine, odnosno svaki časopis nalazi se broj. Upiši broj uz vrstu novina o kojoj je riječ (dnevnik, tjednik, mjesečnik):

Dnevnici (dnevne novine):

Tjednici (tjedne novine):

Mjesečnici (mjesečne novine):

Napomena: Učenicima su ponuđene naslovnice ovih hrvatskih novina i časopisa: *OK!*, *Globus*, *Story*, *Jutarnji list*, *Teen*, *Novi list* i *Gloria*.

13. Koliko ste često u posljednja tri mjeseca namjerno kliknuli na reklamu koju ste vidjeli na internetskoj stranici, društvenoj mreži ili ste je dobili preko e-maila? Označite znakom X tvrdnju s kojom se najviše slažete.*

1) Svaki dan ili gotovo svaki dan

2) Barem jednom tjedno

3) Jednom u nekoliko tjedana

4) Barem jedno mjesečno

5) Nikad

6) Ne znam

14. Jeste li u posljednjih godinu dana napravili nešto od navedenoga:*

	Da	Ne	Ne želim odgovoriti
Napisali kratku vijest ili članak za novine			
Napisali pismo medijima (omiljenom časopisu, televizijskoj emisiji itd.)			
Snimili videosnimku bilo koje vrste (film, crtani film i dr.) uz pomoć mobitela ili drugog uređaja			

▶▶

Snimili audiosnimku bilo koje vrste (glazbu, vijest, reportažu i dr.) uz pomoć mobitela ili drugog uređaja
Napravili blog na internetu
Poslali ili primili *e-mail*
Objavili komentar na internetskim portalima
Sudjelovali na društvenim mrežama
Kreirali profil, stranice ili grupe na društvenim mrežama
Tražili informacije o proizvodima i uslugama u medijima
Gledali seriju, film ili neki drugi sadržaj / Slušali glazbu
Preuzeli („skinuli") seriju, film, glazbu ili neki drugi sadržaj

MEDIA LITERACY OF EIGHTH GRADE STUDENTS IN ZAGREB

Lana Ciboci

ABSTRACT *For quality co-existence with the media, it is essential to possess knowledge and skills on how to use, analyse, critically assess and create media content (Aufderheide 1992),* i.e. *media literacy skills are required. In Croatia media education takes place primarily through the first language classes,* i.e. *through media culture, which is one of the components of the Croatian language subject in primary school from first to eighth grade. Although media culture has been present within the Croatian language subject for many years already, to this day, no research study on media literacy of children in primary schools has been conducted. In this research, media literacy testing was conducted among 1000 eight-grade students in Zagreb. The research has shown that students possess a medium level of media literacy, with the lowest results being recorded in the field of analysis and critical evaluation as well as in the field of creation of media content.*

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MEDIJI I GRAD

MEDIA AND CITY

URBAN INTERVENTIONS IN A GLOBAL CITY: DISSENSUS, CONSENSUS AND AMBIVALENCE IN THE STREETS OF LONDON

Laura Guimarães Corrêa

ABSTRACT *In this article I analyze urban interventions as communicative practices that can become visual "scenes of dissensus", i.e. political disruptions made by emerging voices. In three of the cases I present, activists use a variety of tactics and techniques to make their claims be seen on the surfaces of the city. These actions can generate diverse meanings and have different impacts. One of the cases confirms that corporate discourses can appropriate urban interventions, showing that important contemporary urban expressions such as graffiti and street art might turn into consensus, as part of the increasing phenomenon of the commodification of urban space. I will conclude by stressing the importance of approaching urban interventions as creative practices that reflect and (re)produce the movement, the complexity, the ambivalence, and the contradictions that are inherent to everyday life in global cities.*

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study was to identify and analyze the emergence and meanings of visual interventions in various urban spaces in London. During a period of ten months, different kinds of urban interferences such as tagging, stickers, stencil art, graffiti, *etc.* were observed, collected and analyzed, in order to understand this communication phenomenon within a broader socio-cultural context and to detect their potential for consensus and dissensus. In the cases I discuss in this article, individuals and groups used different tactics and techniques – creative, aggressive, ironic – to make their claims be seen and heard; and these actions can bring new meanings, multiple effects and consequences.

The article is structured in five sections. First, I argue that city surfaces are communication media and that urban interventions must be understood as communication practices and, therefore, as spaces for subjectivation. Second, I unpack the concepts of consensus and dissensus as discussed by Jacques Rancière (1995; 2009; 2015) to analyze the phenomenon. In the subsequent section, I outline the methodological issues relating to my research, including selection of case-studies. After presenting and analyzing the cases, I develop a broader analysis of the phenomena considering the ideas of consensus, dissensus, appropriation and ambivalence. In the last section, I present research findings and articulate the concepts in order to discuss the practices of intervention as political actions and scenes of dissensus.

MEDIA, MEDIATION AND URBAN COMMUNICATION

The whole is not immediately present is this written text, the city. There are other levels of reality which do not become transparent by definition. The city writes and assigns, that is, it signifies, orders, stipulates. What? That is to be discovered by reflection. This text has passed through ideologies, as it also 'reflects' them.
Henri Lefebvre, in *Right to the city* (1996)

Mediation, a concept proposed by Jesús Martín-Barbero (1987) is a crucial constituent of everyday life (Silverstone, 2002) and can be understood as a place between culture, communication and politics which puts logics of production and consumption, industrial formats and cultural matrixes in a dialectical relationship to each other (Lopes, 2014). The contemporary city can be approached as a place of mediation, as a complex system where meanings constantly circulate, through multiple technologies in diverse institutional and social contexts, constituting and being constituted by culture(s). For Silverstone (2002), mediation is both social and technological as it depends increasingly on the media presence in everyday life and the crucial role media and communication technologies play in our lives. Media facilitate and structure spaces for communication, interaction and action. We can understand a medium as material entity, an ambiance and a frame, as each medium has its scope and limitations, which allows and constrains certain forms and kinds of discourses.

Myria Georgiou explores the concept and characteristics of the mediated city in *Media and the City*. She understands the mediated city as "a place where we might come together to clash but also to communicate" (2013: 29), and is attentive to the dynamics of the mediated city when people make their claims: "the meanings of city space shift in times of crisis and as the mediated city space becomes a space for reflection and demand for change" (*Ibid.*: 150). The author discusses the "intriguing manifestations of media culture that link consumption and creativity to identity, community and politics" as well (*Ibid.*: 29).

Urban surfaces can be considered as some of the most pervasive media in everyday life. Cities are spaces for subjectivation and identification processes as images, texts and interactions on urban landscape offer standards and values of social institutions. These processes are not, however, predetermined or fixed, they are riddled with tensions and negotiations over cultures, values, norms and rights. People are enmeshed in discursive power relations in tension between subjugation and autonomy; action and resistance. Besides this, the everyday practices of interaction are complex – and not easily captured by dichotomies. Hence, there are many ways through which city dwellers see, consume, act and react towards urban discourses in everyday life. We construct our identities and subjectivities in relation to others; and this is a reflexive communication phenomenon. Urban surfaces interfere in the way we see ourselves, in the way we live and experience the city, which carries marks, traces and signs of other people's lived and shared urban experience.

I understand urban surfaces as the exterior part of a city, in a broad sense. The surface is what is visible, sensible, in an aesthetic way: what can be caught by the visual and tactile senses in our everyday experience in the city. It has to do with appearance and emergence, as it is the external layer of the city: walls, signs, facades, urban furniture, roads, bridges, and buildings that can be covered by paint, steel, glass, tiles, wood, brick, paper, *etc.* Urban surfaces are designed and built according to purpose and function: they cover, hide, and protect the inside, but they also show it (*e.g.*, a shop window). The materiality of the surfaces (such as texture, color, size, shape, position, decay, *etc.*) can carry meanings, provoke feelings and reveal relations. Any surface is a potential canvas and can be used as a place for communication, expression, and visibility. Therefore, surfaces separate and also connect. Being exposed and vulnerable as a skin, urban surfaces are not static, they change as cities and societies are transformed.

Being in a global city means being immersed in an intense variety of urban discourses. Facades, shop windows and construction hoardings are the media for corporate communication, as well as sites for graphic, typographic and iconographic interventions by commissioned or uninvited artists and activists. Despite the prohibition and regulation of unofficial discourses, the global city is the place for heterogeneity, where individuals and groups from different social strata are, at the same time, linked and separated. There is a constant dialogue about the physical and symbolic occupation of houses, avenues, squares, marquees, and corners. Cities are polyphonic places where multiple voices can be heard in a chaotic concert of large and small players.

Urban communication, as all other forms of mediated communication, tends to be asymmetrical. The most evident discursive constructions allowed in the streets are the speeches of the market and the state. These are the actors who can afford (or are responsible for) the visual occupation of public spaces. Nevertheless, people do subvert the uses and functions of the objects in everyday life, as discussed by Michel De Certeau (1984). Those practices are marks of the weak, whose clever activities respond and attack the places of power in a very fixed enemy territory. De Certeau uses the term "strategies" to name the activities of the strong and "tactics" to those of the weak in order to stress the difference between the two in terms of power and type of action. A strategy is linked to dominant institutions, it is the given structure; tactics are the practices in everyday life that depend on opportunities as the weak have to act with creativity and astuteness in the domain of the strong, in a "tireless but quiet activity, in short by its quasi-invisibility, since it shows itself not in its own products (where would you place them?) but in an art of using those imposed on it " (De Certeau, 1984: 31).

An important characteristic of urban visual communication, both legal and illegal, is that these interactional practices speak about a certain time and a certain place, highlighting contemporary tensions and struggles, reverberating current issues at stake in society, showing the claims made to urban centers. Urban dialogues are marked by relations of power, but at the same time they always entail the possibility of action and resistance. Many urban inscriptions try to overturn, reverse or even ridicule the speech of the powerful, in a kind of revisited culture jamming.

Some interventions may show a desire of transformation in the direction of a more egalitarian, more tolerant and less exploitative society. Others may point to a prejudiced and aggressive view towards marginalized groups, for example. Although many of the urban interferences such as graffiti, street art, jamming *etc.* may offer an antagonist response to hegemonic discourses, not all of them should be considered progressive just because of their illegality, sense of humor or creativity. Some practices of jamming advertising and propaganda also reinforce prejudices and conservative points of view (Cammaerts, 2007; Corrêa and Salgado, 2016). Besides this, advertising has historically incorporated the aesthetics of cultural jamming, thereby unjamming the jam.

Considering and agreeing with these approaches I presented above, this article aims to contribute to the debate about contentious (and – in some cases – coopted,) interactions through urban interventions in the mediated city, connecting the concepts of dissensus and consensus (Rancière, 2015) to the ideas of authenticity, ambivalence (Banet-Weiser, 2012) and contradiction (Georgiou, 2013). With this article, I also intend to contribute to the discussions about visual protests and activism related to gentrification and migration issues.

DISSENSUS AND CONSENSUS IN THE STREETS

Rancière (1995; 2009; 2015) foregrounded the concept of dissensus in order to understand situations whereby the order is disrupted by someone who was not supposed to be part of a discussion. The discussion Rancière proposes is related to the limits of political and private life. As such, whoever draws the line between them has the power to define what can be publicly discussed or not, what has less or more importance in the life of a community, a city, a country. In his view, dissensus "consists in the rejection of every difference that distinguishes between people who 'live' in different spheres of existence, the dismissal of categories of those who are or are not qualified for political life" (Rancière, 2015: 77).

The author proposes a particular definition of "politics" and "police" as opposing concepts. Rancière's definition of "politics" considers its disruptive character, its capacity to collapse the order by changing the way things were usually perceived, *i.e.*, the distribution of the sensible. In this sense, politics is related to aesthetics, as it consists in the public emergence of those who had no voice to take part in the poetic, creative and intellectual work. Therefore, art and politics can be emancipating given the fact that they can create – or at least point to – a new world, a new way of existence and sharing the common: "It [politics] begins when they make the invisible visible, and make what was deemed to be the mere noise of suffering bodies heard as a discourse concerning the 'common' of the community" (Rancière, 2015: 147).

The author understands the "police" as the hierarchical distribution of the sensible in which subjects have specific and determined places. In this sense, formal politics (constituted of parties, state, government as well as formal opposition, unions, *etc.*) is part of what he would name the police order, where everything and every person have their determined place. There is no lack or surplus in the police order, as the police order happens through divisions and partitions of *who* can speak and *what* can be said. In opposition to dissensus, considered by Rancière as the essence of politics, consensus is a process that shrinks the political space, reducing politics to the police. Consensus does not mean that everyone agrees in every issue, but that there is an agreement about the way the sensible is distributed, *i.e.*, about who has and who does not have the right to speak and to be recognized as a voice that counts.

It is argued here that "consensus" and "dissensus" can constitute key concepts to read, interpret and analyze urban contentious interactions. Written and performative interferences are communicative practices that may show scenes of dissensus, marking a new distribution of the sensible. In this case, the autonomous subject, who creates and is created in the gaps, invents a scene that has contingent, situational, aesthetic and political aspects. Furthermore, illegal and even aggressive practices of urban interference are subject to appropriation, normalization and invisibility, approaching what Rancière defines as consensus. Looking at the multiple and ongoing dialogues which take place in the city, one can observe that dissensus and consensus are continuously performed, sometimes in a situation where both types of relation are present, and the boundaries

between them can become blurred and are continuously changing. These reflections lead to the main research question: considering that, in contemporary global cities, dissensus tends to become consensus through commodification and appropriation, what are the impacts and results of urban interventions in a larger – and political – sense?

METHODOLOGY

London's identity is associated with its historical, economic, political and military power; strongly connected to a symbolic power (Georgiou, 2013), which makes it an iconic global city. It is a culturally rich and diverse place, very suitable to ground a research about urban visual communication. In *World City* Doreen Massey (2015) stresses that London holds a hegemonic position at the heart of the establishment of neoliberalism. Quite often, decisions and actions taken in London have material consequences in other parts of the world. The author also describes London as a radical and progressive place that has been a focus of migration, which makes the metropolis a "home to an astonishing multiplicity of ethnicities and culture" (Massey, 2015: 9). She adds that the capital of the UK is one of the richest cities in the world but at the same time it has acute and growing inequalities. As in many other global cities, London points to the paradoxes of living (in) the global city, which for some privileged can be "enormously pleasurable" but for others "a site of serious deprivation and despair" (Massey, 2015: 11).

The empirical research material was not predetermined, but defined inductively during the research conduct. The chosen methodology was an ethnographic exploration of the streets of London, during which attention and openness to the visual dialogues taking place at the street level was central. The spatial limits for the research were drawn alongside London transport zones, privileging zones 1 and 2. My search for discursive interventions was inspired by the idea of "flânerie" in Walter Benjamin (1997; 2004) who was, in his turn, inspired by Charles Baudelaire's (2007) "flâneur", a dandy wanderer aesthetically affected by the cosmopolitan experience. Georgiou (2013: 18) stresses that "flânerie" was not a practice of aesthetic explorations for Benjamin: he sought to understand the city "as a site of struggle, as an unequal place", and also as a "point of meetings of difference". My method consisted firstly in experiencing the city through long walks, without previous planning, but with attentiveness to the environment and, especially, to the visual traces of struggles and antagonist interactions.

Through this practice I learned to choose, beforehand, regions and streets where interventions could potentially be found: the more deprived and less surveilled ones, less central and therefore more likely to receive interventions. Some of the choices had previously been made, as had I known in advance that I could find urban interventions in regions such as East / Northeast London (especially Shoreditch and Hackney Wick) and South London, known as focal points of street art, gentrification and, consequently, urban media studies in London. Once in these sites, I freely explored the streets during my walks. In this sense, my method was also inspired by the Situationist practice of the "dérive" (drifting), as proposed by Guy Debord (1956): "[t]he spatial field of a *dérive* may

be precisely delimited or vague, depending on whether the goal is to study a terrain or to emotionally disorient oneself". Thus, the drifts methodology instilled in me awareness of the urban landscape and of its possible – although unpredictable – findings. The research methodology was intertwined with the conceptual and theoretical framework, as the attention to the tactics of the weak over the strategies of the powerful (De Certeau, 1984), as well as to scenes of dissensus and consensus (Rancière, 2009; 2015).

During the period of analysis, approximately 2,300 images of urban interventions in London were produced. From the collected empirical material, I made a first selection according to technical criteria of quality, intelligibility and appropriateness to the research question. The materiality of the recorded interventions (such as texture, size, material, contrast, color, *etc*.) was also considered, as they could reveal the tools used to write, paint, daub, spray, stick, draw. These visual aspects of the writings were important for the impact, the visibility, the legibility and the discursive argumentation. This observation was significant to the analysis as these elements are also indexes of the intervention practices; suggesting who (and how) did them. The selected images, about 400, were printed and cut. In order to obtain an overview of the empirical evidence, I spread this material on a large desk and, for three weeks, the construction of possible groups for analysis was tested in this stage of redesigning and reinvention of the corpus. Through these procedures, it was possible to detect regularities, peculiarities and differences between the recorded interventions (Figure 1).

▲ *Figure 1.*
Around 400 images were printed and organized in groups
for analysis according to thematic patterns.
Source: Author, 2016

A similar and inspiring methodological approach is the "iconology of the interval", a method of image analysis created by the art historian Aby Warburg (Rampley, 2012). His methodology consisted in organizing large panels[1] according to common elements, similarities and various connections between many images. These sets of images were mobile and changeable. For Warburg, the analysis was in the space between one image and another. The iconology of intervals is not an end in itself; it helps identifying content as well as setting a historical problem by connecting images and collective memory. Thus, the image analysis should consider both the text and the context.

In addition to the analysis inspired by the "iconology of the interval" method, a useful complementary methodology was the Discourse Analysis (DA) which was focused more on the visual aspects of the interventions. This perspective defends the idea that the verbal or visual discourse should not be observed independently, or detached from the historical moment, the power structures and the lines of force in society. Every discourse brings the underlying ideological, historical and political construction that is current in its time. This context, in its turn, is constructed and understood in the clash of the discourses. Norman Fairclough (1992) proposes a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and understands that social actors, through discursive practices, can reproduce and transform structures of domination, challenging domination and ideological frames, resisting and reconfiguring them.

Considering that discursive practices shape society and are shaped by it, CDA claims that theorizing language is also a way of intervening in it and in the social structure. The DA and CDA approaches have important points of convergence: the object of study of any discourse analysis is never only the text/image, because the discourse exists within the relations of power, social institutions, identities, ideologies, *etc.* Therefore, as a premise, I consider that urban discourses are intrinsically related to conflicts in a certain time and place, showing which issues are worrying, affecting and engaging people in public discussions. Reading the claims in the streets, the investigation sought to explore the tangling of texts and contexts, going beyond the inscription itself. The questions for the analysis related to the content of the inscription were: 1) what is this person or group claiming, 2) does the intervention point to a struggle, and 3) what can the intervention reveal about the tensions in London?

After grouping the images in clusters according to thematic patterns, I could detect nine main issues at stake in London between September 2015 and June 2016: austerity, Brexit referendum, refugees/migration, gentrification, gender (mostly feminist interventions), race/racism, use of public resources, preservation of local cultures, surveillance/privacy. As I predicted, I could find fewer interventions in the richest areas, *e.g.*, West London. Nevertheless, some of these contentious themes were distributed rather equally among London regions, being found in many different parts of the city: Brexit, refugees/migration, feminist interventions, and surveillance. I could find more interventions about gentrification, local cultures, and race in areas where the population

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[1] See more about Warburg's Bilder Atlas Mnemosyne at https://warburg.sas.ac.uk/collections/warburginstitute-archive/online-bilderatlas-mnemosyne (Accessed 06 June 2018) and at The Warburg Institute (School of Advanced Study, University of London), Woburn Square, Bloomsbury, London.

was more diverse. Among these issues, I chose to analyze in this article four cases of urban interventions related to refugees/migration and gentrification, concentrating the study on the images reproduced here.

FOUR CASES OF VISUAL INTERVENTION IN LONDON

Four distinct, but also somewhat inter-related case studies were analyzed. In each of these cases, dissenting discourses challenged previously existing consensual discourses and spaces in London, provoking different reactions and results. Official and counter-hegemonic discourses interacted in a contentious or more harmonious context. Three of the interventions were found in East London areas where processes of gentrification are very noticeable (Shoreditch and Hackney Wick). The fourth intervention was situated in Knightsbridge, in the affluent Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. What they have in common is disruption – or attempts to disrupt – in a given urban landscape. Each one of the four cases have a specificity, but also present features in common, which was a criterion for choosing them for analysis.

Spraying and insisting in Hackney Wick

The first case is situated in the northeastern region of London, an area close to Hackney Wick overground station and the River Lee Navigation Canal. Since 2012, this area has been rebuilt and the main constructions were the *Olympic Park* and a huge shopping center called *Westfield Stratford City*. The region of the new buildings has a strange and arid atmosphere. Nevertheless, the area is becoming attractive to newcomers because of the new infrastructure as well as due to lower house prices, given the fact that it used to be (and still is) a poor region of London. Along the canal, in a more alternative spot, it is possible to come across cafés, galleries, art centers, breweries and a bohemian scene that points to a process of cultural effervescence and gentrification of the region. Sharon Zukin (2010: 8) explains that these changes are called gentrification "because of the movement of rich, well-educated folks, the gentry, into lower-class neighborhoods, and the higher property values that follow them, transforming a declining district into an expensive neighborhood with historic or hipster charm".

During the period of data collection, a building was being constructed in the area and dark green hoardings were protecting the construction site. These temporary protective structures were used to promote a corporate visual identity, displaying the logo, information about the project, *etc*. However, these canvases were not left as they were before; they also became a canvas for dissensus: red, white, yellow paint was sprayed over the logo and information, and sentences were written over the hoardings. I visited the place in different times to record these written interactions, which revealed a repetitive and alternate conversation between the official branded discourse and the social actors who practice dissensus.

The first interventions in Hackney Wick were registered in October 2015. In February 2016, there were no visible unofficial inscriptions anymore, only signs of new paint which

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looked like patches in a darker tone covering some parts of the hoardings. In July 2016, the surfaces were all overwritten again, showing that the symbolic struggles are ongoing processes, based on insistence, resistance and repetition: the hoardings are painted, then interfered with graffiti, the company covers it with ink, and it happens again and again. The cycle of branding, interference, erasure, rebranding shows that none of the sides gave up the fight for this physical and symbolic space. They know the panel will be painted and erased again, and this is part of the dynamics of the place.

I understand "insistence" as the repeated denial to accept something, especially when it comes from a more powerful actor, such as a corporation or an institution. The strong have the material resources to produce a message once and then to reproduce it over and over again – this is a common strategy in marketing, advertising, and propaganda. In a different way, the insistent individual is the one who does not seem to care how many times she practices an act – not by reproduction, but by coming back and acting again, in spite of the intervention's ephemerality.

In this case, the repetition is a tactic of the weak. It might not be a clear political action, but insistence can be read as one of the features of resistance. The stubborn repetition, in this case, is the aspect that constitutes a scene of dissensus as the struggle for physical and symbolic space is a constant process, without a solution or a winner. The problem of disruption is not solved by means of effacement as the written interferences always come back, like an ironic and endless game.

▲ *Figure 2.*
Interventions in Hackney, London.
Source: Author, 2015-2016

Fusion and consensus in Shoreditch

Another example of using construction hoardings as a canvas for dissensus could be found in Shoreditch, a region in a much more advanced state of gentrification and commodification than Hackney Wick. Shoreditch is also located in East London, between the boroughs of Hackney and Tower Hamlets. In about one decade, the area transformed from place with a strong Asian migrant presence, mostly Bangladeshi, into a bohemian area with bars, cafés, vintage and designer shops, most of them managed and owned by young white middle-class newcomers.

In recent years, the area has seen the construction of numerous high-rise buildings marketed at wealthy newcomers. *The Fusion* is one of them. On the construction hoardings, its visual communication enacts an appropriation of the graffiti aesthetics using them as a way of illustrating and approaching the building to its surroundings. The colorful graffiti composes a pattern that fades into black in a gradient effect that works as a background to display the logo and the sales phone number. The typography emulates hand-painted numbers, so that the corporate communication would not appear too different from the "urban" character of the neighborhood.

In this case, tagging and graffiti are not *against* the new building, but are used as a visual communication and marketing strategy which attempts to fuse the "shabby-chic" character of the area and the "luxurious" features of the new flats. Nevertheless, on the building's website, the aesthetics of tagging is not present: its design brings a clean and sophisticated atmosphere. The promotional material published online[2] points to the advantages of living in the area, using expressions that suggest the idea of diversity (*cf.* "eclectic, suited to every individual's taste", "mind-boggling variety", "an open book to tourists"); of contemporariness and modernity (*cf.* "fresh", "trendiest", "culture that inspires trends", "fashion"); of liveliness (*cf.* "exciting, urban"). Two dissonant but revealing words are used to describe the area: "ingenuity" and "unique", which stresses its character of authenticity.

The advert praises Brick Lane, a street famous for its diversity, street art and graffiti. The advantages are linked to the consumption of customized clothing, affordable vintage and designer pieces, rare and collectable vinyl, *etc*. Food is also an attraction of the street, which has "market food stalls" as well as "chain restaurants and smaller cafés bringing together larger and local communities with a variety of tastes". We could read this phenomenon as an example of consensus in the city. As Rancière (2015: 79) points out, consensus consists in "... the attempt to dismiss politics by expelling surplus subjects and replacing them with real partners, social and identity groups and so on. The result is that conflicts are turned into problems to be resolved by learned expertise and the negotiated adjustment of interests."

Marketing discourse repeatedly tries to incorporate languages of marginalized groups, which provides the illusion of carrying a certain form of spontaneous originality. Companies know that their audiences are becoming increasingly media savvy and resistant

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[2] Available at: http://www.galliardhomes.com/The-Fusion (20/03/2017)

to the consumption discourses which dominate advertising in mainstream *media*. Thus, there is a constant search (called coolhunting or trendspotting) for whatever may be seen as authentic; and one way of achieving this is by intersecting corporate communication with urban expressions. The aesthetics of the diverse street has been widely used to add authenticity, youth, and informality to products and services. Consequently, the boundaries that separate the illegal and transgressive practices from the illustrative, decorative and commissioned street art are blurred, especially in a place like Shoreditch where ethnic diversity and the related tensions make the place more attractive to tourists and middle-class consumers in general.

This phenomenon influences the experience people have when visiting cities. Today tourists are offered street art tours not only in London, but in many other cities. Instead of traditional sightseeing of historical monuments, the attractions of these tours are the marginal, the transgressive and creative expressions of graffiti and tagging on the canvas of urban tapestry, usually located in neighborhoods where immigrants, poor and non-white people live – or used to live. As Stuart Hall (1992: 23) reminds us: "there is nothing that global postmodernism loves better than a certain kind of difference: a touch of ethnicity, a taste of the exotic, as we say in England, 'a bit of the other' (which in the United Kingdom has a sexual as well as an ethnic connotation)".

Likewise, Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012: 104) points to the racial aspect of the phenomenon when she states that "[s]treet art, mobilized by the early legitimation of hip-hop as popular music, attractive to middle-class, white, suburban audiences as well as the working class and people of color, emerges in the 21st century as a 'white hot commodity'". The aesthetics of urban interventions brings to the place a valuable atmosphere of *authenticity*. This aligns with Zukin (2010: 4), who argues that "[i]n the gentrified and hipster neighborhoods [...], authenticity is a consciously chosen lifestyle and a performance, and a means of displacement as well".

▲ *Figure 3.*
Construction hoardings in Shoreditch.
Source: Author, 2016

(Anti) gentrification and ambivalence in Brick Lane

In global cities worldwide, as well as in smaller historical towns, issues and struggles about housing and gentrification are present today. This contemporary phenomenon leads to tensions and conflicts regarding the commons and the complex use of public and private spaces. According to Rancière (2015), dissensus is precisely a disagreement about the boundaries between what is public and what is private. The issues about gentrification, as in many other urban problems, relate to the relationship and disjunctures between public and private life: the rise of rents affects where and how people live in the city. This can be seen as a private and individual problem, which would need to be solved by, for example, trying to raise the household income or moving to a less expensive area in the city or to another city altogether. However, when individuals and groups get organized to discuss and protest about the issue of gentrification and rising costs, it becomes a public problem and concern. The struggles against gentrification and real estate speculation are inscribed in this effort to make visible this contemporary phenomenon of displacement in some neighborhoods in London, a city, as Massey (2015) argued, of acute and growing inequalities.

In September 2015, protesters attacked a hipster café in Brick Lane, East London. As already pointed out above, both the area (Shoreditch) and the street (Brick Lane) are famous for their cultural diversity and consequent "authenticity". The population of Shoreditch is still very diverse, but the rents are increasing at a rapid pace, making it harder for the former and remaining locals to live there. Owned by two white, good-looking, tattooed, and bearded twin brothers from Belfast, *Cereal Killer Café* has provoked controversy since its opening in December 2014, as the high prices were considered outrageous, especially because it is located in one of the poorest regions in London. Activists and even the press have pointed to the discrepancy between the two facts, arguing that local residents could not afford to eat at the cafe[3]. In this context, trendy *Cereal Killer Cafe* was chosen as the target for a public protest, which was organized via a Facebook page called "Fuck Parade".

Besides the Facebook page, the group used stickers on lampposts to mobilize people into action. On the evening of the protest, the anti-gentrification activists were wearing pig's head masks and torches that scared some customers who were inside the cafe. The protesters threw red paint and daubed the word "scum" over the windows, as they considered the shop a symbol for gentrification. A few minutes after it started, the event was on Twitter and other social media. It was also reported on by major UK newspapers some hours later. The day after, the red paint that remained on some parts of the facade did not contrast much with the graphic style of the café's logo and illustrations. In an area known for graffiti, street art and interventions, that paint could be part of the cafe's visual identity, which already had references of informality, such as loose baselines, retro typography, bright primary colors, *etc*. The protests did not seem to have disturbed the business too much, on the contrary. A photo published in *The Guardian*, where a young woman shows the cafe's window to tourists, suggests that the *Cereal Killer Cafe*

[3] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2869969/Excruciating-encounter-hipster-twin-Cereal-Killer-cafe-challenged-selling-bowl-cornflakes-3-20-one-London-s-poorest-areas.html#ixzz4oap98C7s (01/08/2017)

facade became a sightseeing spot as a result of the protests. The place has become more interesting and attractive as it was the stage – and a reason – for performative struggles. Ironically, the episode gave the café a touch of authenticity and belonging to a new configuration of the neighborhood. Although violence, noise and protests are not desired characteristics for a business, the event seems to have added more layers of value to the commodified region. Months later, splash-shaped stickers could be seen at the café windows, advertising its products and facilities. Again, the aesthetics of protest was appropriated and commodified.

▲ *Figure 4.*
Sticker for the protest. Windows with red paint and promotional splash-shaped stickers.
Source: Author, 2015

The girl and the gas in Knightsbridge

In the night of 23-24 January 2016, Banksy made one of his artworks in the rich area of Knightsbridge, London. He used a wooden construction hoarding located opposite the French Embassy to criticize France's treatment of refugees in Calais by referring to Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, one of France's most popular historical novels which can also be read as a humanitarian manifesto. In the famous preface to the book, Hugo (1909: 3) writes: "so long as ignorance and misery remain on earth, books like this cannot be useless". Banksy reproduced the worldwide famous drawing of a poor and young Cosette, used to market the musical of *Les Misérables*. This production has been very successful in France, UK and USA for more than three decades and it has been the longest-running musical in London.

The location of the intervention was highly symbolic, as it criticized the use of tear gas by the French police against refugees and migrants in the "Jungle", a large encampment in Calais. The iconic figure in the mural had tears coming from her eyes and, as in the poster, a torn French flag as a background. Although the upper part of the artwork was similar to the musical visual identity, its lower part showed the sprayed image of a gas cloud coming from a can with the initials CS, another name for tear gas. The mural portrayed the fragile

Cosette – representing the poor, the weak, the refugees, the migrants – as a victim of the violence perpetrated by the French police forces.

This street art piece adds layers of meaning as it manages to evoke simultaneously a classic French novel, a world famous musical and a repression practice. Like many other urban interventions, he did about controversial political issues, Banksy's work is ironic and bitter. The juxtaposition of the contrasting elements (the girl and the gas) portrayed the incoherence between the widespread acclaimed ideals of humanism and the actual practices of inhumane treatment of those who are excluded.

This mural is mainly an urban work of art, and can be considered very daring regarding the highly surveilled space it was placed in. Nevertheless, the intervention did not end with the mural: in the left corner of this urban canvas, a QR code was placed, which led to a video on YouTube showing scenes of the police attack at the camp in Calais. In this sense, the whole image can also be seen as a lure to draw the viewer's attention to the video. Banksy's work is an example of the complexity of urban interactions and of convergence (Jenkins, 2006). In this transmedia urban communication, the artist used alternative and complementary media resources to communicate, reinforce and prove what he had to say. These were his tactical tools operating in the domains of the strong (De Certeau, 1984).

Banksy's work, although covered and removed on the same day that it appeared, was the most reverberated and probably the most successful in its political aim to call attention to the treatment that refugees were receiving in Calais. This intervention was also the most "professional" one: done by a notoriously anonymous artist, it was reverberated in the mass media in the UK and abroad. At the same time, it is also the most branded and commodifiable intervention, because just as his other works, the hoarding he painted is worth a fortune on the art market.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

My observations across London between September 2015 and June 2016 and the collected images revealed important themes of contention, *i.e.* the following issues were found to be in evidence in the streets: austerity, Brexit referendum, refugees/migration, gentrification, gender, race/racism, use of public resources, preservation of local cultures and surveillance/privacy. Regarding the communication between the social actors, there are many forms of interaction taking place at the street level. One of them is the communication between the "writers": the official institution, the company and the jammers, for example. But, as interventions happen in open spaces, the dialogue also includes the general public: both the institution and the jammer are talking to publics. They are using the street as a canvas and as a screen for their discussion. Even when the intervention is addressed to a corporation or to an individual, it seems to be aimed at the general public too. Most of the times, artists and activists work *in situ* but seek to receive social and mainstream media publicity, reverberation and a wider visibility to the artwork and also to the cause – when there is one.

Observing the urban surfaces' materiality, I noticed that many interventions were done over hoardings originally made for protecting construction sites from view and unauthorized access. These structures are also a separation device, as they prevent the contact between the general public and the workers; and between the public and the private space. Besides its primary function as a shield, they are also used to display warning and information signs as well as marketing and promotional messages. As seen in three of the four cases I presented, activists extend and subvert the purposes of construction hoardings, using them as canvases for urban interaction. I believe that the large number of inscriptions found over this kind of surface is not a coincidence, but a sign that hoardings work well for this kind of interactions for particular reasons. If compared to walls, windows, doors and facades, hoardings are cheap structures that can receive paint and other interferences without much damage to their function. They are not seen as valuable private property; hence, using them as canvasses for contentious communication is a kind of compromising, respectful and obedient transgression. Even when writing provocative or counter-hegemonic discourses, the individuals, artists and activists seem to avoid permanently damaging the actual properties. Besides, the transitory character of the construction hoarding makes it also an almost perfect base for transitory claims to the city.

Interventions against corporate and state communication are not a new phenomenon. Rhetorical strategies such as parody and criticism of advertising, as well as the appropriation of these counter-hegemonic speeches, have been part of the capitalist dynamics and neoliberal rationale. There is also an especially ambivalent and intertwining relation between transgressive street culture and the phenomenon of commodification of the city's space; and this is linked to class and race. As Banet-Weiser (2012: 106) observes, "in creative cities that develop alongside processes of gentrification, "urban" street art signals a desirable racial presence to wealthy investors and tourists rather than actual raced, undesirable bodies". In the same vein David Harvey (2012) notes that singularity and transgression are valued as they break the homogeneity of the production of goods. The dynamics for the functioning of capitalism in contemporary life needs dissensus, as it tends to be appropriated, normalized and even sold as a mark of authenticity and originality.

Looking back at the cases observed, I tend to consider the protest against *Killer Cereal Café* in Brick Lane, as a scene of dissensus, precisely due to the fact that a subaltern group forced a visibility through disruptive tactics. Their claims against gentrification were somehow heard, as the action highlighted the issue in the media and made it an object of public debate. In spite of this visibility, however, the actual result of that direct action was uncertain and presumably not very successful: as we could see, the process of the city's commodification can rather easily appropriate and neutralize protests.

In Hackney Wick, the people who sprayed paint over the hoardings also forced a visibility in the urban landscape, in ideally sanitized spaces; controlled by other pictorial and verbal speeches. These inscriptions also referred to the process of gentrification, but in a kind of nonsense way. Although this might be read as simple noise, I consider that

their presence and especially their insistence is a way of producing scenes of dissensus and politics through nonsense and humor. The ephemeral speech of unauthorized urban interventions are temporary and volatile, but can also embed resistance, marked by audacity and creativity. Maybe because of its enigmatic or nonsense character, opposite to the neoliberal criteria, consumer culture cannot absorb some of the urban expressions that remain marginal.

The Fusion, in Shoreditch, on the contrary, was a case of hegemonic voice that not only illustrates the aesthetic and political consensus and appropriation of East London; but also dilutes the creative character of graffiti, transforming it into a kind of decorative accessory for a luxurious building.

In Knightsbridge, Banksy's work is an example of vicarious counter-hegemonic voice. The artist is not speaking about his own experience when he addresses issues like wars, refugee camps, etc. His oeuvre highlights the point of view of the weak, of gay people, of children, of migrants, of the poor. Even considering that Banksy's work challenges hegemonic institutions, Banet-Weiser (2012: 94-95) sees the street artist as "a brand in and on himself" and a neoliberal "*free* enterprising individual". His audacious act of making his protest art in such a rich and surveilled area adds value to his intervention, in a sort of authenticity that comes with transgression and illegality.

In this article, I chose to analyze four specific cases of interventions in London, in three different areas. All these cases raised awareness regarding important issues that have been central in discussions about the urban context in the UK and beyond, namely the phenomenon of gentrification and tensions regarding migrants/refugees. Both topics reflect struggles about spaces and are directly connected to ideas of displacement, of migration, of people moving and being moved from one place to another, searching for something, escaping from something, looking for a better life. These two processes – gentrification and migration - have points of crisis, but are not isolated nor inscribed only in a determined time and space, as they are part of the history of cities and of people who live (in) them.

Returning to the research question I proposed, seeking to understand the impacts and results of the urban interventions in a larger – and political – sense, I believe there is no definite or "right" answer, as the concrete impact is not measurable. By studying these and other cases of urban inscriptions, I could see that dissenting voices are undoubtedly weak, not only because of their limited scope of action in urban spaces but also because of the dynamics of appropriation and commodification that are constantly trying to neutralize them. Looking at London and other global cities, we can observe that, unfortunately, in spite of interventions and protests, gentrification is a fast and strong phenomenon and migrants and refugees are continuously refused entry and/or kept on the fringes of society.

The evidence shows that, in the end, almost nothing escapes the neoliberal rationale as the appropriation undermines and assimilates many kinds of protest and critique in

urban interventions. Nevertheless, I do not believe it can completely neutralize them, as these interventions show that the "distribution of the sensible is never secure" (Tanke, 2011: 72) and that discourse can carry maintenance or transformation (Fairclough, 1992). In this sense, when causing small symbolic disruptions – and persisting in doing so, individuals and groups make politics. There are important contradictions in all the cases analyzed in this article, at different levels: the multiple combination of words and images in the streets often constitutes ambivalent discourses, showing critique and appropriation. Adopting an extended concept of dissensus, I argue that the practice and the presence of the interventions can configure (in themselves) scenes of dissensus.

I conclude by stressing the importance of approaching urban interventions as creative communication practices that reveal tensions, power relations, dissensus as well as consensus taking place in global cities. They comment on current issues, sometimes contributing to public debate about crucial questions. They interfere not only materially, but in the way we understand and make sense of ourselves and of the physical and symbolic world. The city is a site of lived, interpreted, mediated, shared experiences. These usually banal inscriptions are important to the city, to the society and as objects of research. Urban artists and activists – be individuals or groups, organised or not, famous or anonymous, making occasional or regular interventions – can become political, showing the uneasiness, the discomfort, the lack and the excess of contemporary life. They can reflect and produce the movement, the instability, the insecurity; as societies are not fixed. They are always in the making, in the writing.

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URBANE INTERVENCIJE U GLOBALNOM GRADU: NESLAGANJE, KONSENZUS I AMBIVALENCIJA NA ULICAMA LONDONA

Laura Guimarães Corrêa

SAŽETAK *Ovaj rad analizira urbane intervencije kao komunikativne prakse koje mogu postati vizualne „scene neslaganja", odnosno političkog remećenja koje iniciraju novi glasovi u društvu. U tri prezentirana slučaja aktivisti upotrebljavaju različite taktike i tehnike kako bi se njihovi zahtjevi vidjeli na površini grada. Takve aktivnosti mogu generirati razna značenja i imati različite učinke. Jedan od slučajeva potvrđuje da korporativni diskursi mogu prisvojiti urbane intervencije, što pokazuje da važni suvremeni urbani izričaji, poput grafita i ulične umjetnosti, koji su dio rastućeg fenomena komodifikacije urbanog prostora, mogu dovesti do konsenzusa. U zaključku se ističe važnost pristupanja urbanim intervencijama kao kreativnim praksama koje odražavaju i (re)produciraju kretanje, kompleksnost, ambivalenciju i kontradikcije koje su inherentne svakodnevnom životu u globalnim gradovima.*

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

URBANE INTERVENCIJE, VIZUALNA KOMUNIKACIJA, NESLAGANJE, KONSENZUS, AMBIVALENCIJA

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IZBORNE KAMPANJE

ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

UREĐENJE IZBORNE KAMPANJE (PROMIDŽBE) U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ I PROBLEM (NE)KOHERENTNOSTI VAŽEĆEGA NORMATIVNOG OKVIRA

Gordan Struić

SAŽETAK *U radu se razmatra normativni okvir uređenja izborne kampanje (promidžbe) u Republici Hrvatskoj, napose s obzirom na poveći broj propisa koji uređuju ovu materiju te činjenicu da ne postoji jedinstven izborni zakon koji uređuje ovo pitanje. Analizom niza zakona, drugih propisa i akata kojima se uređuje izborna kampanja za parlamentarne, predsjedničke i lokalne izbore te za izbore članova u Europski parlament iz Republike Hrvatske, nastoji se ispitati koherentnost tog okvira. Nakon nekoliko općenitih napomena o normativnom okviru, rad donosi pregled uređenja izborne kampanje nakon 1990. te analizira važeća rješenja. Zaključeno je da su važeća rješenja postupno oblikovana, ali i da ima prostora za njihovo unaprjeđenje te je potvrđena polazišna teza da važeći normativni okvir uređenja izborne kampanje nije koherentan.*

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UVODNA RAZMATRANJA

Iako se ideja izborne kampanje javila još potkraj 18. stoljeća u SAD-u, odnosno u prvoj polovici 19. stoljeća u Europi, do njezina evoluiranja u suvremenu, organiziranu aktivnost došlo je tek sredinom 20. stoljeća, korištenjem televizije za vrijeme američkih predsjedničkih izbora (Kustec Lipicer, 2007; Norris, 2004; Tomić, 2017). U politološkoj literaturi postoje brojne definicije izborne kampanje. Mirjana Kasapović (2003: 134) tako navodi da je riječ o planiranoj i organiziranoj političkoj djelatnosti „kojom izborni akteri nastoje dobiti što veću potporu birača za vlastite političke opcije i tako osvojiti vlast ili steći što veći udio u vlasti, tj. maksimirati izbornu dobit". Slično tome, Dražen Lalić i Suzana Kunac (2005: 38) određuju izbornu kampanju kao organiziranu i planiranu komunikacijsko-marketinšku „aktivnost političkih stranaka i kandidata kojoj je cilj osiguranje potpore (dijela) javnosti potrebne za održanje na vlasti, osvajanje vlasti ili utjecanje na vlast". Na sličan način i Zoran Tomić (2012: 240) izbornu kampanju definira kao „aktivnost političkih stranaka i kandidata u vrijeme (pred)izborne kampanje", čiji je cilj primjenom integrirane marketinške komunikacije „predstaviti kandidate i program, izgraditi pozitivan stranački i osobni *image*, a zatim pridobiti birače za postizanje planiranog izbornog cilja". Polazeći od političko-pragmatičnog pristupa, mogu se uočiti tri osnovna cilja izborne kampanje: prvo, mobilizacija birača (radi njihove izborne participacije u što većem broju); drugo, predstavljanje kandidata, stranaka i njihovih političkih programa biračima; treće, prikupljanje novčanih sredstava i regrutiranje aktivista za kampanju; gledano iz komunikološko-dijaloške perspektive izborna se kampanja određuje kao „poglavito komunikacijski proces u kojemu kandidati i stranke odašilju poruke biračima kako bi im na dan izbora dali svoj glas" (Kasapović, 2003: 134).

U pravnoj literaturi preferira se korištenje zakonskog izraza „izborna promidžba" te se pod njome općenito razumijeva „djelatnost političkih stranaka i kandidata, u razdoblju od dana raspisivanja izbora ili dana objave kandidacijskih lista do određenog dana prije izbora, kojom se biračkom tijelu prezentira izborni program u nastojanju da pridobiju podršku što većeg broja birača" (Vidaković Mukić, 2015: 423). Međutim, zamjetno je kako većina autora uobičajeno naglašava (tek) njezin proceduralni značaj, ističući da je riječ o „vrlo važnoj fazi izbornog postupka" (Smerdel i Sokol, 2009: 263), vremenskom razdoblju „u kojem se kandidati (...) predstavljaju svojim izbornim programima (...) svojim biračima" (Jelušić, 2004: 4) te da ona „počinje danom objave zbirnih lista izbornih jedinica, a završava 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora" (Smerdel, 2013: 357) – bez pobližeg određivanja samog sadržaja i komunikološko-dijaloškog pristupa određenju toga pojma. Bez obzira na navedenu razliku, u ovom radu oba izraza koriste se ravnopravno.

Polazeći od shvaćanja Craiga A. Smitha (1990: 108, prema Šiber, 2003) da je za razumijevanje izborne kampanje nužna analiza, *inter alia*, izbornih pravila, odnosno izbornih propisa i pravila koja predviđaju uvjete i vrijeme kandidiranja, način financiranja kampanje itd., u radu se razmatra normativni (pravni) okvir njezina uređenja radi istraživanja koherentnosti tog okvira, napose s obzirom na poveći broj propisa koji uređuju ovu materiju, kao i to da ne postoji jedinstven izborni zakon. Iako o temi izbornih kampanja postoji izrazito bogata literatura, kako u Hrvatskoj, tako i u svijetu, analizi normativnog okvira uređenja

izborne kampanje dosad se u literaturi, posebice hrvatskoj, posvećivala premala pozornost. Ovim se radom nastoji to promijeniti: nakon uvodnog dijela i općenitih napomena o normativnom okviru uređenja izborne kampanje u drugom dijelu, u trećem dijelu rada pristupa se pregledu načina uređenja izborne kampanje u Hrvatskoj nakon 1990., dok se u četvrtom, središnjem dijelu rada razmatraju relevantne odredbe niza važećih propisa kojima se uređuju pojedina pitanja izborne kampanje[1]. Konačno, u petom, završnom dijelu rada donose se zaključna razmatranja.

OPĆENITE NAPOMENE O NORMATIVNOM OKVIRU

S obzirom na to da je demokratska kontrola cjelokupnoga izbornog procesa, pa tako i kampanje, jedan od temelja na kojima počivaju izbori u svakoj „ustavno-demokratskoj državi liberalnopluralističke provenijencije" (Bačić, 2000: 155), normativni okvir uređenja izbora treba biti jasno i razumljivo strukturiran kako ne bi ostavljao mjesta dvojbi i treba „obuhvatiti sve komponente izbornog sustava nužne za osiguravanje demokratskih izbora" (International IDEA, 2002: 11). U arhitekturi pravnog okvira uređenja izbora postoji niz potkategorija koje čine predmet pobližeg istraživanja, poput izbornog sustava, izbornog menadžmenta, granica izbornih okruga, registracije birača, izborne kampanje, organiziranja i financiranja političkih stranaka i kandidata, glasovanja i utvrđivanja rezultata glasovanja, načina rješavanja izbornih sporova, edukacije birača, promatrača izbora, uloge medija, kao i korištenja tehnologije u izborima (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2012). Kao što je uvodno spomenuto, u radu će biti razmotren samo onaj dio normativnog okvira uređenja izbora koji se odnosi na izborne kampanje u Hrvatskoj. Prije nego što se tome pristupi, potrebno je ukazati na one njezine elemente koji možda i nisu toliko značajni iz perspektive istraživačkog pitanja ovog rada, ali su koristan alat u budućim istraživanjima ove teme – primjerice, njezine komparativne perspektive – pa ih u tom kontekstu treba ukratko izložiti.

Pri istraživanju uređenja izborne kampanje u komparativnoj perspektivi prisutno je nastojanje da se izborna kampanja promatra kroz njezina četiri elementa: prvi element čine akteri izborne kampanje, drugi vremensko razdoblje njezina trajanja, treći njezino financiranje i četvrti sloboda izborne kampanje (*ibid.*: 97-102). Kada je riječ o akterima izborne kampanje, iako u usporednom izbornom pravu postoje različita rješenja, normativni okvir uvijek treba jasno predvidjeti u izbornom ili kaznenom zakonu kakvo postupanje neće biti dopušteno tijekom izborne kampanje; takve odredbe ne bi trebale biti odveć restriktivne, već omogućiti „aktivnu i otvorenu kampanju, oslobođenu od utjecaja" vlasti (International IDEA, 2002: 56). Pritom kodeksi ponašanja političkih stranaka i kandidata u izbornoj kampanji ne moraju nužno biti uključeni u normativni okvir, već mogu činiti dobrovoljni sporazum, kako je to, primjerice, slučaj u Indiji, Indoneziji, Keniji i Liberiji (Catt i dr., 2014: 81).

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[1] Iako se izborna kampanja spominje i u nizu međunarodnih dokumenata, uzimajući u obzir da je njihov značaj u nastojanju oblikovanja općih načela na međunarodnoj razini, poput razumne ravnoteže javnog i privatnog financiranja, poštenih kriterija raspodjele državnih davanja strankama itd., koja, pak, „ne treba miješati s mjerama koje poduzimaju pojedine zemlje" (Kregar, 2007: 97), u ovom se radu na njih neće posebno osvrtati.

Izuzev rijetkih primjera država koje previđaju nešto duže trajanje izborne kampanje, poput Meksika, u kojemu izborna kampanja za predsjedničke izbore traje duže od četiri mjeseca, u najvećem broju država ona uobičajeno traje od dva do četiri tjedna (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2012: 98). Ujedno, za razliku od država anglosaksonskoga pravnog sustava u kojima izborna šutnja nije predviđena, čak ni na pojmovnoj razini, postoji niz država u kojima je njezino trajanje određeno zakonom (poput Bugarske, Slovenije, Mađarske, Rusije i Albanije, u kojima izborna šutnja počinje 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora, dok u Češkoj, Slovačkoj i Rumunjskoj ona traje 48 sati), no postoje i države, poput Švedske, u kojima je dostatan samo džentlmenski sporazum glavnih političkih opcija kojim se obvezuju pridržavati izborne kampanje prema stanovitim standardima, kao i suzdržati se od nje prije dana održavanja izbora (Musiał-Karg, 2013: 101-102).

Kod uređivanja načina financiranja izborne kampanje treba imati u vidu da postoje javni i privatni izvori te da razlike u pristupu država u normiranju proizlaze iz političke tradicije, prevladavajuće političke kulture i načina na koji se oblikuju i provode njihove javne politike (Mataković i Petak, 2010: 86-87). Primjerice, u državama anglosaksonskoga pravnog sustava prevladava financiranje iz privatnih izvora (npr. donacije korporacija), dok u državama kontinentalnoga pravnog sustava – uz rijetke izuzetke, poput Nizozemske u kojoj je primarno financiranje iz privatnih izvora – prevladava financiranje iz javnih izvora (*ibid.*). Zanimljivo je da pojedine države (npr. Švicarska) nemaju poseban propis koji bi uređivao financiranje političkih aktivnosti i izborne kampanje (van Biezen, 2004; Piccio, 2016).

Četvrti element izborne kampanje čini njezina sloboda koja ujedno sadrži i zahtjev za pridržavanjem niza srodnih prava i sloboda, poput izražavanja, udruživanja, okupljanja i kretanja, pa normativni okvir uređenja izborne kampanje treba obuhvaćati pravo na otvorenu i poštenu kampanju, ali i omogućiti pravodobno i djelotvorno pravno sredstvo u slučajevima povrede prava ili primjene „nerazumnih ograničenja" (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2012: 101).

U usporednoj studiji o uređenju izborne kampanje u 18 država Latinske Amerike (INE/UNDP, 2014), koju su proveli meksički Nacionalni institut za izbore i Program Ujedinjenih naroda za razvoj, također se ističu četiri elementa izborne kampanje. Iako se sadržajno većina njih poklapa s prethodno navedenim – akterima kampanje, aktivnostima koje su usmjerene na realizaciju cilja kampanje (koju bi se moglo podvesti pod opisani element slobode kampanje) i razdobljem u kojemu su te aktivnosti dopuštene – u spomenutoj studiji financiranje kampanja izdvojeno je u zasebnu kategoriju, dok se kao element izborne kampanje navodi njezin cilj, odnosno svrha koja se uobičajeno svodi na pridobivanje glasova birača (*ibid.*: 19-20). Tako se navodi da od ukupno 18 država Latinske Amerike njih 14 zakonom izrijekom i relativno jasno propisuje cilj, odnosno svrhu, poput Argentine, Bolivije, Čilea, Kolumbije, Meksika itd., dok u izbornom zakonodavstvu četiriju država (Brazil, Peru, Urugvaj i Salvador) nije nađena takva odredba (*ibid.*: 22, 118).

Iz dosad izloženog slijedi da postoje različiti pristupi u uređenju izborne kampanje, što proizlazi iz slobode svake države da odlučuje o načinu na koji će urediti svoj izborni sustav, ali i da pritom normativni okvir uređenja izbora, a time i izborne kampanje u pojedinoj

državi, treba biti jasno i razumljivo strukturiran, kako ne bi ostavljao mjesta eventualnim dvojbama pri interpretaciji izbornih pravila, bez kojih, kako primjećuju Mala Htun i Bingham G. Powell (2013: 1), „predstavnička demokracija nije održiva".

IZBORNA KAMPANJA U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ NAKON 1990.

Pri razmatranju normativnog okvira uređenja izborne kampanje najprije vrijedi primijetiti da je još *Zakonom o izboru i opozivu odbornika i zastupnika* iz 1989. (Narodne novine, 55/89) prvi put propisano kako predloženi kandidati imaju „pod jednakim uvjetima pravo na iznošenje i obrazlaganje svojih programa" (čl. 27. st. 2.), a već sljedeće godine donesen je *Zakon o izboru i opozivu odbornika i zastupnika* (Narodne novine, 7/90) kojim je uveden izraz „(pred)izborna kampanja", ali bez određivanja njezina sadržaja. Njime je bilo propisano da Republički odbor za nadzor izbora upozorava na „postupke sredstava informiranja, političkih i drugih organizacija, organa uprave ili kandidata koji ometaju korektnost izborne kampanje i ugrožavaju jednakost prava svih kandidata u njoj". Ako je bilo koji sudionik (pred)izborne kampanje pozivao na nasilje, širio vjersku ili rasnu mržnju ili, pak, poticao neravnopravnost spolova, isti je odbor inicirao pokretanje postupka kod nadležnih državnih tijela.

Zakonom o izborima zastupnika u Sabor Republike Hrvatske iz 1992. (Narodne novine, 22/92) uveden je izraz „izborna promičba" te je prvi put izrijekom propisano da od dana objave lista kandidata izbornih jedinica i zbirne liste državnih lista pa do 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora „svi kandidati za zastupnike i sve političke stranke, koje su predložile kandidate, imaju pod jednakim uvjetima pravo na iznošenje i obrazlaganje svojih izbornih programa te izbornu promičbu" (čl. 18.). Tijekom tog razdoblja Hrvatska radiotelevizija bila je obvezna u okviru svojih programa svim političkim strankama i manjinskim zajednicama određenima zakonom, koje su sudjelovale na izborima za zastupnike, omogućiti da u jednakom vremenu izlože svoj izborni program. Također, sva sredstva javnog priopćavanja morala su „političkim strankama i manjinskim zajednicama (...) i kandidatima za zastupnike (...) omogućiti da pod jednakim uvjetima izlažu svoj program i obavljaju izbornu promičbu" (čl. 19.). Na dan izbora, kao i 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora, bila je zabranjena svaka „promičba" i svako objavljivanje prethodnih rezultata ili procjena rezultata izbora. Njezinu pravilnost isprva je nadzirala Izborna komisija Republike Hrvatske, a nakon *Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izborima zastupnika u Sabor Republike Hrvatske* iz 1993. (Narodne novine, 1/93) i Županijska izborna komisija. Važeći izraz „izborna promidžba" prvi put korišten je tek u *Zakonu o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izborima zastupnika u Sabor Republike Hrvatske* iz 1995. (Narodne novine, 68/95), no sve do donošenja *Zakona o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski državni sabor* iz 1999. (Narodne novine, 116/99)[2] nije bilo značajnijih izmjena i dopuna navedenih odredbi.

Gotovo identične zakonske odredbe iz 1992. o „izbornoj promičbi" bile su ugrađene i u *Zakon o izboru predsjednika Republike Hrvatske* iz 1992. (Narodne novine, 22/92) te su ostale na snazi do *Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izboru predsjednika Republike*

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[2] *Zakonom o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski državni sabor* (Narodne novine, 53/03) naziv tog zakona izmijenjen je u *Zakon o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor.*

Hrvatske iz 2014. (Narodne novine, 128/14). Sličan pristup zakonodavca može se uočiti i u *Zakonu o izboru članova predstavničkih tijela jedinica lokalne samouprave i uprave* iz 1992. (Narodne novine, 90/92). Važeći zakonski izraz „izborna promidžba" uveden je *Zakonom o izboru članova predstavničkih tijela jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave* iz 2001. (Narodne novine, 33/01), koji je svim političkim strankama koje su predložile liste, nositeljima ili drugim predstavnicima nezavisnih lista davao pravo na iznošenje i obrazlaganje svojih izbornih programa i izbornu promidžbu pod jednakim uvjetima, i to od dana objave zbirne kandidacijske liste pa do 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora, a lokalna sredstva javnog informiranja bila su im pod jednakim uvjetima obvezna omogućiti iznošenje i obrazlaganje izbornih programa te „nesmetano obavljanje izborne promidžbe". *Zakonom o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izboru članova predstavničkih tijela jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave* iz 2005. (Narodne novine, 40/05) određeno je da je na dan koji prethodi danu održavanja izbora, kao i na sȃm dan održavanja izbora, sve do zatvaranja birališta u 19 sati, zabranjena svaka izborna promidžba i objavljivanje privremenih rezultata ili njihovih procjena. Ispitivanje javnog mnijenja i opredjeljenja birača o glasovanju bilo je dopušteno i za vrijeme trajanja izbora, a rezultati ispitivanja nisu se smjeli objavljivati do zatvaranja birališta. Navedene odredbe potom su preuzete u *Zakon o izborima općinskih načelnika, gradonačelnika, župana i gradonačelnika Grada Zagreba* iz 2007. (Narodne novine, 109/07) te su ostale na snazi sve do važećeg *Zakona o lokalnim izborima*. Stupanjem na snagu *Zakona o financiranju političkih aktivnosti i izborne promidžbe* iz 2011. (dalje: ZoFPAIP; Narodne novine, 24/11) prestali su važiti *Zakon o financiranju političkih stranaka, nezavisnih lista i kandidata* (Narodne novine, 1/07) i *Zakon o financiranju izborne promidžbe za izbor predsjednika Republike Hrvatske* (Narodne novine, 105/04).

VAŽEĆA NORMATIVNA RJEŠENJA

Zakon o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor

Zakonom o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor (dalje: ZoIZHS; Narodne novine, 116/99, 109/00, 53/03, 167/03, 44/06, 19/07, 20/09, 145/10, 24/11, 93/11, 120/11, 19/15, 104/15, 48/18) određeno je da izborna promidžba započinje „danom objave zbirnih lista izbornih jedinica, a završava 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora". Od dana održavanja izbora pa sve do zatvaranja birališta, kao i 24 sata koja prethode danu održavanja izbora, zabranjena je „svaka izborna promidžba, objavljivanje procjena izbornih rezultata, kao i objavljivanje prethodnih, neslužbenih rezultata izbora, objavljivanje fotografija u sredstvima javnog priopćavanja, izjava i intervjua kandidata, te navođenje njihovih izjava ili pisanih djela" (čl. 28.).

Nakon što su više od 15 godina od donošenja ZoIZHS-a (1999.) na snazi bile odredbe prema kojima su sve političke stranke koje su predložile kandidacijske liste u vrijeme izborne promidžbe pod jednakim uvjetima imale pravo na iznošenje i obrazlaganje svojih izbornih programa te na izbornu promidžbu, a sva sredstva javnog priopćavanja obvezu da u svom djelovanju omoguće ostvarivanje tog prava, *Zakonom o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor* iz 2015. (Narodne novine, 19/15) u čl. 29. propisano je da su Hrvatska televizija i Hrvatski radio dužni „pratiti izbornu promidžbu te (...) u razdoblju izborne promidžbe svim sudionicima u izborima dužni omogućiti iznošenje i

obrazlaganje njihovih izbornih programa. Nakladnici ostalih medija samostalno odlučuju hoće li i u kojoj mjeri pratiti izbornu promidžbu". Smisao takvog pristupa valja pronaći u *Konačnom prijedlogu zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izboru zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor*, *P. Z. br. 722* od 4. veljače 2015. (Hrvatski sabor, 2015a) u kojemu se ističe da se time "uvažava realnost da danas postoji čitav niz medija koji u svojem programu imaju minimum ili uopće nemaju političke sadržaje", realiziraju preporuke iz *Konačnog izvješća Ograničene misije za promatranje parlamentarnih izbora OESS/ODIHR-a* (OSCE, 2012) održanih 4. prosinca 2011. te omogućuje kvalitetno i sustavno praćenje izborne promidžbe.

Izmjenama i dopunama ZoIZHS-a iz 2015. propisana je obveza nakladnika svih medija da u praćenju izborne promidžbe i predstavljanju izbornih aktivnosti kandidata u izborima jamče novinarsku neovisnost, profesionalnost i stručnost, dosljedno poštivanje novinarskoga kodeksa te posebno temeljnog načela slobode izražavanja propisanog u čl. 38. *Ustava Republike Hrvatske* (dalje: *Ustav*; Narodne novine, 56/90, 135/97, 8/98, 113/00, 124/00, 28/01, 41/01, 55/01, 76/10, 85/10, 5/14), čl. 10. *Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda* (Narodne novine – Međunarodni ugovori, 18/97, 6/99, 8/99, 14/02, 1/06, 2/10, 13/17) i čl. 11. *Povelje Europske unije o temeljnim pravima* (Službeni list EU, C 202/389 od 7. lipnja 2016.), vodeći se interesima javnosti. Cilj ovih izmjena treba pronaći u modernizaciji i racionalizaciji pravila u postupanju elektroničkih medija tijekom izborne promidžbe radi boljeg utvrđivanja oblika i vremena praćenja izborne promidžbe svih sudionika izbora. Njima se sudionicima izbora jamči jednak tretman, a urednicima i novinarima novinarska neovisnost, profesionalnost i stručnost te, posebice, poštivanje načela slobode izražavanja.

Pravila o postupanju elektroničkih medija s nacionalnom koncesijom u Republici Hrvatskoj tijekom izborne promidžbe

Radi ostvarenja pravične zastupljenosti sudionika u izborima koji su istaknuli liste, pravične mogućnosti predstavljanja programa i vođenja izborne promidžbe, temeljem čl. 30. ZoIZHS-a, Hrvatski sabor donio je *Pravila o postupanju elektroničkih medija s nacionalnom koncesijom u Republici Hrvatskoj tijekom izborne promidžbe* (dalje: *Pravila o postupanju*; Narodne novine, 118/14). Njima je predviđeno da će "Hrvatska radiotelevizija i drugi elektronički mediji s nacionalnom koncesijom (...) u razdoblju izborne promidžbe za izbore zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor, počevši od dana objave zbirnih lista izbornih jedinica pa do 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora", omogućiti sudionicima ("političkim strankama, odnosno stranačkim i neovisnim listama te kandidatima za zastupnike pripadnike nacionalnih manjina") da predstave sebe i svoje programe u emisijama nakladnika elektroničkih medija. Međutim, valja naglasiti da se odredbe *Pravila o postupanju* primjenjuju isključivo na postupanje elektroničkih medija s nacionalnom koncesijom, dok postupanja ostalih medija (poput tiskanih medija) tijekom istog razdoblja njima nisu obuhvaćena. Zbog toga su u praksi već zabilježene određene primjedbe, poput one kada naziv jednog od sudionika na izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatske sabor 2016. nije bio naveden u jednim dnevnim novinama pri predstavljanju predložene liste, ali – unatoč tome što se radilo o očitom postupanju koje nije bilo u skladu s izbornim pravilima – Državno izborno povjerenstvo Republike Hrvatske (dalje: DIP), zbog nepostojanja odredbe kojom bi bili obuhvaćeni i ostali mediji, nije moglo zatražiti da se to ispravi (vidi npr. DIP, 2016).

Načela kojih se nakladnici elektroničkih medija s nacionalnom koncesijom (dalje: nakladnici) moraju pridržavati u predstavljanju izbornih aktivnosti identična su načelima iz čl. 29. ZoIZHS-a. Hrvatska televizija i Hrvatski radio moraju osigurati najmanje pet minuta za predstavljanje političkih programa za sve sudionike izbora, a nakladnici internim pravilima moraju urediti mjesto i vrijeme snimanja, vrijeme osigurano za predstavljanje programa, vrijeme i način prikazivanja programa, pravila za sučeljavanje u izborima i objavljivanje političkih programa sudionika izbora. Navedena pravila moraju biti javno objavljena u roku od sedam dana od dana raspisivanja izbora.

Nakladnici imaju pravo organizirati sučeljavanja kandidata u izborima, a oblik političkog predstavljanja uređuju svojim internim pravilima, što im ostavlja vrlo širok prostor diskrecije u njihovu oblikovanju. Naime, s obzirom na to da su spomenuta pravila vrlo općenita, postoji mogućnost da budu nejasna i otvore prostor različitim interpretacijama, o čemu svjedoče primjeri izbora za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor 2016., kada programska pravila jednog nakladnika za praćenje izborne promidžbe na tim izborima nisu bila jasno određena u pogledu načina organiziranja sučeljavanja (*ibid.*). Državni dužnosnici i dužnosnici lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave koji su ujedno sudionici izbora ne smiju imati povlašteni položaj prema drugim sudionicima i njihove redovite aktivnosti ne smiju biti korištene radi izborne promidžbe. Informiranje o njihovim redovitim aktivnostima dopušteno je u okviru informativnih programa nakladnika, bez navođenja njihove kandidature na izborima, ako te aktivnosti proizlaze iz zakonom utvrđenog djelokruga tijela u kojima obnašaju dužnost. Uslijed prigovora sudionika izbora na način njihova predstavljanja, odnosno zastupljenosti ili učestalosti njihova pojavljivanja u emisijama nakladnika, o zahtjevu podnositelja prigovora odlučuje DIP. Međutim, nije posve jasno kako bi u tom slučaju DIP trebao postupiti, napose jer ne raspolaže mehanizmom za izricanje sankcija, na što je ukazivao i sam DIP (Hrvatski sabor, 2014), pa bi u perspektivi unaprjeđenja ove materije valjalo razmotriti i mogućnost jasnijeg definiranja njegovih ovlasti kod postupanja koje je u suprotnosti s odredbama o izbornoj promidžbi.

Pravila o postupanju predviđaju obvezu nakladnika da svim sudionicima izbora pod jednakim uvjetima omoguće objavljivanje plaćenih oglasa izborne promidžbe i usto osiguraju njihovu jasnu odvojenost od preostalog programa tako da javnost može razlučiti da je riječ o plaćenim oglasima izborne promidžbe. Međutim, oglašavanje izborne promidžbe ne ubraja se u trajanje spotova za oglašavanje prema *Zakonu o elektroničkim medijima* (dalje: ZoEM; Narodne novine, 153/09, 84/11, 94/13, 136/13)[3] i *Zakonu o Hrvatskoj radioteleviziji* (dalje: ZoHRT; Narodne novine, 137/10, 76/12, 78/16, 46/17, 73/17)[4]. Pritom vrijedi spomenuti da je Agencija za elektroničke medije podnijela Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske (dalje: Ustavni sud) prijedlog za pokretanje postupka za ocjenu suglasnosti s *Ustavom* i zakonom odredbi *Pravila o postupanju* o oglašavanju izborne promidžbe, navodeći, među ostalim, da te odredbe nisu suglasne s čl. 5. st. 1. *Ustava* (o suglasnosti zakona s *Ustavom*), kao i s čl. 32. st. 1. ZoEM-a te čl. 37. st. 1. i 2. ZoHRT-a te da se osporene odredbe

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[3] Prema čl. 32. st. 1. ZoEM-a kratki televizijski oglasi i kratki oglasi za teletrgovinu unutar pojedinog sata, izuzev televizijskih programskih kanala isključivo posvećenih oglašavanju i teletrgovini te samopromidžbi, ne smiju trajati dulje od 12 minuta.

[4] Prema čl. 37. st. 1. i 2. ZoHRT-a promidžbene poruke u svakom programu HRT-a u radijskim programskim kanalima ne smiju trajati dulje od 9 minuta u jednom satu programa, a promidžbene poruke u svakom programu HRT-a u općim televizijskim programskim kanalima dulje od 9 minuta u jednom satu programa, s tim da od 18 do 22 sata ne smiju trajati dulje od 4 minute u jednom satu programa.

odnose samo na nakladnike na nacionalnoj razini, čime se stavljaju u nejednak položaj ostali nakladnici (na regionalnoj i lokalnoj razini). Međutim, *Rješenjem Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske broj: U-II-7673/2014 od 14. travnja 2015.* (Narodne novine, 46/15) utvrđeno je da razrada obveza nakladnika tijekom promidžbe nije u nesuglasju s *Ustavom* i navedenim zakonima jer se na izbornu promidžbu „ne odnose odredbe drugih zakona (ZoEM-a i ZoHRT-a) kojima je uređena promidžba i trajanje promidžbenih poruka u druge, komercijalne svrhe". Ustavni sud utvrdio je da se odredba na temelju koje su donesena *Pravila o postupanju* odnosi isključivo na elektroničke medije s nacionalnom koncesijom i uputio na stajalište izraženo u *Rješenju Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske broj: U-II-3432/2003 od 11. srpnja 2007.* (Ustavni sud, 2007). U njemu se, uz ostalo, navodi da *Pravila o postupanju* čine razliku između javne i privatnih televizija, što „pokazuje da je donositelj Pravila vodio računa o specifičnom, drugačijem položaju komercijalnih elektroničkih medija u odnosu na javnu televiziju". U tom *Rješenju*, koje se odnosilo na *Pravila o postupanju elektroničkih medija s nacionalnom koncesijom u Republici Hrvatskoj tijekom izborne promidžbe* iz 2003. (Narodne novine, 165/03, 105/07), ističe se ustavnosudsko stajalište da „cjelina Pravila i svih njegovih odredbi previše podrobno razrađuju obveze svih nakladnika elektroničkih medija u predstavljanju stranaka i kandidata u izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor" i da sustav praćenja promidžbe nije svrhovit u cjelini sa stajališta sudionika u izborima i gledatelja koji prate te emisije jer su po „trajanju i strukturi obveznih pitanja i izlaganja kandidata u osnovi suprotne njihovoj svrsi".

Izborni etički kodeks

ZoIZHS-om iz 1999. prvi je put bilo propisano osnivanje Etičkog povjerenstva kao nadstranačkog tijela „općepriznatoga javnog ugleda koje priopćenjima i upozorenjima djeluje na promicanje i ostvarivanje etičkih i demokratskih načela u izborima" te „ocjenjuje ponašanje sudionika izbora tijekom izborne promidžbe i samog postupka izbora i provodi izvanpravni nadzor izborne promidžbe" (čl. 103.). Njegove članove, po prijedlogu parlamentarnih stranaka, imenuje Ustavni sud iz reda istaknutih javnih osoba koje nisu kandidati na izborima i nisu članovi političkih stranaka, a predsjednik HAZU-a po položaju je predsjednik tog povjerenstva. Nakon objave odluke o raspisivanju izbora, a prije početka promidžbe, Etičko povjerenstvo donosi i objavljuje *Izborni etički kodeks* koji čini sustav pravila o ponašanju pojedinaca i političkih stranaka u izbornoj promidžbi i izbornom postupku, no prije njegova donošenja mora zatražiti mišljenje parlamentarnih stranaka (čl. 106.).

Izborni etički kodeks (dalje: *Kodeks*; Narodne novine, 75/16) predviđa temeljne vrijednosti, ponašanje sudionika izbora i promatrača izbornog postupka, ravnopravnost i jednakost u sredstvima javnog priopćavanja, jednakost svih u mogućnostima predizbornog predstavljanja. Biračima je omogućeno dobivanje objektivnih informacija koje se odnose na stranke i kandidate u svim sredstvima javnog priopćavanja, dok su strankama i kandidatima omogućeni jednaki uvjeti za predizborno nadmetanje. U tom cilju, *Kodeks* predviđa u t. III. st. 1. potrebu ravnopravnog položaja svih stranaka u predstavljanju njihovih programa i kandidata, kao i dostupnost vremena pod jednakim uvjetima, u skladu s *Pravilima o postupanju*. Također, *Kodeksom* se u t. III. st. 2. i 3. očekuje „od elektroničkih medija s nacionalnom koncesijom da u svojim emisijama, koje nisu vezane uz predstavljanje izbornih stranačkih programa i kandidata, ne koriste sadržaje koji bi se mogli tumačiti kao

izborna promidžba", dok se od komercijalnih medija „očekuje poštovanje načela jednakog pristupa plaćenoj političkoj promidžbi svih stranaka i kandidata te objektivno, nepristrano i uravnoteženo informiranje o izbornoj kampanji". Pritom, vrijedi primijetiti da se u *Kodeksu* koriste oba izraza – i „izborna kampanja" i „izborna promidžba".

Iako *Kodeks* predstavlja sustav pravila o ponašanju pojedinaca i političkih stranaka u izbornoj promidžbi i izbornom postupku, potrebno je naglasiti da je riječ o aktu koji u biti ne predviđa sankcije, već se za stranke i pojedince koji su postupili protivno *Kodeksu* tijekom izborne promidžbe i postupka izbora samo očekuje da će se javno ispričati.

Zakon o izboru predsjednika Republike Hrvatske

U usporedbi sa ZoIZHS-om, *Zakon o izboru predsjednika Republike Hrvatske* (dalje: ZoI-PRH; Narodne novine, 22/92, 42/92, 71/97, 69/04, 99/04, 44/06, 24/11, 128/14) sadrži gotovo identične odredbe o trajanju izborne promidžbe, pravu kandidata na iznošenje i obrazlaganje izbornih programa, obvezi Hrvatske televizije i Hrvatskog radija na praćenje izborne promidžbe i omogućavanje iznošenja i obrazlaganje izbornih programa te o samostalnoj odluci nakladnika ostalih medija hoće li i u kojoj mjeri pratiti izbornu promidžbu, kao i odredbe o izbornoj šutnji (čl. 13.-15.). Načela kojih su se nakladnici svih medija dužni pridržavati u praćenju izborne promidžbe i predstavljanju izbornih aktivnosti identična su načelima iz čl. 29. ZoIZHS-a, a na praćenje izborne promidžbe na odgovarajući način primjenjuju se *Pravila o postupanju* pa bi i ovdje valjalo podcrtati nedostatke spomenute pri razmatranju primjene *Pravila o postupanju* na izbore za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor. Uz navedene odredbe, koje su propisane izmjenama i dopunama ZoIPRH-a iz 2014., potrebno je spomenuti da je ZoIPRH-om izrijekom propisano da u slučaju ponavljanja izbora, u vremenu od dana prvoga glasovanja pa do 24 sata prije dana ponovljenih izbora, kandidati za predsjednika imaju sva prava na iznošenje izbornih programa i „izbornu promičbu" (čl. 19.) te da DIP nadzire pravilnost „izborne promičbe" (čl. 22. st. 1. t. 6.)[5].

Zakon o izboru članova u Europski parlament iz Republike Hrvatske

Zakon o izboru članova u Europski parlament iz Republike Hrvatske (dalje: ZoIČEPRH; Narodne novine, 92/10, 23/13, 143/13) sadrži gotovo identične odredbe o trajanju izborne promidžbe, izbornoj šutnji i Etičkom povjerenstvu kao i ZoIZHS. Međutim, za razliku od ZoIZHS-a, ZoIČEPRH-om je propisano da u vrijeme izborne promidžbe sve političke stranke koje su predložile liste kandidata i kandidati kandidacijske liste grupe birača pod jednakim uvjetima imaju pravo na iznošenje stavova te izbornu promidžbu, a sva sredstva javnog priopćavanja moraju u svom djelovanju omogućiti ostvarivanje njihovih prava sukladno *Pravilima o postupanju* (čl. 22.). Stoga, i ovdje vrijede napomene o nedostacima koji su prethodno spomenuti pri razmatranju primjene *Pravila o postupanju* na izbore za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor, kao i na predsjedničke izbore. Nadalje, istim zakonom izrijekom je određeno da DIP nadzire pravilnost izborne promidžbe (čl. 19. t. 8.), ali i da političke stranke, birači koji su predložili kandidacijske liste grupe birača, nevladine udruge, međunarodne organizacije koje djeluju u Hrvatskoj imaju pravo, između ostalog, pratiti izbornu promidžbu (čl. 72.).

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[5] U navedenim člancima nije usklađena terminologija s novijim izbornim zakonima.

Zakon o lokalnim izborima

Za razliku od ZoIZHS-a, ZoIPRH-a i ZoIČEPRH-a, koji ne određuju sadržaj izborne promidžbe, *Zakon o lokalnim izborima* (dalje: ZoLI, Narodne novine, 144/12, 121/16) izbornu promidžbu definira kao skup radnji koje poduzimaju sudionici izborne promidžbe radi javnog predstavljanja i obrazlaganja svojih izbornih programa biračima (čl. 32.). Pritom se kao sudionici izborne promidžbe navode kandidati, nositelji kandidacijskih lista grupe birača, političke stranke, odnosno dvije ili više političkih stranaka, naznačeni na objavljenoj listi kandidata i zbirnoj listi, a svi oni imaju pravo na izbornu promidžbu pod jednakim uvjetima (čl. 33.), uz obvezu da je vode slobodno, otvoreno, javno i argumentirano, dok suprotstavljanje i sučeljavanje treba biti obrazloženo i utemeljeno na činjenicama. Na tom temelju, svi sudionici imaju jednake uvjete predizbornog nadmetanja i ravnopravan položaj u predstavljanju u svim lokalnim medijima, koji u svojim emisijama ili člancima u tiskanim medijima, a koji nisu vezani uz predstavljanje izbornih programa, ne smiju koristiti sadržaje koji se mogu tumačiti kao izborna promidžba. Usto, elektronički mediji moraju poštivati načelo jednakog pristupa plaćenoj političkoj promidžbi sudionika izborne promidžbe i načelo objektivnog, nepristranog i uravnoteženog informiranja o izbornoj promidžbi.

Izborna promidžba počinje danom objave zbirnih lista, a prestaje 24 sata prije dana održavanja izbora. Međutim, unatoč jasnom određenju trenutka početka izborne promidžbe, u praksi lokalnih izbora zabilježene su nedoumice oko dopuštenosti oglašavanja potencijalnih sudionika na internetskim stranicama, plakatima, letcima ili u tisku prije službenog početka izborne promidžbe. DIP je na upite odgovarao da ZoLI ne predviđa zabranu takvog oglašavanja, ali da ZoEM propisuje zabranu oglašavanja političkih stranaka, koalicija i nezavisnih zastupnika predstavničkih tijela putem radija i televizije i zabranu političkim strankama i koalicijama da sponzoriraju audiovizualni ili radijski program, izuzev u vrijeme izborne promidžbe, tumačeći da DIP, županijska, gradska i općinska izborna povjerenstva nisu ovlašteni „nadzirati pravilnost oglašavanja potencijalnih izbornih sudionika u razdoblju prije službenog početka izborne promidžbe, jer se takvo oglašavanje (…) ne može smatrati izbornom promidžbom" (DIP, 2017: 13). No, imajući u vidu da pitanje dopuštenosti oglašavanja prije službenog početka promidžbe izaziva nedoumice u praksi, valjalo bi razmotriti mogućnost da se i ono jasno zakonski uredi. Protekom izborne promidžbe započinje razdoblje izborne šutnje koje traje do dana održavanja izbora (do 19 sati), tijekom kojeg je prema čl. 35. st. 3. zabranjeno „javno predstavljanje i obrazlaganje izbornih programa sudionika biračima, nagovaranje birača da glasuju za određenu kandidacijsku listu ili kandidata, objavljivanje procjena izbornih rezultata kao i prethodnih, neslužbenih rezultata izbora, izjava i intervjua sudionika izborne promidžbe te navođenje njihovih izjava ili pisanih djela", a optužni prijedlog za prekršaje koji bi povredom ove zabrane bili počinjeni podnosi nadležno izborno povjerenstvo, sukladno čl. 134. st. 6. Ipak, s obzirom na to da se općinsko, gradsko i županijsko izborno povjerenstvo ne bi mogli smatrati stalnim tijelima, trebalo bi pobliže zakonski razjasniti pitanje njihove stranačke sposobnosti u tom postupku pa u tom svjetlu vrijedi istaknuti prijedlog DIP-a da se propiše ovlast Državnog odvjetništva Republike Hrvatske za pokretanje prekršajnog postupka po obavijesti koju o povredi odredbi o izbornoj šutnji zaprimi od nadležnoga izbornog povje-

renstva (*ibid.*: 14). Što se tiče izborne promidžbe za izbor općinskih načelnika, gradonačelnika i župana te njihovih zamjenika u drugom, odnosno trećem krugu izbora, ona počinje sljedećeg dana od dana proglašenja rezultata prethodnog kruga, a prestaje 24 sata prije dana novog kruga izbora. Nadzor pravilnosti izborne promidžbe provode nadležna izborna povjerenstva (županijsko, gradsko i općinsko te izborno povjerenstvo Grada Zagreba).

Zanimljivo je da ZoLI izrijekom propisuje da se na sudionike na odgovarajući način primjenjuju odredbe zakona kojima se uređuje zaštita osobnih podataka (čl. 36.) te da se troškovi izborne promidžbe i prava na naknadu uređuju posebnim zakonom (čl. 34.), dok se u ZoIZHS-u, ZoIPRH-u i ZoIČEPRH-u to *explicite* ne navodi, iako se i na njih *mutatis mutandis* primjenjuju odredbe tih zakona.

Zakon o financiranju političkih aktivnosti i izborne promidžbe

Kao što je spomenuto u kratkom prikazu uređenja izborne kampanje u Hrvatskoj nakon 1990., stupanjem na snagu ZoFPAIP-a (Narodne novine, 24/11, 61/11, 27/13, 2/14, 96/16, 70/17) prestali su važiti zakoni, odnosno odredbe zakona kojima je financiranje izborne promidžbe do tada bilo regulirano na necjelovit i nejedinstven način. Naime, ZoFPAIP-om je određeno da se njegove odredbe primjenjuju na financiranje izborne promidžbe političkih stranaka, nezavisnih lista, odnosno lista grupa birača i kandidata na svim izborima – za predsjednika Republike Hrvatske, zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor, članove za Europski parlament, općinske načelnike, gradonačelnike, župane i gradonačelnika Grada Zagreba te članove predstavničkih tijela jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave izabrane s liste grupe birača (čl. 1. st. 2.). Političke stranke, kandidati i nezavisne liste, odnosno grupe birača mogu financirati izbornu promidžbu iz donacija i vlastitih sredstava i imaju pravo na naknadu troškova izborne promidžbe iz državnog proračuna, odnosno proračuna jedinice lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave, na način i pod uvjetima utvrđenima ZoFPAIP-om (u čl. 18.-21.). Pritom vrijedi primijetiti kako ni ZoFPAIP[6], baš kao ni ZoIZHS, ZoIPRH i ZoIČEPRH, ne definira izbornu promidžbu, odnosno ne precizira njezin sadržaj.

Na temelju čl. 16. ZoFPAIP-a sredstva prikupljena za financiranje izborne promidžbe mogu se koristiti samo za aktivnosti izborne promidžbe te je zabranjeno njihovo korištenje za podmirenje osobnih troškova kandidata, poput troškova za osobnu odjeću, otplatu dugovanja i drugih troškova koji nisu izravno povezani s izbornom promidžbom za dužnost na koju se kandidat kandidira.[7] Usto, ZoFPAIP propisuje ograničenje ukupnog iznosa troškova izborne promidžbe, zabranu financiranja i pogodovanja, obvezu objavljivanja podataka o donacijama i troškovima izborne promidžbe, nadzor nad poštivanjem njegovih odredbi o izbornoj promidžbi[8] te administrativne sankcije i novčane kazne. Međutim,

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[6] *Prijedlog zakona o financiranju političkih aktivnosti, izborne promidžbe i referenduma, P. Z. br. 53* od 29. travnja 2016. (Hrvatski sabor 2016a), nastojao je otkloniti taj nedostatak odredbom prema kojoj je izborna promidžba „skup radnji koje poduzimaju sudionici izborne promidžbe, koje se odnose na vlastito javno predstavljanje te javno predstavljanje i obrazlaganje svojih izbornih programa, u svrhu uvjeravanja birača da glasuju za njih". Međutim, u 8. sazivu Hrvatskoga sabora, ni kasnije, taj prijedlog nije raspravljen.

[7] Također, precizirano je da je za potrebe izborne promidžbe zabranjeno koristiti sredstva državnog proračuna ili proračuna jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave koja kandidati, kao državni dužnosnici ili ovlašteni lokalni dužnosnici, koriste u obavljanju svojih dužnosti te korištenje uredskih prostorija, službenih vozila i uredske opreme državnih tijela i jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave, izuzev osobama na koje se odnose posebni propisi o štićenim osobama.

[8] Riječ je o čl. 27.-39. ZoFPAIP-a. Nadzor provodi DIP, i to od dana otvaranja posebnih računa za financiranje izborne promidžbe do završetka transakcija na tim računima.

G. Struić : UREĐENJE IZBORNE KAMPANJE (PROMIDŽBE) U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ I PROBLEM ...

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uvid u GONG-ov izvještaj o lokalnim izborima 2017. otkriva neke od primjedbi na primjenu zakonskih odredbi u praksi, poput one da se DIP „teško aktivira kako bi pokrenuo nadzor, a kamoli javno reagiraju bar nekim upozorenjem" [*sic*] (GONG, 2017: 7) te da se provodi tek formalni nadzor i ne ispituju pojedinačni slučajevi koji bi možda mogli otkriti neke teže povrede zakonskih odredbi (*ibid.*: 6). Na istom tragu vrijedi izdvojiti *Konačno izvješće OESS/ UDILJP-ove Misije za procjenu parlamentarnih izbora* održanih 8. studenoga 2015. u kojemu je istaknuto da je nekoliko sugovornika Misije za procjenu izbora Ureda za demokratske institucije i ljudska prava pri OESS-u na izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor spomenulo DIP-ov manjak ljudskih resursa, uz sumnju da DIP može provesti primjereni nadzor, zbog čega je u tom izvješću sugerirano da bi u cilju dodatnog jačanja transparentnosti i povjerenja javnosti trebalo „razmotriti mogućnost objavljivanja prijelaznih i konačnih izvješća na stranicama DIP-a" (OSCE, 2016: 14). Općenito, pitanje provedbe nadzora financiranja izborne promidžbe i sankcija za povredu zakonskih odredbi spominjala su i ranija izvješća OESS/ODIHR-ovih misija (npr. OSCE, 2008 i 2012). Njihovu važnost nipošto ne treba zanemariti, napose ima li se u vidu da se izvješća promatračkih misija mogu upotrijebiti i kao dokazi, odnosno argumenti u predmetima koji se dotiču ljudskih prava (npr. Markku, 2016), nalazeći svoju potvrdu u jurisprudenciji Europskog suda za ljudska prava (npr. *Krasnov and Skuratov v. Russia*, ECHR, 2007 ili *Riza and others v. Bulgaria*, ECHR, 2015)

Ostali propisi koji uređuju pojedina pitanja izborne kampanje

Među ostalim propisima koji uređuju samo pojedina pitanja izborne kampanje valja izdvojiti *Zakon o medijima* (Narodne novine, 59/04, 84/11, 81/13), koji u čl. 42. st. 2. određuje da u vrijeme izborne promidžbe ispravak (objavljene informacije) mora biti objavljen u prvom izdanju, odnosno programskom sadržaju medija nakon primitka ispravka, a u slučaju počinjenja kaznenih djela protiv časti i ugleda ili, primjerice, protiv biračkog prava, primijenit će se relevantne odredbe *Kaznenog zakona* (Narodne novine, 125/11, 144/12, 56/15, 61/15, 101/17). Iako se upravo u izborno vrijeme u medijima aktualiziraju pojedina pitanja vezana uz kaznena djela protiv biračkog prava, ona se u praksi svode na teme u kojima je riječ „o manipuliranju demografskim podacima u pograničnim područjima, odnosno 'uvozu' birača ili 'glasovanju mrtvih'" (Sokanović i Getoš Kalac, 2017: 169), no uz njih se u praksi posebice veže problem teškog dokazivanja njihova počinjenja. Što se tiče kaznenih djela protiv časti i ugleda, unatoč nastojanjima za njihovu dekriminalizaciju, koja smjeraju većoj slobodi izražavanja (Hrvatsko novinarsko društvo, 2014; Novoselec, 2016), zakonodavac je zadržao kaznenu odgovornost zbog povrede časti i ugleda nalazeći uporište u čl. 10. st. 2. *Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda*, kojim je omogućeno podvrgavanje slobode izražavanja kaznama propisanima zakonom koje su nužne u demokratskom društvu, uz ostalo, radi zaštite ugleda ili prava drugih. Štoviše, Petar Novoselec (2016: 444) ističe ukorijenjenost kaznenopravne zaštite časti u europskom kontinentalnom pravu. Usto, pojašnjavajući jedno od tih djela, klevetu, koja predstavlja kvalificirani oblik teškog sramoćenja kod kojeg se od počinitelja zahtijeva i da bude svjestan svih obilježja djela i da hoće njihovo ostvarenje, isti autor tumači da namjeru počinitelja „ne isključuje okolnost da je tvrdnju iznio u predizbornoj kampanji (...)" (*ibid.*: 466). Istovremeno, vrijedi imati u vidu stajalište Europskog suda za ljudska prava u predmetu *Lingens v. Austria* (ECHR, 1986) prema kojemu su „granice prihvatljive kritike šire kad je riječ o političaru nego o privatnoj

osobi" jer „za razliku od privatne osobe, političar se neizbježno i svjesno izlaže detaljnom proučavanju svake njegove riječi i postupka, kako od novinara, tako i od javnosti u cjelini, i stoga mora pokazati viši stupanj snošljivosti".

Prema ZoEM-u nije dopušteno oglašavanje političkih stranaka, koalicija i nezavisnih zastupnika predstavničkih tijela, osim za vrijeme izborne promidžbe sukladno posebnom zakonu (čl. 30. st. 3.), a političke stranke i koalicije ne smiju biti sponzori audiovizualnog ili radijskog programa, osim u vrijeme izborne promidžbe sukladno posebnom zakonu (čl. 35.). Također, u vrijeme izborne promidžbe nakladnik televizije i/ili radija mora omogućiti svim političkim strankama promidžbu pod jednakim uvjetima, sukladno izbornim propisima i uputama nadležnog tijela koje nadzire ili provodi izbore (čl. 36. st. 8.). Usto, valja primijetiti da je prema čl. 21. ZoHRT-a i čl. 15. *Statuta Hrvatske radiotelevizije* (Narodne novine, 14/13) glavni ravnatelj HRT-a donio *Programska pravila Hrvatske radiotelevizije za praćenje izbora zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor 2016.* (HRT, 2016), kojima je uređeno postupanje HRT-a tijekom izborne promidžbe za parlamentarne izbore 2016. Iako potonja pravila sadrže precizan kriterij pozivanja na sučeljavanje (u anketi HRT-a izborni sudionici moraju osvojiti najmanje 4 % glasova u uzorku od 1000 ispitanika u najmanje jednoj izbornoj jedinici), u praksi izbora zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor 2016. zabilježene su primjedbe na njihovu primjenu zbog organiziranja sučeljavanja i prije službenog početka izborne promidžbe (vidi npr. DIP, 2016: 12).

Iako se u *Zakonu o zaštiti osobnih podataka*[9] (Narodne novine, 103/03, 118/06, 41/08, 130/11, 106/12) ne navodi pojam izborne promidžbe, odredbe tog zakona primjenjuju se u slučaju prikupljanja i obrade osobnih podataka građana u svrhe izborne promidžbe. Naime, osobni podaci smiju se prikupljati i dalje obrađivati isključivo uz privolu ispitanika, i to isključivo u onu svrhu za koju je ispitanik dao privolu i u drugim zakonom određenim slučajevima, a ispitanik ima pravo usprotiviti se obradi osobnih podataka u svrhe marketinga te se osobni podaci koji se na njega odnose u tu svrhu tada ne smiju obrađivati. Voditelj zbirke osobnih podataka ispitanika mora unaprijed obavijestiti o namjeravanoj obradi osobnih podataka u svrhe marketinga i o pravu da se usprotivi takvoj obradi. Ipak, u praksi su zabilježeni primjeri postupanja protivno spomenutoj odredbi, poput onog kada je jedan od izbornih sudionika na izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor 2016. uputio pismo biraču na njegovo ime i kućnu adresu, a da mu birač prethodno nije dao svoju privolu. Agencija za zaštitu osobnih podataka reagirala je tada preporukom izbornom sudioniku da nema pravo upućivanja personaliziranog pisma biraču isključivo po spoznaji da je riječ o biraču koji se smatra njegovim simpatizerom, već da mora „nedvojbeno utvrditi postojanje privole birača na takvu radnju" (DIP, 2016: 14).

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[9] Iako je *Zakon o zaštiti osobnih podataka* bio na snazi u trenutku završetka pisanja ovog rada, kao i njegova zaprimanja (22. ožujka 2018.), taj zakon prestao je važiti stupanjem na snagu *Zakona o provedbi Opće uredbe o zaštiti podataka* (Narodne novine, 42/18) 25. svibnja 2018., kojim se osigurava provedba *Uredbe (EU) 2016/679 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 27. travnja 2016. o zaštiti pojedinaca u vezi s obradom osobnih podataka i o slobodnom kretanju takvih podataka te o stavljanju izvan snage Direktive 95/46/EZ (Opća uredba o zaštiti podataka)* (Službeni list EU, L 119/1 od 4. svibnja 2016.). U kontekstu ovog rada treba spomenuti, primjerice, čl. 21. potonje uredbe prema kojemu ispitanik u slučaju obrade osobnih podataka za potrebe izravnog marketinga u svakom trenutku ima pravo prigovoriti takvoj obradi osobnih podataka koji se na njega odnose (st. 2.), s time da se osobni podaci ispitanika u slučaju njegova protivljenja više ne smiju obrađivati u takve svrhe (st. 3.), kao i čl. 7. prema kojem ispitanik u svakom trenutku može povući svoju privolu, s time da povlačenje privole mora biti „jednako jednostavno kao i njezino davanje" (st. 3.).

Zakon o zaštiti potrošača (Narodne novine, 41/14, 110/15) zabranjuje ostavljanje oglasnih poruka i materijala u ili na poštanskim sandučićima te na kućna vrata ili ispred kućnih vrata potrošača, ako je takva zabrana na njima jasno napisana (čl. 17. st. 1.), a *Zakon o elektroničkim komunikacijama* (Narodne novine, 73/08, 90/11, 133/12, 80/13, 71/14, 72/17) dopušta upotrebu automatskih pozivnih i komunikacijskih sustava bez ljudskog posredovanja, telefaksa ili elektroničke pošte, uključujući SMS i MMS poruke, u svrhu izravne promidžbe i prodaje samo uz prethodno pribavljenu privolu pretplatnika ili korisnika usluga (čl. 107. st. 1.). Unatoč takvoj zakonskoj odredbi na izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor 2016. zabilježeno je više primjedbi birača upućenih DIP-u o zaprimanju poziva i SMS poruka s nepoznatih brojeva s pozivom na (ne)glasovanje za određenu političku opciju koje je DIP prosljeđivao na postupanje Hrvatskoj regulatornoj agenciji za mrežne djelatnosti (DIP, 2016), ali zbog nedostatka odgovarajućeg mehanizma DIP nije mogao izricati nikakve sankcije.

ZAKLJUČNA RAZMATRANJA

Razmatrajući normativni okvir uređenja izborne kampanje od 1990. do danas, može se primijetiti postupno oblikovanje važećih normativnih rješenja, uz zamjetan prostor za njihova moguća unaprjeđenja. Kako bi se to potkrijepilo, sažeto se mogu izdvojiti razlike u važećim rješenjima: prvo, prekršajnu sankciju za povredu izborne šutnje propisuju samo ZoLI i ZoIČEPRH, dok je ostali zakoni ne predviđaju; drugo, Etičko povjerenstvo, unatoč njegovoj važnosti, propisuju tek ZoIZHS i ZoIČEPRH; treće, od svih izbornih zakona zaštitu osobnih podataka u izbornoj promidžbi izrijekom predviđa samo ZoLI; četvrto, nijedan izborni zakon, izuzev ZoLI-ja, nije predvidio definiciju izborne promidžbe; peto, pravo na iznošenje izbornih programa i izbornu promidžbu kod ponavljanja izbora izrijekom određuje samo ZoIPRH; šesto, ZoIZHS-om nije izrijekom propisana nadležnost DIP-a da nadzire pravilnost izborne promidžbe, premda takvu odredbu sadrže i ZoIPRH i ZoIČEPRH, a ZoLI na razini općinskog, gradskog i županijskog izbornog povjerenstva i izbornog povjerenstva Grada Zagreba; sedmo, terminologija i dalje nije usklađena pa je, primjerice, u dvije odredbe ZoIPRH-a prisutan izraz „promičba". Stoga, konkretni prijedlozi ponajprije bi trebali biti usmjereni na otklanjanje navedenih nedostataka, i to od usklađivanja terminologije, definiranja izborne promidžbe i propisivanja nadležnosti DIP-a u ZoIZHS-u da nadzire pravilnost promidžbe po uzoru na ZoIPRH i ZoIČEPRH pa do ostalih izloženih neusklađenosti koje bi valjalo urediti, poput uređenja pitanja zaštite osobnih podataka u izbornoj promidžbi po uzoru na ZoLI, ali i prekršajnih sankcija za povredu izborne šutnje po uzoru na ZoLI i ZoIČEPRH te Etičkog povjerenstva po uzoru na ZoIZHS i ZoIČEPRH.

Iako iz dosad izloženog slijedi da je potvrđena polazišna teza ovog rada, tj. da važeći normativni okvir uređenja izborne kampanje nije koherentan, u nastojanju za unaprjeđenjem važećih rješenja ukratko bi se valjalo osvrnuti na još nekoliko važnih pitanja u okviru ove materije koja bi pri budućim izmjenama i/ili dopunama tih rješenja dodatno valjalo razmotriti. Primjerice, imajući u vidu da prema ZoIZHS-u i ZoIPRH-u nakladnici ostalih medija (za razliku od Hrvatske televizije i Hrvatskog radija) samostalno odlučuju hoće li pratiti izbornu promidžbu, i u kojoj mjeri, te da takvo rješenje ne određuje „minimalne kriterije uključivanja, niti dalje razrađuje model predstavljanja na svim razinama izbora" (Grbeša,

2014), doima se da bi ono vrlo lako moglo biti točka prijepora i „odvesti u favoriziranje jedne političke opcije ili ignoriranje pojedinih političkih opcija" (Zelić, 2015). Stoga, trebalo bi urediti navedeno pitanje propisivanjem spomenutih kriterija, ali i razmotriti neka druga otvorena pitanja, poput regulacije ostalih medija na koje se ne primjenjuju *Pravila o postupanju*, uspostave okvira za jasnija interna pravila nakladnika, jasnijeg definiranja ovlasti DIP-a i formuliranja mehanizma za izricanje sankcija zbog povrede odredbi o izbornoj promidžbi, kao što je prethodno opisano.

Ne bi bilo naodmet ukazati i na mogućnost dijeljenja službene izborne promidžbe u nekoliko faza, što je jedan od prijedloga GONG-a. Naime, u tom slučaju tijekom prve faze svi kandidati, odnosno kandidacijske liste imali bi pravo na jednak pristup medijima, no u daljnjim fazama uslijedilo bi sučeljavanje kandidata, pri čemu bi objektivni kriterij za izbor kandidata bili rezultati istraživanja javnog mnijenja koje bi DIP putem javnog natječaja naručio od dvije agencije koje zadovoljavaju sve međunarodne standarde (*ibid.* vidi i Berković i dr., 2014). Takav pristup ujedno bi odgovarao proporcionalnoj ravnopravnosti stranaka i kandidata (koja se naročito odnosi na predstavljanje na radiju i televiziji) sadržanoj u *Kodeksu dobre prakse u izbornim pitanjima Venecijanske komisije* (Council of Europe, 2002),[10] pa bi spomenuto rješenje imalo snažnu podlogu u tom važnom dokumentu na koji se poziva i Ustavni sud, primjerice, u *Rješenju Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske broj: U-I-4780/2014 od 24. rujna 2015.* (Narodne novine, 104/15) i *Odluci i Rješenju Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske broj: U-I-1397/2015 od 24. rujna 2015.* (Narodne novine, 104/15).

S obzirom na to da nije propisana nadležnost za reguliranje tiskanih i internetskih medija tijekom izborne promidžbe, valjalo bi skrenuti pozornost i na prijedloge GONG-a da se regulatorne ovlasti dodijele novom ili reformiranom regulatornom tijelu radi nadzora svih medijskih sadržaja u svim vrstama medijima, a do njegova ustrojavanja ili reformiranja ovlasti nadzora medijskih sadržaja imao bi DIP, uz obavezno stručno mišljenje Vijeća za elektroničke medije. Uz te prijedloge vrijedi uočiti i one da ovlasti regulatornih tijela jasno budu definirane i da postoje alati za sankcioniranje medija zbog povrede izbornih pravila[11] (vidi Berković i dr., 2014). Potonji prijedlozi u biti slijede preporuke iz *Konačnog izvješća Ograničene misije za promatranje parlamentarnih izbora OESS/ODIHR-a* održanih 4. prosinca 2011. (OSCE, 2012), ali i *Konačnog izvješća OESS/UDILJP-ove Misije za procjenu parlamentarnih izbora* održanih 8. studenoga 2015. (OSCE, 2016).

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[10] Europski sud za ljudska prava (dalje: ESLJP) u predmetu *Communist Party of Russia v. Russia* (ECHR, 2012), pozivajući se na navedeni kodeks, ističe da Venecijanska komisija razlikuje dvije posebne obveze tijela vlasti u medijskoj pokrivenosti izborne promidžbe – prvo, omogućiti kandidatima i/ili političkim strankama „dostatno uravnoteženu količinu medijskog prostora i/ili prostora za oglašavanje, uključujući onaj na kanalima državne televizije ('obveza pristupa medijima')" i, drugo, osigurati 'neutralni odnos' tijela vlasti, posebno u odnosu na izbornu promidžbu i na pokrivenost u medijima u državnom vlasništvu ('obveza neutralnog odnosa')". Na tu presudu ESLJP-a Ustavni sud referirao se u *Odluci i Rješenju Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske broj: U-I-1397/2015 od 24. rujna 2015.* (Narodne novine, 104/15), ne prihvaćajući prijedlog za pokretanje postupka za ocjenu suglasnosti s *Ustavom* čl. 22. *Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o izboru zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor* (Narodne novine, 19/15), u kojemu se ključni prigovor podnositeljice prijedloga svodio na to da je brisanjem riječi „jednakost" iz čl. 30. ZoIZHS-a, odnosno zamjenom riječi „jednakost" riječju „pravičnost", „narušeno ustavno načelo jednakosti".

[11] U *Konačnom izvješću Ograničene misije za promatranje predsjedničkih izbora OESS/ODIHR-a* održanih 27. prosinca 2009. i 10. siječnja 2010. (OSCE, 2010) tako se, primjerice, navodi da „dionici izbora imaju ograničenu mogućnost službenog prigovora na sve elemente izbornog procesa i odluke DIP-a o kampanji ne prolaze sudsku provjeru". Nadalje, kada je riječ o lokalnim izborima, u *Rješenju Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske broj: U-VII/3280/2013 od 10. lipnja 2013.* (Ustavni sud, 2013) navedeno je da „niti Ustavni zakon niti ZoLI ne propisuju pravno sredstvo protiv akata i drugih odgovarajućih mjera nadležnog izbornog povjerenstva donesenih u provedbi nadzora pravilnosti izborne promidžbe".

Uz sve navedeno, nužno je istaknuti referendumsku promidžbu koja nije regulirana ni *Zakonom o referendumu i drugim oblicima osobnog sudjelovanja u obavljanju državne vlasti i lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave* (Narodne novine, 33/96, 92/01, 44/06, 58/06, 69/07, 38/09, 100/16, 73/17), ni drugim zakonom. Unatoč pokušaju propisivanja referendumske promidžbe, kao i obveze nakladnika svih medija da u praćenju i predstavljanju referendumske aktivnosti i referendumske promidžbe sudionika tih aktivnosti i promidžbe jamče načela koja su identična onima iz čl. 29. ZoIZHS-a i čl. 14. st. 2. ZoIPRH-a, takav zakon ipak nije donesen ni u 7. ni u 8. sazivu Hrvatskoga sabora (Hrvatski sabor, 2015b, Hrvatski sabor, 2016b).

Na samom kraju, neovisno o tome odluči li se zakonodavac za unaprjeđenje važećega normativnog okvira izradom jedinstvenoga izbornog zakona ili, pak, izmjenama i/ili dopunama postojećih propisa, vodeći se zahtjevom vladavine prava, koja se ubraja među najviše vrednote ustavnog poretka iz članka 3. *Ustava* i predstavlja podlogu za tumačenje *Ustava*, a posebice načelom pravne sigurnosti, izvjesnosti i dosljednosti, izložena rješenja valjalo bi regulirati tako da ne ostavljaju mjesta različitim interpretacijama i dvojbama – kako na strani onih koji propise primjenjuju, tako i na strani onih na koje se ti propisi primjenjuju.

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REGULATION OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE PROBLEM OF (NON)COHERENCE OF THE CURRENT NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

Gordan Struić

ABSTRACT *The author examines the normative framework for the election campaign in the Republic of Croatia, especially considering a number of regulations and the fact that there is no single electoral law. By analyzing numerous laws, other regulations and acts regulating the election campaign for parliamentary, presidential and local elections and for election of members of the European Parliament from the Republic of Croatia, the author tries to answer the question of the coherence of its normative framework. To this end, after a few general remarks about the normative framework, the author outlines a brief overview of election campaign regulation since 1990 and examines the relevant provisions. On this basis, the author concludes that the normative solutions were progressively shaped, although there is still room for their further improvement, and the initial thesis is confirmed by the fact that the normative framework for the election campaign in the Republic of Croatia is not coherent.*

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"I'M IN AND I'M IN TO WIN": THE 2008 AND 2016 INTERNET ANNOUNCEMENT VIDEOS OF HILLARY CLINTON FOR PRESIDENT

Nichola D. Gutgold :: Johnna Purcell

ABSTRACT *It is well known that a first impression may indeed set the tone for an entire relationship. In politics that first impression is likely to be the announcement speech. Hillary Clinton had a more complicated relationship with that first political impression than most politicians because she had been in the eye of the international public long before she ran for President of the United States. This article compares her two presidential announcement speeches – from 2008 and 2016 – in an effort to gauge what impressions she was trying to make in the hearts and minds of the United States voters, even though they no doubt had already formed an impression of her from her many years as the First Lady, the Senator from New York, and after the 2008 election as the Secretary of State.*

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INTRODUCTION

Hillary Clinton is one of the most well-known women in the political world. The only woman in United States history to transition from her role as First Lady into her own national political career, she served two terms as a New York Senator, was the first non-symbolic female candidate for President of the United States, and when she lost to Barack Obama, she became a member of his "team of rivals" to serve the country as Secretary of State. In 2016 when she won the democratic nomination for president, she became the first woman in United States history to be nominated for President by a major party ticket. Though she lost in a surprising election result to a political newcomer, the internationally known real estate billionaire and reality television personality Donald Trump, her place in history is unquestionable.

This article examines the two presidential announcement videos of Hillary Clinton from 2008 and 2016. How a presidential candidate introduces himself or herself to the nation is important and revealing. Referred to as "surfacing", this early communication by a candidate sets the stage for the campaign (Trent, 2005: 18). This initial introduction to the electorate is crucial for a candidate and may alter a candidate's momentum and thereby his or her victory. Important to note, however, is that Hillary Clinton was in no way a newcomer to voters in the United States. They had been well acquainted with both Hillary Clinton and her husband, former president Bill Clinton for more than twenty years. Since Clinton's bid for the presidency in 2008 there has not been a woman who has run for president until Clinton again in 2016. This is important to keep in mind as we suggest that the challenges that Clinton faced in her announcement videos are different than those faced by male candidates. Diana Carlin and Kelly L. Winfrey (2009), in their detailed and often cited analysis of sexism in the 2008 presidential campaign, sum up many of the problems that Clinton faced her first time around as a presidential contender. Using common stereotypes of women in corporations developed by Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1993), language theories, and media framing, Carlin and Winfrey's (2009) essay uncovers the common gendered stereotypes that surfaced in the 2008 campaign. The analysis notes that "there was a considerable amount of negative coverage of both candidates, and that such coverage has the potential to cast doubt on a woman's suitability to be Commander-in-chief" (Carlin and Winfrey, 2009: 326). Some of the gendered stereotypes that Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin encountered include an emphasis on the sexuality of each woman. Palin, who ran for Vice President alongside the Republican candidate John McCain, was portrayed as a sex symbol and Clinton as an unattractive, old woman (*Ibid.*: 2009: 332). The authors of the article discuss how the media often mentioned their role as a "mother" as the first or second thing about a female candidate and refer to this as negative (*Ibid.*: 332-336). Palin was frequently described as a governor, mother of five, reformer, creationist, runner-up to Miss Alaska, suggesting that her motherhood is one of her qualifications to serve as President (see also Miller and Peake, 2013; Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011).

Although the ideologies of Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton could not be more different, they were both political women angling for support in a national political contest, and it may have prompted the media to focus on their gender and stereotype them in a way that may not have happened if there had been more women in the race (Carlin and Winfrey, 2009: 8). As Liesbet van Zoonen (2006) argues, there are few female politicians who can bypass the personalization of politics. Unlike the former President of Finland Tarja Halonen or German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton were not able to keep the media from separating the personal from the political (*Ibid*.). As Clinton campaign staffer Jennifer Palmieri (2018: 126) underscores in her post-election book: "All our leaders had been men. Our history – the canon of American stories we treasured and that told us who we are – were all based on men. Hillary didn't fit the narrative." Similarly, Amy Chozick (2018: 3) in her book that recounted covering Hillary Clinton's two presidential campaigns suggests that "no one in modern politics, male or female, has had to withstand more indignities, setbacks and cynicism." The way to tell the story of a woman angling for the most powerful position in the world was yet not known — not in 2008 and not in 2016.

In this article we contend that a dramatic change in her approach and presence in her announcement speeches reflect an acknowledgement of some of the problems she faced in 2008 and a resolve to succeed through changing tactics. After a detailed analysis of each announcement, this article suggests whether or not her change in presentation improved her rhetorical effectiveness as a candidate in 2016.

HILLARY CLINTON'S ANNOUNCEMENT SPEECHES

At first glance, announcement speeches may seem a straightforward necessity of any candidate's campaign. However, a presidential announcement speech is critical to setting the momentum and tone of a candidate's campaign. Therefore, these rhetorical opportunities must be closely formulated and coordinated within the greater goals of the campaign. The announcement speech signals to the country what kind of candidate and leader he or she plans to be. It reveals the themes and stances that will be taken and attempts to re-shape a weak image or strengthen a favorable one. An announcement speech is also a chance to get voters to like a candidate, which is an important goal in modern-day media-saturated political campaigning.

In a widely cited book *Political Campaign Communication: Principles and Practices* by Judith Trent *et al.* (2011), the functions and merits of announcement speeches are discussed within the context of a candidate's campaign and their potential term in office. Trent *et al.* (2011) assert that the campaign announcement speech serves several additional purposes beyond the obvious signal of a candidate's intent to run. Additionally, announcement speeches serve to discourage prospective opponents, indicate why the candidate has chosen to run, and develop major themes of the candidates' campaign (Trent *et al.*, 2011: 11). Candidates are often trying to signal to voters that they are like voters themselves and that they care about the same issues that voters care about.

Clinton in 2008: "I'm In, and I'm In To Win."[1]

In 2008 Clinton faced off with a relative political newcomer, the young and photogenic, Barack Obama. The race was long, and the nation's craving for change insatiable. The eloquent, Ciceronian, and inspiring Illinois senator, who burst on to the national stage in 2004 with an incredibly effective speech at the Democratic National Convention, caught the imagination of the country. Barack Obama displayed a tremendous natural political talent. Hillary Clinton, though a tough competitor, was bested for the nomination by him. But when she cozied up, soft lit in her toney Georgetown home, and made her campaign announcement speech, Hillary Clinton was the one to beat for President in 2008.

Seated on a stylish sofa in her well-appointed living room, Hillary Clinton warmly looked into the camera on January 20, 2007, and announced that she would seek the Democratic nomination for President.[2] It came as no surprise. The thought that Hillary Clinton was as much a presidential possibility as her husband was a sentiment that followed her around from Yale Law School, where she met her husband, to Arkansas, when she served as first lady in her husband's governorship, and to the White House, as the moniker "Billary" and the sentiment "buy one, get one free" became part of the national subconscious about this modern, outspoken, well-educated woman who simply would not be relegated to the traditional sphere of domesticity so often occupied by political spouses. In 2003 Clinton's colorful pollster Mark Penn was measuring Hillary Clinton's presidential appeal, with an eye toward the 2004 election. Joshua Green (2008) notes how polling suggested that her prospects were "reasonably favorable," but that Clinton herself never seriously considered running: "Instead, over the next three years, a handful of her advisors met to prepare for 2008. They believed the biggest threat was John Edwards." Amy Sullivan (2005) wrote in Washington Monthly magazine:

Over the last five years, Clinton has developed into perhaps the most interesting politician in America. She has a reputation for bipartisanship in the Senate, forming partnerships with some of her most conservative Republican colleagues, including Senator Bill Frist, Republican from Tennessee, Senator Rick Santorum, Republican from Pennsylvania, and Senator Sam Brownback, Republican from Kansas. She has quietly, but firmly, assumed a leadership role in her own caucus. And she has shown vision and backbone in a party that is accused of having none.[3]

Therefore, it is not remarkable or surprising that she ran for President, or even that she announced it on the internet. What is remarkable is that she almost won the nomination, making her the first woman in the United States to be a front-runner, non-symbolic candidate for the presidency. When Barack Obama won the Democratic nomination in 2008, he agreed to allow Hillary Clinton's name to be placed into nomination at the Democratic National Convention in August, acknowledging her significant contribution to the democratic process and her achievement in the race. Larry Scanlon, political director of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, said:

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[1] Parts of this chapter were originally published in Gutgold Nichola (2009) *Almost Madam President: Why Hillary Clinton 'Won' in 2008*. Lexington Books.
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPMhQmHFXAw (02/02/2018).
[3] https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/julyaugust-2005/hillary-in-2008-3/ (03/07/ 2018).

She sought to be the first woman nominated for president. She came up a little short, but she made it easier for the next female candidate to get the brass ring. Many in the Democratic Party would like to celebrate that. I think that they should celebrate that (Nicholas, 2008).[4]

Her assertive line, that she is "in to win" gave no doubt that she was not going to be categorized as testing the waters. Clearly, Hillary Clinton was running for President. What is often the case with women candidates for President, is that the media are quick to cast them as vice presidential contenders instead. Hillary Clinton would have none of that. While her message was masculine, her style could not have been more feminine. Indeed, her message was in many ways a study of contrasts: there was a hint of entitlement in her "in to win" and yet, she called for a conversation, indicating that she wanted to hear from the American people. Her decision to sit on a sofa, in her home with family photos featuring her daughter Chelsea and her husband, former President Bill Clinton in the background, was a soft, friendly approach. She was doing her best to be likable. It was not surprising that Bill Clinton would have a role in the campaign, but the emergence of the young adult Chelsea Clinton as an articulate voice for her mother was notable. Famously shielded from the press as the first daughter, Chelsea Clinton played a minimal role in Hillary Clinton's 2006 Senate re-election campaign. Her presence in the presidential campaign, however, was wholeheartedly welcomed by the press and the public, especially since there were already a number of photogenic children of candidates, including the young families of Senator Barack Obama and former Senator John Edwards. Seeing Chelsea Clinton in the photographs in the living room was also a non-verbal announcement of the well-raised and well-educated young woman she had become. Having delivered Chelsea Clinton to adulthood in relative obscurity could be seen as an ethos builder for Hillary Clinton since women candidates are more often seen through the lens of motherhood than male candidates are judged by their fatherhood (see Deason *et al.*, 2015). Certainly, as the campaign progressed, and Sarah Palin was announced as the vice-presidential candidate on the Republican ticket, the motherhood lens became even more prominent.

The setting of the internet speech embodied feminine political rhetoric. When we first look at the scene, we take in a familiar figure: former First Lady and Senator from New York, Hillary Clinton. We are reminded of her domestic side, the one of mother as we glimpse the framed family photos in the setting. Clinton begins: "I announced today that I am forming a presidential exploratory committee. I'm not just starting a campaign, though: I'm beginning a conversation – with you with America". She had the appearance of a matriarch in a made-for-TV drama. Her suggestion to "have a conversation" is intimate and suggests interpersonal communication rather than public campaigning. Her choice to launch her campaign over the internet (which was also widely broadcast over television) suggests a personal connection of participation and communication. She used personal experience to back up her claim that she would be an effective president. Her experiential evidence:

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[4] http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/15/nation/na-clinton15 (15/05/2018).

I grew up in a middle-class family in the middle of America, and we believed in that promise. I still do. I've spent my entire life trying to make good on it. Whether it was fighting for women's basic rights or children's basic health care. Protecting our Social Security or protecting our soldiers. It's a kind of basic bargain, and we've got to keep up our end.

Clinton closed her announcement with an intimate request: "So let's talk. Let's chat. Let's start a dialogue about your ideas and mine. Because the conversation in Washington has been just a little one-sided lately, don't you think?" The presidential announcement speech by Hillary Clinton was a sophisticated communication strategy and it is a unique presidential announcement artifact. It created a personal, warm, likable connection to voters. It adopted a modern technology to relate to younger voters and offered a chatty, interpersonal conversational speech of presidential announcement that was unlike any of her competitors in 2008.

There has never been a time in American history when a first lady built upon her experience of her first lady tenure to provide evidence that she was prepared to be the leader of the free world, but that was part of Hillary Clinton's pitch as a presidential candidate in 2008. She also had her tenure in the Senate, but she drew from her eight years in the White House to run successfully for the Senate and she continued to draw on those first lady experiences in her stump speeches for President.

A Washington Post-ABC News poll released on January 2, 2007 showed Clinton was the favorite of 41 percent of Democrats, more than double the support of any of her rivals. She was emphatic about her reasons for seeking the presidency. She repeated often on the campaign trail:

I am worried about the future of our country, and I want to help put it back on the right course, so that we can work together to meet the challenges that confront us at home and abroad. I believe that I am in the best position to be able to do that.

And she repeated her mantra: "I'm in to win. And that's what I intend to do" (Healy, 2007). The most "battle tested' of all the Democratic candidates is how Patrick Healy (2007) of The New York Times described Hillary Clinton the day after Hillary Clinton declared herself "in to win." And indeed, Hillary Clinton faced battles when she ran for the Senate although before that she had been forever criticized by the press for being a first lady that participated in a wider sphere of influence than tradition allows. In the United States, the roles of First Lady and elected officials could not be more different. While Robert Watson (1997: 807) notes that first ladies regularly fulfill both private and public roles, first ladies who use their white glove pulpit for controversial issues are often judged harshly by the public. The promise that Bill Clinton made on the campaign trail for the presidency that voters would "get two for the price of one" was not what voters bargained for. Although there had been a few exceptions, for example, former First Lady Betty Ford became a champion for breast cancer awareness and – after her White House years - for drug and alcohol recovery. Hillary Clinton had a rough first ladyship when she wielded power that made much of the American public uncomfortable. Most notably, her

work on the healthcare initiative made her an unelected policymaker, which raised the ire of those who may have preferred her to stay in a small sphere of influence more akin to a traditional woman's role. Hillary Clinton is not the first lady to experience backlash for fitting into an impossible standard in the public eye. As Carl Sferrazza Anthony (1990: 9) pointed out in his first lady scholarship, "by facing challenges with their own unique approaches, they consequently changed the public role [of first lady]." This is utterly true for Hillary Clinton.

Karrin Vasby Anderson (2002: 106) notes that Hillary Clinton was aware that when she enacted a more traditional role her popularity rose. In her autobiography, *Living History* (2004), Hillary Clinton recounts an encounter with Clinton's advisor James Carville that occurred shortly after a trip to Nepal where she and Chelsea were photographed atop an elephant. She explains, "when we got back to Washington, James Carville remarked: "Don't you just love it? You spend two years trying to get people better health care and they tried to kill you. You and Chelsea rode an elephant and they loved you!'" (Clinton, 2004: 102). Indeed, Hillary Clinton received constant criticism during her husband's presidency for presenting herself in a way that many Americans considered unorthodox for a first lady. She was always received more favorably when her motherhood and other domestic attributes, or ceremonial aspects of her first ladyship were more strongly in focus.

As the First Lady, Hillary Clinton served as a spokesperson throughout America and the world when she ardently attempted to gain support for universal healthcare. She spoke about children's and women's rights and repeatedly defended her husband against several incriminating charges. As the equally educated political spouse of her husband, she met criticism for her public role, yet she could not deny her political acumen. Lisa M. Burns (2008: 48) aptly notes that "the question of woman's "proper" place in political culture is as relevant today as it has been during any historical period." No stranger to rhetorical situations that demanded rhetorical agility, her skills would be tested in a way they had never been tested before. While Anderson (2002) views the candidacy of a spokesperson first as the "logical next step", many critics of Hillary Clinton were not as supportive as logic might suggest. Clearly, Hillary Clinton had to launch her presidential bid with rhetorical care.

How would Hillary Clinton re-introduce herself to the American people, not as first lady, but instead an elected senator in her own right and strike the right balance between a powerful policy maker and a populist "every woman" who is likable enough to win their vote? How would she highlight just enough of her first lady experience to create an ethos that demonstrated leadership without dredging up details of Clinton White House drama that many Americans would just as soon forget? Would accentuating her feminine side win over voters or was that only a side of her that people wanted to see when she was First Lady? When she ran for the Senate while finishing up her duties as First Lady, Hillary Clinton faced similar exigencies as a public speaker and a public figure. She successfully fulfilled the need to meet people of New York, not as a celebrity first lady, but as a political powerhouse in her own right. She managed to do that and started to be thought of as a political figure who would fight for New Yorkers' needs. She not only won a Senate seat

but she won re-election to the Senate in 2006. Originally labeled a "carpetbagger" for running for Senate from New York, a state she had never lived in, former First Lady Hillary Clinton was not only successful in her bid, she was a popular senator. How did she do it? One of the ways she got to know New Yorkers and allowed them to get to know her was not by talking, but by listening. Hillary Clinton embarked upon a "listening bus tour" of all parts of New York after her entrance into the Senate race. She made it her goal to visit sixty-two counties in the state of New York, spending time with New Yorkers, talking to them in small-group settings according to the principles of retail politics.

To announce herself as a presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton did the electronic version of a listening tour, one that would be aided with "a little help from modern technology."[5] Hillary Clinton's groundbreaking choice of using the internet to announce her candidacy for President in 2008 spoke to her style of communication. This new style of announcement allowed for a different analysis of the effect of campaign rhetoric through the use of YouTube comments. YouTube comments allowed voters to have a direct dialogue with both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton through their perspective YouTube channels, both of which the candidates actively used throughout the 2008 election cycle.

YouTube has been described as the arena of the people. It is a place where individuals may express and release their opinions in a manner that is untouched and unfiltered by conventional media sources (Arthurs *et al.,* 2018). Because of its one-on-one nature, the use of the online video can be perceived as more personal than other traditional media forms: "The success of YouTube comes from the user-to-user social experiences that differentiates it from traditional context broadcasters" (Wattenhofer *et al.*, 2012). Through comments on YouTube videos, voters have the chance to be in a dialogue with the candidates, and Hillary Clinton was one of the first presidential candidates to utilize YouTube to directly reach voters (see Burgess and Green, 2009).

The standard for the content of announcement speeches has shifted between approaches based upon political issues and approaches based upon the candidate's character. While candidates' performance in both arenas holds significant influence over a candidate's success, candidates generally choose to focus on one area over another. In a quantitative analysis of the content of presidential announcement speeches, William Benoit and Mark Glantz (2012: 24) found that candidates began to discuss policy more and character less. Hillary Clinton's speech was no exception to this rule. She wanted voters to know that she came from "the middle of America" and that she grew up in a "middle class family". Although much better than coming from a rich family, her narrative did not have the drama of her husband's or that of Barack Obama's. This is a point she would make after her disappointing loss in 2016. Throughout her 2008 speech, Clinton vocalized her issue stances while showing her character. Throughout the announcement, Clinton spoke about finding solutions to problems such as ending the war in Iraq, making America energy independent, and reforming Medicare and Medicaid. Secretary Clinton spent relatively no time in the speech acknowledging her own character traits that would make her suitable for the job of Commander-in-chief. Despite the absence of direct reference,

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[5] Hillary Clinton 2008 presidential announcement, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPMhQmHFXAw (10/02/2018).

Clinton's character was very much present in the announcement. Her posture, hand positions, attire, and tone all said what her words did not linger on; that she was ready to be President and that she possessed the skill and character to succeed.

Hillary Clinton's 2016 internet announcement speech: "I'm getting ready to run for President." [6]

When Hillary Clinton ran for President again in 2016 she was seen as a political insider and for many Americans that meant more of the same. Even worse, she was part of a political dynasty. Young voters flocked to Bernie Sanders, a little-known Vermont senator, who promised an unruly solution. Her rhetoric was not soaring and while she did not have a stamina issue, as Donald Trump continued to assert, she did have an excitement deficit. Not true for Donald Trump. Even detractors of the P.T. Barnum-like reality show billionaire would tune in to see him bombastically debate. And when he promised to "make America great again," his slogan caught fire much more successfully than the four or five slogans Hillary Clinton's campaign seemed to be testing as the campaign progressed (see for instance Kayam, 2018).

The video opens with upbeat music and the voice over that announces: "I'm getting ready to do a lot of things – a lot of things!" We first see a woman tending to her garden and sharing: "It's spring – so we're starting to get the gardens ready, and my tomatoes are legendary here in my own neighborhood." Next, a young mother explains: "My daughter is about to start kindergarten next year, and so we're moving so she can belong to a better school." Two Spanish-speaking brothers announce: "My brother and I are starting our first business!" while another mother adds: "After five years of raising my children, I am now going back to work." A young couple, including a very pregnant woman, says, "Every day we're trying to get more and more ready and more prepared", and the man says, "Baby boy, coming your way!" A young female student says: "Right now I'm applying for jobs. It's a look into what the real world will look like after college." An LGBT couple shares: "I'm getting married this summer to someone I really care about." A cute child exuberantly shared: "I'm gonna be in a play, and I'm going to be in a fish costume" and starts singing… "from little tiny fishes" and an almost retired person says: "I'm getting ready to retire soon. Retirement means reinventing yourself in many ways." A couple of dog owners declare: "Well, we've been doing a lot of home renovations, but most importantly we just want to teach our dog to quit eating trash!" while a factory worker pronounces: "I've started a new career recently. This is a fifth-generation company, which means a lot to me. This country was founded on hard work, and it really feels good to be a part of that."

The video and audio montage of Americans plunging confidently into new tasks is reminiscent of Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign "Morning in America" because, as Gil Troy (2007: 5) wrote, "his Hollywood slick, small town faith in America as a shining 'city upon a hill' restored many Americans' confidence in themselves and their country." The upstart of the Americans in this video harkens to the same feeling of confidence a plunging in that Americans felt when they supported Reagan and believed that everything was fresh and new. Starting a new job, planting a garden, having a child and getting married are

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[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N708P-A45D0 (02/02/2018).

activities that people undertake when they believe in something. Every person featured – even the retiree – is optimistically embracing the exciting opportunity of what is ahead. And, then, Hillary Clinton shares what she is getting ready to do, too, perhaps in that same spirit of optimism and excitement for the future.

At first, we see the back of Hillary Clinton as she is talking with a man in a New York Yankees baseball cap, and then we see Hillary Clinton seated, with a cup of coffee, listening to a man with grey hair. We hear Hillary Clinton say, "I'm getting ready to do something too". The camera then faces her head on and she says: "I'm running for President". We then hear her voice as we see video of laborers. Here voiceover continues: "Americans have fought their way back from tough economic times. But the deck is still stacked in favor of those at the top." Again, the camera shows Clinton and she says: "Everyday Americans need a champion, and I want to be that champion. So, you can do more than just get by. You can get ahead, and stay ahead. Because when families are strong, America is strong." The camera again focuses on Clinton who says: "So I'm hitting the road to earn your vote, because it's your time. And I hope you'll join me on this journey."

That we see and hear much less of Hillary Clinton in her 2016 announcement speech than we did in her 2008 one may have been a tactical decision on the part of the Clinton campaign. Having been in the national public eye since 1991, the campaign may have felt the need to quash "Hillary overload" and present her in a much less visible and voluble way. Yale psychologist Victoria Brescoll, in her 2011 study found that the rules of the power game differ for men and women. Using actual speech data from the U.S. Senate, she discovered a significant relationship between power and volubility (*i.e.*, the total time senators spoke on the Senate floor). Because of this difference, "volubility not only plays an important role in establishing power hierarchies but also in communicating one's power to others" (Brescoll, 2011: 623). However, while male senators show a significant relationship between power and volubility, female senators do not. Furthermore, Brescoll found that being conceived of as overly talkative can deflate women's power, not enhance it.

When Brescoll studied CEOs she found that "a female CEO who talked dispropor-tionately longer than others in an organizational setting was rated as significantly less competent and less suitable for leadership than a male CEO who talked for an equivalent amount of time" (*Ibid.*: 635). Brescoll's findings point to an obvious "double-bind" that Hillary Clinton has been tasked to overcome in her campaign(s). The job of a candidate for President is to talk in a variety of settings for nearly two years. Conventional political wisdom would assert that this volubility and visibility would only help a candidate. However, for a female candidate, there is strong evidence that talking for several years in public forums may actually do more harm to than good to their candidacy. As the first female nominee from a major political party, Hillary Clinton is breaking new ground in deciphering the nature of being a woman running for President and discerning whether it is possible for a candidate to talk too much.

Clinton's strategy in the 2016 campaign is a grand experiment to find the appropriate balance of talking and listening for a female candidate for president. In her post-campaign

book, *What Happened* (2017), Hillary Clinton ruminates about her choices to speak for others instead of herself. She describes how her choices were based on research that *Facebook* executive Sheryl Sandberg revealed to her: "For men, likability and professional success are correlated. The more successful a man is, the more people like him. Women – opposite: The more professionally successful we are, the less people like us" (Clinton, 2017: 125). Hillary Clinton may be a listener according to her friends and colleagues, but the success of a candidate still lies in their rhetorical presence and abilities. Furthermore, in *What Happened* Hillary Clinton simply reveals that she did not think her story was riveting enough to capture the imagination of voters. She describes her childhood as "perfectly ordinary" and that "We yearn for that show stopping tale – that one-sentence pitch that captures something magical about America; that hooks you and won't let go. Mine wasn't it" (*Ibid.*: 112). She compared her Midwestern upbringing with her husband's well-worn political narrative: "that Bill Clinton lived for a while on a farm with no indoor plumbing, his father had died before he was born, he stopped his stepfather from beating his mother, he became the first in his family to go to college" (*Ibid.*: 112). Hillary Clinton also reiterates Barack Obama's riveting multi-cultural upbringing: "Raised by a teenage mom and his grandparents, his father was Kenyan, he spent part of his childhood living in Indonesia, worked as a community organizer and law professor" (*Ibid.*). She explains that her narrative, of growing up in a "white, middle-class family in Park Ridge, a suburb, is a story that many would consider perfectly ordinary" (*Ibid.*).

Despite what most voters and historians see as a trailblazing life - one of just 27 women out of 235 students at Yale Law School, the first woman partner at the oldest law firm in Arkansas, the first woman to chair the national board of the Legal Services Corporation, the First Lady to be elected to public office, the first woman Senator from New York, and the first woman to be nominated for president by a major political party and win the national popular vote – the Clinton campaign, and Hillary Clinton herself did not choose to underscore any of these biographical points in her campaign. In her 2016 campaign, Clinton and her team sought to find a balance of speaking, listening, visibility, and silence that would convince American voters to elect her Madam President. Hillary Clinton's action-oriented and forward-thinking "getting ready" harkened back to the "Morning in America" theme of Ronald Reagan, and featured other "everyday Americans" more than it featured the candidate herself. Instead of re-telling her upbringing in Middle America, like she did in 2008, she decided that showing others would make up for what she perceived as her less than riveting biography.

CONCLUSION

The 2008 campaign saw the emergence of a charismatic political star, Barack Obama who captured the hope of the nation and derailed Hillary Clinton's quest for the presidency. The 2016 campaign was one the most negative and uninspiring in United States history. However, Hillary Clinton had to navigate the constraints that women seeking elected office face in public life, and her circumstances are unprecedented. She was the First Lady, a senator, the failed presidential candidate in a close fight for the 2008 nomination, Secretary

of State and finally, in 2016, the nominee for the Democratic Party. Perhaps her campaign believed that the public had grown weary of Hillary Clinton in the eight years since her 2008 announcement speech. She knew she was not a political natural like her husband or Barack Obama, and so her tactic in her announcement speech was vastly different in 2016. These two announcement speeches, eight years apart, offer insight into the ever-evolving public image of Hillary Clinton. Perhaps her long time in the international public sphere made her campaign wary about over-exposure, and thus chose to show more of others that Hillary Clinton in the 2016 video. Certainly, the research by Sheryl Sandberg that suggested showing others, instead of Clinton, a powerful, accomplished woman, was an influence. In 2008, she was introducing herself as a presidential possibility, but by 2016 it was clearly established in the minds of Americans that she was presidential. Furthermore, soaring, inspirational rhetoric is not Hillary Clinton's strength. The 2016 announcement video advanced the themes of her campaign, starting with her listening tour, and focusing on the goals of one of her several campaign tag lines: "everyday Americans." The effort of the Clinton campaign to focus on Hillary Clinton as a listener, more than a speaker, may be found in the campaign throughout the primary and the general election. The differences in the announcement videos by Hillary Clinton hint to the challenges that women candidates must confront: to be seen and not as much heard, to focus on others and to be the leader that touts not their own physical presence or persona, but what she can do for others.

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"U IGRI SAM I TU SAM KAKO BIH POBIJEDILA": ANALIZA NAJAVNIH VIDEOOGLASA HILLARY CLINTON NA PREDSJEDNIČKIM IZBORIMA 2008. I 2016. GODINE

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SAŽETAK *Poznato je da prvi dojam može presudno utjecati na cjelokupni odnos. Taj prvi dojam u politici se često uspostavlja putem najavnih videooglasa. Stvaranje prvog dojma bilo je puno složenije za Hillary Clinton nego za većinu ostalih političara, s obzirom na to da je ona bila prisutna u javnosti puno prije nego što se kandidirala za predsjednicu SAD-a. Ovaj članak uspoređuje njezina dva predsjednička video-oglasa – onaj iz 2008. i onaj iz 2016. Cilj je analize utvrditi kakav je dojam Hillary Clinton htjela ostaviti na američke birače, iako nema sumnje da su oni već ranije stvorili sliku o njoj iz vremena koje je provela kao Prva dama, zatim kao senatorica iz New Yorka i konačno, nakon predsjedničkih izbora 2008., kao ministrica vanjskih poslova.*

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

RETORIKA, NAJAVNI VIDEOOGLASI, PREDSJEDNIK, SAD, HILLARY CLINTON

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KOMENTAR

COMMENTARY

NEW PROBLEMS, OLD SOLUTIONS?
A CRITICAL LOOK ON THE REPORT OF THE
HIGH LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON FAKE NEWS
AND ON-LINE DISINFORMATION

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In March 2018 a High Level Expert Group set up by the European Commission published a report on fake news and on-line disinformation. The goal of the report was to advise on policy initiatives to counter these negative phenomena. Although the document is generally valuable, we believe that it remains fixed on "evergreen" policies that may be suited for traditional journalism, but that are deficient in solving the problems of the new digital media matrix.

The development and popularization of social media has redefined core media practices. Never before have the media been so fast, interactive and engaging: "The immediacy, responsiveness and social presence of interaction via new media channels constitute a qualitatively and substantively different experience than that was possible via mass media channels" (Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2006: 7). Social media have also changed users' media habits and needs. The rise of participatory culture (Jenkins, 2006) and user empowerment, as well as the growing role of producers in contemporary media rationale (Bruns, 2006) is transforming definitions "of both 'social' and 'media'" (Hinton and Hjort, 2013: 2). As Lance Bennett (2015: 154) points out, "new technologies and channels enable more fine-grained 'many-to-many' communication within fragmenting societies" while "individuals become active agents in the production and transmission of information".

In the past years, the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism[1] has pointed to a rising impact and a more intensive use of social media as information platforms. According to 2017 data "more than half of all online users across the 36 countries (54%) say they use social media as a source of news each week." On the other hand, a stagnation in use of social media for information purposes was recorded in 2018, especially when it comes to Facebook, but there was a "rise in the use of messaging apps for news as consumers look for more private (and less confrontational) spaces to communicate." The use of WhatsApp for news has almost tripled since 2014 and has overtaken Twitter in many countries. This shows that users are looking for a more personal, interactive and faster access to information and that a massive change in media habits can be observed year after year.

Due to speed with which the media ecosystem changes and the specifics of these changes, the existing theories, terms and concepts developed within journalism, communication or media studies seem to have been struggling to adequately address these processes. In the last two decades, discussions and studies have focused on the development and influence of technology (*e.g.*, Boczkowski and Siles, 2013; Fidler, 1997; Kaye and Quin, 2010; Lapham, 2001; Steensen, 2011;), convergence of journalism (*e.g.*, Deuze, 2004; Domingo *et. al*, 2014; Erdal, 2011; Mico *et al.*, 2013; Oblak, 2005), multimedia (*e.g.*, Deuze, 2004; Everett and Caldwell, 2003; Harper, 2005; Jacobson, 2012; Pauly, 2014; Pincus *et al.*; 2016; Stepp; 2001; Vobič, 2011), and concepts of participatory media and participatory culture (*e.g.*, Alhabash and McAlister, 2014; Dewdney and Ride, 2006; Hermida, 2010; Huang, 2014; Jenkins, 2006; Jenkins *et al.*, 2013; Kumpel *et al.*, 2015; Steensen, 2011; Villi and Matikainen, 2015). Recently the focus has shifted to the need of redefining *the truth, the facts* and *objectiveness*. For example, Pierre R. Berthon and Leyland F. Pitt (2018: 1) welcome us to a "post-fact world: a world in which the validity of something is based

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[1] http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2017/ (07/03/2018).

on how it feels (truthiness) and the world is what you wish it: regardless of objective, verifiable statements about the world (post-fact)." Similarly, Tarlach McGonagle (2017:208) notes that concepts such as "fake, false, fraudulent, dishonest, bogus, scam, hoax, phoney, phoney-baloney" have become "emotively-charged terms to disparage, question and refute the truthfulness of content or content-producers".

The 2018 Reuters Report shows that there was a drop in the level of trust in online news, a rise in fake news dissemination and a decrease in trusting media content: "more than half of global sample (54%) expresses concern or strong concern about 'what is real or fake', when thinking about online news."[2] Likewise, Edelman Trust Barometer (2018) reports:

For the first time media is the least trusted institution globally. In 22 of the 28 markets surveyed it is now distrusted. The demise of confidence in the Fourth Estate is driven primarily by a significant drop in trust in platforms, notably search engines and social media. Sixty-three percent of respondents say they do not know how to tell good journalism from rumor or falsehoods or if a piece of news was produced by a respected media organization.

Interestingly, the decline of trust in media is accompanied by a rise of trust in information, recommendations and comments posted by online users. Even though the Edelman Trust Barometer (2018) data show that there has been a drop in the level of trusting other online users compared to 2017, it is still fairly high: 54% respondents from around the world consider that other online users, "a person like yourself", are very or extremely credible.

Liesbet van Zoonen (2012) uses the term "I-pistemology" to explain this phenomenon, suggesting that traditional authorities (governments, media, universities, experts) are no longer the source of truth, which now belongs exclusively to 'us', 'ordinary people', and people 'like us', whose experiences can be easily reached through social media. In other words, the term "I-pistemology" captures "this turn into the self as the origin of all truth" (van Zoonen, 2012: 57). She goes on to explain that I-pistemology "is a contemporary cultural process in which people from all walks of life have come to suspect the knowledge coming from official institutions and experts and have replaced it with the truth coming from their own individual experience and opinions" and that "online and offline popular culture have raised personal experience to the level of the only relevant truth" (van Zoonen, 2012: 56). The notion of *truth* has been redefined but it is still present "in the self, in personal experiences and feelings, in subjective judgement, in individual memory" (van Zoonen, 2012: 57). This means that the taste and preferences of users in the digital environment have become a key variable in consumption of media content because the architecture of social platforms supports the selectivity in choosing and tracking information. The so-called "filter bubble" (Pariser, 2011) enables us to select the information from digital environment based on our own interests and preferences, avoiding news, information and opinions that do not fit into our mindset. In doing this we create our own media world (media bubble) based solely on our own interests,

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[2] http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/ (08/05/2018).

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values, preferences and selections. By filtering content, as opposed to getting general information, we create a partial reality which is highly subjective, personalised, emotional, nuanced and selected based on our interests.

Dominic Spohr (2017: 150) explains that in the past years "fake news and the effect of the social media filter bubble have become of increasing importance both in academic and general discourse." Spohr (2017: 152) argues that "social media plays an increasing role in the consumption of news and information and that the effects of ideological polarization in information consumption become arguably more apparent". While explaining the term "filter bubble" Eli Pariser (2011: 9) mentions that "the basic code at the heart of the new Internet is pretty simple: the new generation of Internet filters looks at the things you seem to like – the actual things you've done, or the things people like you like – and tries to extrapolate". Gil de Zuniga and Trevor Diehl (2017: 3) use the term "news-finds-me-perception", which is "the extent to which individuals believe they can indirectly stay informed about public affairs – despite not actively following the news – through general Internet use, information received from peers, and connections within online social networks".

Due to these trends and characteristics of digital environment a need to redefine *the truth* has emerged. EBU Media Intelligence Service 2018 report confirms the allegation that the truth is becoming more and more difficult to define and that it is more difficult to achieve trust in the new media environment: "In the age of media abundance, trust is important in the relationship between media and their audience. However, maintaining a high level of trust is more and more challenging in a world of filter bubbles, echo chambers and fake news" (EBU Media Intelligence Service, 2018).

Since Donald Trump was elected president of the USA, fake news has become a symbol of media changes happening before our eyes and a trigger for heated discussions on the features and quality of contemporary consumer-centred media. Chris J. Vargo *et al.* (2017) show that in November and December 2016, more people in the USA Googled "fake news" than the combined previous 15 months (Google Trends, 2017). "Fake news" has become a much-used and much-hyped term in the so-called "post-truth" era that we now live in (McGonagle, 2017: 203). Fake news, post-truth, alternative facts *etc.* have become the buzzword of today, a part of the global language, or the symbol of media changes that we are witnessing.

According to Ethical Journalism Network (2017) "fake news is information that has been deliberately fabricated and disseminated with the intention to deceive and mislead others into believing falsehoods or doubting verifiable facts"[3]. Harikrishnan Bhaskaran *et al.* (2017: 42) use the example of India in the paper to explain that "Fake news is not a new phenomenon. It has always been present in one form or another." The names of world renowned journalists Joseph Pulitzer and William Hearst are mentioned as ambassadors of the concept of "fake news". They claim that "fake news" has been present in journalism

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[3] Ethical Journalism Network, http://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/tag/fake-news (25/4/2018).

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for decades "with the only difference being that the rise of the Internet and different social media platforms has made the spread of fake news lightning fast" (Ibid.). Controversial YouTube guru Mark Dice (2017:1) similarly asserts that fake news stories have been around for centuries although they had usually just been called disinformation, propaganda, yellow journalism, conspiracy theories, or hoaxes; but this modern incarnation was different. All of the sudden it was supposedly everywhere, and just cost Hillary Clinton the election.

Jacob L. Nelson and Harsh Taneja (2018) explain that there has been a big change in understanding the concept of "fake news". Until 2012 the term "fake news" mainly referred to "The Daily Show" and "The Colbert Report", that is, to "the late night television shows that blurred the line between news and comedy" (Borden and Tew, 2007; Day and Thompson, 2012, as quoted in Nelson and Taneja, 2018: 2). Today the term more commonly refers to false or misleading information made to look like a fact-based news story in order to "influence public opinion or cull digital advertising dollars" (Uberti, 2017, as quoted in Nelson and Taneja, 2018: 2). For Nick Richardson (2017: 1) "the phrase 'fake news' represents the existential challenge to journalists dealing with an audience losing its faith in what journalism does."

In sum, fake news has become a symbol of the new media paradigm, characterized by tectonic changes in the media system and a general decline of trust in media:

while politicians and the media often talk about fake news in terms of Russian propaganda or for-profit fabrication by Macedonian teenagers, it is clear that audience concerns are very different, relating to different kinds of deception largely perpetrated by journalists, politicians, and advertisers (Reuters Institute Digital news report, 2018).

Alerted by the spread of fake news the European Commission gathered a high-level group of experts ("the HLEG") whose task was to analyse the current media situation and give recommendations and solutions to prevent the problem of disinformation: "The HLEG's task was to advise the Commission on all issues arising in the context of false information speed across traditional and social media and on possible ways to cope with its social and political consequences"[4].

Based on the analysis of the current media state, the high-level group has issued a report called "A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation: Report of the independent High-level Group on fake news and online disinformation." The report is not focused exclusively on 'fake news', but on the broader concept of 'disinformation' "that goes well beyond the term 'fake news'" (HLEG report, 2018). The report contains 5 guidelines focused on preventing disinformation designed to: (1) enhance transparency; (2) promote media and information literacy; (3) develop tools for empowering users and journalists to tackle disinformation; (4) safeguard the diversity and sustainability of the European news media ecosystem; (5) promote continuous research on the impact of disinformation in Europe.

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[4] European Commission (2018) A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation. Report of the Independent High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation.
https://blog.wanifra.org/sites/default/files/field_blog_entry_file/HLEGReportonFakeNewsandOnlineDisinformation.pdf (20/3/2018).

Recommendations related to transparency are focused primarily on the transparency of advertising space in digital environment. Moreover, a higher level of transparency can be achieved by highlighting journalistic sources and journalistic processes, as well as by accessing information and data. The report states that there is a need to cooperate within EU Member States and across the EU "to support the creation of European Centres for interdisciplinary and independent evidence-based research" (HLEG report, 2018). Recommendations on media and information literacy focus on designing better curricula and developing competences of schools and universities around Europe. Education of teachers, as well as other citizens is mentioned in the context of achieving a greater level of media literacy, and thus reducing the rate of disinformation. In the context of empowerment of users and journalists, the report proposes development of online tools for user empowerment, *i.e.* "platforms should consider ways to encourage users' control over the selection of the content to be displayed as results of a search and/or in news feeds" (HLEG report, 2018). It also proposes development of tools for journalists, such as "professional automatic content verification tool", as well as journalist training and Europe-wide cooperation. The recommendation for achieving diversity and sustainability of the news media ecosystem is focused on activities in the context of the European Union, as well as in the national context. On the European level the recommendations are oriented towards activities supporting freedom of reporting and pluralism, as well financing projects and research supporting journalism quality, while recommendations on the national level are focused on putting an emphasis on editorial independence and protection of fundamental rights. Finally, recommendations on processes and evaluation suggest the implementation of multi-stakeholder Code of Practices in the context of disinformation and call for an independent and permanent evaluation.

However useful, the report created by the European Commission is primarily focused on recommendations and postulates arising from the "old" understanding of journalism, while it puts too little emphasis on the rationale behind the new media environment. Although the report goes further to explain the understanding of the nature of new media and including different stakeholders in the media process, it does not offer solutions that match the dynamics of contemporary media processes. The conventional approach, which calls for information transparency, naming news sources and the need for media literacy, does not address trends that the new media paradigm is conditional upon, such as the changing media habits of users accustomed to following news on their smartphones, who inform themselves solely through fragments of news or "chunks of content" (Deuze, 1999); strengthening of the 'filter bubbles'; decreasing role of the media as gatekeepers; increasing speed of reporting; changes to the distribution system; changes in the concept of news; growing impact of advertisers on media content; the rise of the click-based "attention economy" (Goldhaber, 1997) *etc.*

The report is targeted at explaining and regulating disinformation as one of the negative byproducts of transformation from one communication paradigm into another. However, the impression is that the European Commission guidelines do not adequately acknowledge the logic or the dynamics of the new media environment. Fake news is solely

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a surface reflection of a deeper change, which needs to be addressed systematically, while solutions to problems should arise from the logics of the transformed digital environment.

One of the concepts containing the awareness of the changed media environment is the concept of 'viral journalism' (Bebić and Volarević, 2016). It was introduced in order to cover the changes created in the process of communication and the way in which media content is created, shared and distributed via social media. Viral journalism implies creating content in a digital environment that does not follow the traditional media rationale, but combines all media formats and forms (photo, video, text) into content suitable for fast, dynamic and interactive social media forms. Content created in this way is aimed at getting attention and adjusting to media habits of today's users. This type of content cannot be defined as news in the traditional sense of the word. It is perceived as viral news – created in order to draw attention and intended for sharing. The aim of viral journalism is not to decrease the role and importance of journalism standards and journalist profession, but to adjust contemporary journalism to the needs of 21st-century media audiences. This type of journalism creates content suitable for sharing on social media, it gets users involved in the process of distributing content in an online environment and it does not follow the traditional rationale of media reporting, but the media habits of users.

Based on the idea of 'viral journalism', we propose to upgrade the HLEG guidelines with 5 elements:

1) Understanding the new media paradigm: the starting point of media discussions should be focused on understanding current communication trends and the new media habits of users. By following current trends and behaviours we can develop models and solutions suitable for a new media environment, without constantly going back to the 'old days and old ways'. For example, one of the most popular websites of today, BuzzFeed, is a paradigmatic example of a media outlet adapted to the 21st-century media needs, from engagement to content sharing. Interactivity and speed brought about by social media in communication and journalism require new patterns of content placement and call for re-evaluation of the entire media rationale (see Alhabash *et al.*, 2014; Bebić and Volarević, 2016; Boczkowski, 2013; Domingo *et al.*, 2014; Hermida, 2010; Jenkis *et al.* 2013)

2) Developing new media models: advertisers are one of the key stakeholders in today's media environment. Media, especially its digital forms, depend on ads posted on sites, overshadowing reporting (factual, objective and systematic). The media industry is faced with new challenges of getting trust back and redefining the industry. Developing new business models which will not depend on advertising and clicking, but will be focused on the truth and ethical and professional journalism standards is certainly a step in that direction. For several years Reuters Institute has been examining the possibility of developing paid media models around the world. The 2018 data show that the number of users willing to pay for content is on the rise, especially in the Scandinavian countries:

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Many Norwegian newspapers use a hybrid paywall model (a combination of a monthly page view limit and some premium content) supported by data driven editorial and marketing teams looking to convert users. Using these techniques, AftenPosten reached 100,000 digital subscribers in December 2017 after just two years (Reuters Institute Digital News Report, 2018).

Developing a paid media model has attracted new users:

In Finland quality news provider Helsingin Sanomat has returned to growth after 25 years of declining circulation – thanks to digital. They have 230,000 readers who pay for digital access, of whom 70,000 are digital only (up 40% in the last year) – part of a total subscriber base of almost 400,000. (Reuters Institute Digital News Report, 2018).

The Scandinavian model might not be universally applicable, but it is certainly food for thought and an incentive to suggest new business models.

3) Regulating online environment: regulation of online content is one of the hottest media topics. In the past years both on national and EU levels effort has been made to set out and establish regulations and directives aimed at decreasing hate speech in digital environment and putting an end to false and unverified information dissemination. For example, in early 2018 Germany adopted an act called NetzDG, *i.e.* Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks, regulating hate speech dissemination on social media. The Act provides regulatory rules the aim of which is to transfer responsibility to online users:

Providers of social networks which receive more than 100 complaints per calendar year about unlawful content shall be obliged to produce half-yearly German-language reports on the handling of complaints about unlawful content on their platforms, covering the points, and shall be obliged to publish these reports in the Federal Gazette and on their own website no later than one month after the half-year concerned has ended. The reports published on their own website shall be easily recognizable, directly accessible and permanently available (NetzDG, 2018).

The Act is particularly targeted at social media sites with more than 2 million users, and the content is regulated by deleting illegal and inappropriate content from the website. "Under the act platforms are required to maintain effective and transparent procedures for handling complaints about unlawful content through which users can flag problematic content" (Report by the Internet Policy Observatory at the Annenberg School, 2018). Despite facing a lot of criticism related to censorship and unclear regulation of deleting social media content, the Act is unique because it deals exclusively with regulating social media content and, among other things, it is an important step in finding a solution for the issue of fake news. Although the European Commission report suggests regulation by establishing a Code of Practices and it lists the principles it should encompass, the report does not go into detail, nor does it list existing practices and regulation models or ways to implement this type of regulation – both within the EU and in individual Member States.

4) Educating and training on new media trends: education and training on new media trends leads to grasping, understanding and critically reflecting on media content. The education with regard to trends and possibilities of digital platforms is a step towards

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decreasing distrust in media content on social media. Media trends evolve fast, and media habits of users keep changing year after year. This is why the education system should keep up with the changes in media environment and it should be understood and adapted better to the new media paradigm. Raising the level of media literacy is an important part of the European Commission report (2018): "The strength of media and information literacy is that it is a preventive, rather than a reactive solution, engendering critical thinking skills that are crucial for the 21st century citizen living in an increasingly digital environment (HLEG report, 2018)".

However, in addition to raising the level of media literacy, media-related education should be focused on understanding the new media paradigm and factors that influence changes and ensure tools and methods for mastering the new media environment.

5) Exploring the impact of the new media paradigm: social media has caused changes in all spheres of communication. The change taking place in the media environment is neither one-off nor one-dimensional, but it is comprehensive and requires continuous monitoring and impact analysis. Going back to old platforms, passive users and daily reporting is certainly not the option. In a dynamic, interactive and fast media environment, trends largely change year after year. In order to adjust, we need to monitor, track and discuss changes and behaviours in the media environment. This is the only way we can (try to) project future trends.

The goal of this brief essay is to point to the fact that fake news is neither the only nor the biggest problem of contemporary media environment. Moreover, we wanted to accentuate that the problems related to new media environment cannot be solved using conventional methods. Fake news may be an old problem but it is a problem that has taken a new form in a digital environment. At the same time, fake news symbolizes general disorientation and incapacity of the stakeholders to adapt to the emerging media paradigm. We therefore call for a less conventional approach and more progressive media policies that are anchored in the new digital media paradigm, in which users represent an important instance of content creation and distribution.

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PRIKAZI KNJIGA

BOOK REVIEWS

Richard Davis, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Marion R. Just (eds)
TWITTER AND ELECTIONS AROUND THE WORLD:
CAMPAIGNING IN 140 CHARACTERS OR LESS
Routledge, 1st Edition, New York, 2017, 232 pp
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ISBN-13: 978-1138949355

In the last decade, the role of social media in election campaigns has been drawing attention of many scholars. With the social media legacy of Barack Obama and Donald Trump's use of Twitter, the importance and power of social media in election campaigns can hardly be questioned. Facebook, Twitter and recently Instagram are the most commonly used social media platforms. But even though Facebook and Instagram are more popular in terms of the number of users, Twitter has been profiled as an online platform that brings together everyone in politics. This edited collection of research papers examines the importance of Twitter in elections around the world. It does so by looking at different actors in elections: journalists, the audience, parties and candidates.

The first part of the book called "Election journalism" consists of four chapters that examine how journalists used Twitter in the 2012 US elections; what the agenda setting potential of Twitter was in relation to traditional media in the 2013 German elections and what the role of Twitter was in the 2014 EU elections in Belgium. The authors discuss Twitter's influence on traditional norms of objectivity and find that political journalists push the boundaries of objectivity on Twitter but do not entirely redraw them (48). When it comes to the agenda setting role of the social media, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Reimar Zeh find no systematic imprint of social media on traditional media coverage (41). Particularly interesting are mentions of the democratic potential of Twitter. In the first chapter, Peter Hamby quotes Tim Miller, a GOP operative and former spokesman for the Republican National Committee, who says that "complaining about the triviality of Twitter and glorifying the golden era of journalism is ridiculous, because at that time bunch of cranky old white men was determining what they deigned worthy of the masses' ears only served them and the ruling elites who were in on the joke" (16). In the last chapter on the EU elections in Belgium, Evelien D'heer and Pieter Verdegem suggest that Twitter has the potential to contribute to the 'Europeanization' of political communication because of its ability to overcome cultural, regional and linguistic boundaries.

The second part of the book is dedicated to audiences. Given the pivotal role of audiences in social media logic, it is disappointing that this part consists of only two chapters. The fifth chapter written by Heather K. Evans offers another analysis of the use of Twitter in the US elections, this time by members of Congress in the 2014 midterm election. The sixth chapter provides a study on South Korean citizens' political information-sharing on Twitter during the 2012 general election. In this paper Jisue Lee, Hohyon Ryu, Lorri Mon, and Sung Jae Park studied how often three leading political figures were mentioned on Twitter. They also examined sentiments of messages that had been retweeted by citizens about the three leading political figures. Sentiments expressed toward these politicians were understood as an indicator of how Twitter users perceived the leaders in question (97). Finally, the authors established an interesting correlation between citizens' opinions expressed online on Twitter and offline through public opinion polls. All that makes this

chapter the only extensive study of audiences on Twitter although the power of online audiences is addressed in the tenth chapter of the book, namely in Joel Penney's study on promoted trends and bashtagging in the 2012 US Presidential election. Penney talks about the phenomenon of bashtagging, explaining to the reader that Twitter users are not only active participants operating only as 'brand advocates', but they also have the power to interpret and resist the preferred meanings of promotional texts. Most importantly, they have the capacity to oppose them through different online actions (159). In this context, the author provides the example of a Promoted Trend #AreYouBetterOff, echoing Mitt Romney's campaign message stressing that voters were in fact not better off now than they had been before Obama was elected in 2008 (161). However, the campaign faced sensational backfiring with five times more tweets with the word "yes" than those with the word "no" (162), which doesn't make it the only bashtagging moment in the Romney campaign.

Besides Penny's chapter, the third and final part of the book contains six other chapters focusing on parties, candidates and campaigns. The authors in this section mostly explore how candidates and political parties campaigned on Twitter. For instance, in Chapter 11 Tamara Small researches the phenomenon of personalization on Twitter in Canada while in Chapter 7 Kate Kenski and Bethany A. Conway studied if candidates in the 2012 US election managed to impose consistency in messaging on Twitter, which is one of the critical components in advertising. Sara Bentivegna and Rita Marchetti in their comprehensive and methodologically solid study of Italian candidates in the 2014 European election established that the element of interactivity was not sufficiently exploited (Chapter 8). They concluded that only newer parties were likely to communicate with voters in a more personal manner, while most of the other candidates preferred the broadcast model of communication, characterized by one-way communication. Gender differences in Twitter communication in the US Senate races in 2012 and 2014 are discussed in Chapter 9. Marion R. Just, Ann N. Crigler, and Rose A. Owen revealed that there are some significant differences related to gender: female candidates attack their opponents less than male candidates and tweets by females are more often retweeted and "favorited" by others. In the last chapter of this book called "From a Tweet to a Seat" Reimar Zeh seeks to establish whether Twitter can help smaller parties overcome the visibility gap between themselves and major parties in traditional media. He looks at the case of the Pirate Party in Luxembourg to conclude that Twitter has the potential to attract votes.

Overall, this collection of essays has enormous importance, especially nowadays when US president Donald Trump is using Twitter as his most powerful channel of communication with the world. Trump obviously recognized what Richard Davis emphasized in the conclusion of this book, i.e., that candidate and party electioneering on Twitter must recognize that this platform does not resemble traditional media and that ultimately it should not be treated as such (225). Evidently it will not take long before the second edition of this book is published, with more than a few chapters dedicated to Donald Trump. It will hopefully put greater emphasis on Twitter as an independent and powerful medium, without excessive comparisons between Twitter and traditional media, abundantly present in this volume.

Milica Vučković

Marijana Grbeša i Berto Šalaj

DOBAR, LOŠ ILI ZAO? POPULIZAM U HRVATSKOJ
TIM press, Zagreb, 2018., 307 str.
ISBN 978-953-8075-45-2

U knjizi *Dobar, loš ili zao? Populizam u Hrvatskoj* autori Marijana Grbeša i Berto Šalaj fenomenu populizma prilaze iz dva smjera: s jedne strane, daju pregled i analizu suvremene literature o populizmu, kao i pregled relevantnih istraživanja, te, s druge strane, nude svoju konceptualizaciju i metodologiju istraživanja populizma koju prezentiraju kroz rezultate vlastitih istraživanja. Drugim riječima, knjiga, da parafraziram same autore, odgovara na tri istraživačka pitanja: na konceptualnoj razini odgovara na pitanje što je populizam, na metodološkoj razini na pitanje kako ga istraživati, a na empirijskoj razini na pitanje ima li (i u kojim oblicima) populizma u hrvatskoj politici.

Knjiga ima osam poglavlja (uz uvod i zaključak). Prvo poglavlje naslovljeno *Povijest populizma* daje kratak pregled pojave i razvoja fenomena populizma.

Drugo poglavlje *Suvremena razumijevanja populizma* progovara o načinu na koji se „taj pojam koristi u javnom prostoru" (29), i to kroz „nekoliko više ili manje povezanih razina korištenja tog pojma" (29). Autori u tom smislu izdvajaju tri najčešće razine korištenja pojma populizma: na prvoj se razini populizam koristi kao oznaka za ideologiju i diskurs političkih stranaka; na drugoj se razini populizam koristi kao pejorativni termin kojim se nastoje diskreditirati određeni politički akteri; na trećoj se razini govori o znanstvenoj upotrebi tog pojma. Fokus ove knjige upravo je na tom trećem, znanstvenom razumijevanju populizma.

Treće poglavlje *Inkluzivni pristup populizmu* nudi novi pristup njegovu izučavanju koji povezuje populizam kao političku ideologiju te populizam kao političko-komunikacijski stil. Riječ je o pristupu koji se temelji na shvaćanju „populizma kao svojevrsne političke metaideologije koju se može jasno razlikovati od drugih političkih metaideologija" (15), a „predstavlja inovaciju u suvremenim raspravama o populizmu" (15).

Četvrto poglavlje *Tipovi populizma* predstavlja pregled najvažnije literature (uglavnom na engleskom jeziku) „koja se bavi pitanjima prisutnosti i tipova populizma u različitim dijelovima svijeta" (77). Poglavlje donosi tablični pregled populističkih opcija u pojedinim europskim državama, prvi takve vrste, s najvažnijim informacijama (naziv stranke, predsjednik, prvi ulazak u parlament, recentni politički rezultati, politička potpora, članstvo u političkoj grupaciji u EP-u, literatura i tip populizma).

Peto poglavlje *Uzroci jačanja populizma* analizira „glavne razloge nedavnog jačanja populizma i populističkih aktera u suvremenim društvima" (16), pri čemu se autori fokusiraju i na „skiciranje teorijskog modela koji bi obuhvatio sve najvažnije odrednice koje utječu na snagu populističkih aktera" (16). Riječ je o modelu koji obuhvaća dvije razine (strukture ili dimenzije): kontekstualnu (određena ukupnim kontekstom neke zajednice s određenim poddimenzijama) te latentnu (činitelji su prisutni u svim suvremenim liberalno-demokratskim društvima, ali se manifestiraju u različitim oblicima). Na taj se način uzroke populizma traži u „kombinaciji strukturalnih činitelja i djelovanja određenih aktera" (139).

Šesto poglavlje *Populizam i mediji* govori o ulozi medija u jačanju populističkih aktera, bilo kroz eksplicitnu podršku ili vidljivost koje mediji daju populistima ili kroz populistički diskurs samih medija, neovisno o postojanju konkretnih populističkih aktera (tzv. populi-

stičko novinarstvo). U tom kontekstu autori ističu kako je *medijski populizam* koji se prepoznaje „u općenito tabloidnom pristupu, simplifikaciji tema, senzacionalizmu, banalizaciji, identifikaciji s 'malim ljudima' nasuprot korumpiranim i moćnim elitama" (162) još uvijek „relativno zanemarena dimenzija u istraživanjima populizma" (161).

U sedmom poglavlju *Populizam u Hrvatskoj* autori predstavljaju nacrt i rezultate triju istraživanja populizma u Hrvatskoj u kojima su koristili metodu analize sadržaja intervjua odabranih hrvatskih političara. Prva se studija usredotočuje na razdoblje između dvaju lokalnih izbora, od 2009. do 2013. godine; druga se studija bavi populizmom na predsjedničkim izborima 2014./2015. godine; treća se studija bavi populizmom Mosta na parlamentarnim izborima 2015. godine. Ta su istraživanja među prvim empirijskim istraživanjima populizma u Hrvatskoj. Njihov je poseban doprinos u tome što autori u njima testiraju tzv. inkluzivni pristup populizmu koji uspješno razlikuje populizam kao stil od populizma kao ideologije.

Osmo poglavlje *Populizam i (liberalna) demokracija: prijetnja ili korektiv?* identificira dva lica koje populizam može imati u odnosu prema liberalnoj demokraciji: negativno ili prijeteće, koje češće ističu političari i mediji i koje se doživljava kao prijetnja liberalno-demokratskom poretku, te drugo lice, prema kojem „populizam isticanjem nekih ideja (...) može pridonijeti prevladavanju krize suvremenih liberalnih demokracija i obnovi demokratske ideje" (18).

U zaključku autori ističu najvažnije i najzanimljivije rezultate istraživanja populizma u Hrvatskoj te ukazuju na neka otvorena pitanja, „odnosno na ključne izazove s kojima se i dalje suočavaju svi oni koji se bave populizmom" (266).

Kako su autori konstatirali u uvodu, fenomen populizma u Hrvatskoj „u suvremenoj društveno-znanstvenoj literaturi uvelike [je] zanemaren" (11). Budući da je riječ o fenomenu koji bitno utječe na političke procese u Hrvatskoj i svijetu, ova knjiga zasigurno predstavlja velik doprinos njegovu razumijevanju te sustavnijem istraživanju.

Dunja Majstorović

- -

Nenad Vertovšek

**NOAM CHOMSKY I KRITIKA SUVREMENIH MASMEDIJA:
PROIZVODNJA SLIKE STVARNOSTI I NEOPHODNIH ILUZIJA**

Knjiga *Noam Chomsky i kritika suvremenih masmedija: proizvodnja slike stvarnosti i neophodnih iluzija* podijeljena je u devet cjelina. U *Uvodu* autor progovara o utjecaju medija na kreiranje javnog mnijenja i na mase, pri čemu se ta moć nerijetko manifestira u vidu manipulacije. Iako su novi mediji i nove tehnologije ukinuli medijski monopol, ali i doprinijeli stvaranju zbunjene i otuđene javnosti kojom upravljaju različite interesne skupine, Vertovšek navodi kako želi podići stupanj odgovornosti konzumenata prema medijskom sadržaju, ali istodobno i jačati njihove slobode (15-17). Uvodni dio završava kratkim životopisom Noama Chomskog kao najutjecajnijeg intelektualca današnjice i zagovornika slobode govora, čiji radovi kritički propituju ulogu masovnih medija u zapadnim demokracijama.

U drugoj cjelini *Kritički pogled na suvremene medije* Vertovšek se osvrće na opsjednutost medijima, koja pogubno utječe na kritičke vještine pojedinca (125). Iščitavajući Chomskog, autor naglašava univerzalnost, ali i kompleksnost njegovih misli, što je posljedica njegova multidisciplinarnog pristupa pitanjima o kojima raspravlja i piše. Da bismo razumjeli medije, moramo razumjeti tri najvažnija izvora informacija: „unutarnju strukturu medija, njihovu ulogu u širem društvu, kao i njihov odnos prema drugim centrima moći i autoritetima" (30). U analizi masovnih medija Chomsky polazi od vrijednosti i sloboda koje osiguravaju novinari i ostali medijski djelatnici iznošenjem činjenica koje ugrožavaju interese različitih skupina (32). Chomsky razdvaja slobodu medija i slobodu govora, kritički progovarajući o američkom političkom i *mainstream* medijskom sustavu, pri čemu se zalaže za slobodu govora čak i kada ne postoji sloboda medija (36). Kritizirajući američke masovne medije zbog potpore vojnim akcijama diljem svijeta, što je sastavni dio američke vanjske politike, te jačanja propagande u korporativnom i PR sektoru, Chomsky propituje ulogu suvremenih *gatekeepera*, za koje Vertovšek tvrdi da doprinose jednosmjernoj komunikaciji i manipulaciji (39-42). Iako bi mediji trebali biti suprotstavljeni centrima moći, stvarno je stanje potpuno obratno, što je, prema Chomskom, posljedica društvenog nasljeđa, a upravo to nasljeđe obrađuje treća cjelina *Društvene elite i masovni mediji*. Elitne skupine tako proces selekcije medijskih sadržaja svode na „podčinjavanje i 'humano prilagođavanje' " (48), koje rezultira umjetnom slikom stvarnosti. Vertovšek se slaže s Chomskim da je nužna promjena obrazovnog sustava, što je preduvjet za stvaranje konzumenata koji su kritični i odgovorni (54). Vladajuće elite u svom se djelovanju služe i kreiranjem slobode privida, namećući vrijednosti kompatibilne aktualnom javnom mnijenju, uz mnoštvo lažne simbolike koja osigurava lakše upravljanje zbunjenim stadom (74).

Manipulacija odabranih i povlaštenih, kako ih naziva Vertovšek u četvrtoj cjelini *Od pristanka javnosti do proizvodnje pristanka*, ogleda se u ratnim izvještajima američkih televizija i prikazu stvarnosti prema binarnome modelu *mi* i *oni*, pri čemu jača neosjetljivost na prikaze sukoba i žrtava sukoba. Pritom se autor pita jesmo li mi kao pojedinci uopće dali pristanak na preusmjeravanje pažnje te kakav je utjecaj takvog medijskog djelovanja na globalnoj, ali i regionalnoj razini (83). O proizvodnji pristanka kod masa pisali su Chomsky i Herman, upozoravajući da proizvodnja normi i stereotipa, uz višekratno ponavljanje, postaje medijskom istinom, dok se pristranost ogleda u izboru tema, njihovu medijskom uokvirivanju te filtriranju informacija (94-95). Govoreći o proizvodnji vijesti kao temeljnom procesu kreiranja (slike) stvarnosti, Vertovšek ističe kako na navedeni proces snažno utječu individualno i društveno otuđenje, konvergencija medija te koncentracija medijskog vlasništva (97-101). Pritom ne treba zaboraviti ni ulogu okvira, koje Vertovšek promatra kao model za stvaranje iluzija. Iako je pitanje objektivnosti jedno od temeljnih postulata novinarskih standarda, Vertovšek (pozivajući se na Ulricha Saxera) ističe važnost poželjnosti u ovim raspravama.

Prikazujući medijski sustav kroz lanac potreba, u petoj cjelini *Propagandni modeli i filtri za elitnu stvarnost* autor analizira pet filtara o kojima govore Chomsky i Herman: 1) veličina, vlasništvo i orijentacija prema profitu masovnih medija, 2) oglasna „licenca" u vidu orijentacije i poticanja poslovanja, 3) izvor vijesti masovnih medija, 4) oštra kritika izvršitelja te 5) antikomunizam kao mehanizam kontrole (111-116). Riječ je o filtrima koje svaka vijest treba proći da bi bila objavljena. Tako prvi filtar ukazuje na opasnost dominacije megakorporacija u vlasničkoj strukturi medija, koje izravno sudjeluju u kreiranju medijskog sadržaja i

doprinose njegovoj unifikaciji. Drugi filtar obuhvaća oglašivačku industriju koja utječe na proizvodnju vijesti, baš kao i brojne informacije i glasine koje predstavljaju temelj informacija te ujedno i treći filtar. Nadalje, ublažavanje svakog kritičkog stava prema oglašivačima i drugim interesnim skupinama također je jedna od metoda medijskog djelovanja i ujedno četvrti filtar. Posljednji, peti filtar uključuje prikaz ideologije u razlikama između Istoka i Zapada temeljen na stereotipnim podjelama *mi* i *oni*.

Dominacija *storytellinga*, promjenjive medijske agende te guranje u zaborav samo su neke od strategija globalnih medija, pri čemu se javnost pokušava pasivizirati. S druge strane, potrošačka je kultura postala važnim dijelom medijske kulture, ponajprije zahvaljujući novim tehnologijama koje čovjeka svode na jednodimenzionalnost, upozorava Vertovšek (128-130).

U šestoj cjelini *Neophodne iluzije i globalne manipulacije* Vertovšek analizira tri modela medijskih organizacija: 1) korporativni oligopol, 2) medije pod kontrolom države te 3) medije čija se uređivačka politika temelji na demokratskom komuniciranju (136). Zbunjivanje stada odvija se najprije uz proizvodnju pristanka brojnim manipulativnim tehnikama na nesvjesnoj razini, odvraćanjem pozornosti od stvarnosti te korištenjem tehnika odnosa s javnošću prema kojima je Chomsky osobito kritičan (142-146). No, govoreći o stvarnim i virtualnim iluzijama, Vertovšek upozorava na manipulacije činjenicama u svakodnevnom medijskom diskursu, ali i propituje budućnost ljudskoga u digitalnom dobu i digitalnim medijima.

U sedmoj cjelini *Filozofija jezika i uma: lingvistički doprinos vrednovanju slobode* autor nas podsjeća na lingvističku teoriju Noama Chomskog o univerzalnoj gramatici u čijem je središtu analiza osobnog i medijskog diskursa, pri čemu se uloga jezika promatra kao jedan od ključnih alata za promicanje ljudske slobode (158).

Razotkrivanje interesnih veza centara moći u središtu je kritike Chomskog usmjerene prema masovnim medijima, a njegovu liniju slijedi i Vertovšek u osmoj cjelini *Nove dimenzije medijske stvarnosti: od klasičnih stereotipa do stereotipa budućnosti*, naglašavajući važnost razumijevanja stereotipa, temeljenih često na imaginarnim strahovima koji također doprinose pasivnosti publike i zavođenju masa (169-172). Iako je *kritika medija* najčešće korištena sintagma u djelima Chomskog, pa i u diskursu Vertovšeka, obojica upozoravaju kako je nužno jačanje intelektualnih elita kao najmoćnijeg oružja u borbi protiv (medijske) manipulacije, ali i odgovornosti prema *drugima* (174). Oslanjajući se na McLuhanovu tezu o medijima kao produžetcima ljudskih osjetila, što je postalo naša stvarnost, Vertovšek upozorava na zamke *cyber* zbilje u vidu gubitka identiteta i osobnosti. Tako postmodernističko shvaćanje medija polazi od pokušaja pronalaska opravdanja i nametanja slika budućnosti (182), a Vertovšek u tom konceptu vidi Chomskog kao predstavnika slobode volterovskog tipa koji prihvaća *druge* i *drukčije*, i što je najvažnije – one koji misle drukčije. Podjela medija na masovne i elitne pomaže u razumijevanju proizvodnog procesa medija te u shvaćanju iluzija za različite tipove publike. Riječ je o svojevrsnoj kulturi globalizacije, koju Chomsky povezuje s globalizacijom komunikacije, pozivajući se na vodeće teoretičare filozofije medija, od Marshalla McLuhana i Paula Levinsona do Nicholasa Carra.

U posljednjoj cjelini, odnosno u *Zaključku* Vertovšek navodi kako nije jednostavno suprotstaviti se proizvodnji medijskih manipulacija s obzirom na brojne dionike iz (ne)medijskog svijeta koji su u njih uključeni. Svakom obliku manipulacije prepreka bi trebali biti profesionalni novinarski standardi. No, Vertovšek se pita nisu li oni samo jedna u nizu iluzija te

podsjeća da su digitalni mediji postavili pred korisnike dilemu – kvantiteta i površnost ili kvaliteta (22). Promjene u medijskoj sferi moguće je prema njemu razumjeti samo uključivanjem humanističke orijentacije, što je izostalo u prethodnim povijesnim razdobljima. Knjiga Nenada Vertovšeka donosi sveobuhvatnu analizu masovnih medija iz perspektive jednog od vodećih intelektualaca današnjice, Noama Chomskog, koji izravno i kritički progovara o zbivanjima „iza ekrana" i interesnim skupinama koje utječu na proizvodni proces medija te na stvaranje medijske manipulacije. Iako su u središtu kritika Chomskog uvijek moć medija i odnos Zapada prema korištenju komunikacijskih kanala u svrhu postizanja ili održavanja statusa imperijalizma, Vertovšek u ovome djelu sintetizira ključne poruke Chomskog u kontekstu suvremenih komunikacijskih (digitalno doba, rastući individualizam, promjene u strukturi javnosti i publike te nove manipulativne tehnike) i političkih zbivanja (brojna krizna žarišta diljem svijeta, upotreba medija u svrhu političkog marketinga). Knjiga je pisana jasnim i jednostavnim jezikom. U njoj se ponavljaju pojedine teze i sintagme, kao što su: *društvene elite*, *proizvodnja pristanka*, *neophodne iluzije* i *medijske manipulacije*, čime se doprinosi izgradnji kritičke svijesti kod publike i potiče na preuzimanje odgovornosti za konzumirani sadržaj. Knjiga je namijenjena studentima informacijskih i komunikacijskih znanosti, teoretičarima medija, ali i svima koji žele osnažiti medijske kompetencije i biti medijski pismeniji.

Tanja Grmuša

Knjiga *Od novinara do novinarstva* donosi prvo cjelovito znanstveno istraživanje novinarskih vještina u visokoškolskim programima za obrazovanje novinara u Hrvatskoj. Autorica Tijana Vukić istraživanje je provela u sklopu svoje doktorske disertacije, a krenula je s idejom da je upravo visokoškolsko obrazovanje novinara ključ u rješavanju krize novinarstva u Hrvatskoj. Jedan od ključnih doprinosa knjige jest zahtjev za promjenom perspektive u istraživanju novinarskih vještina, odnosno da se pažnja s novinarstva preusmjeri na samog novinara. Sukladno tome, autorica predlaže alternativni model novinarskog obrazovanja pod imenom „model novinarske ličnosti", čiju implementaciju ispituje teorijski i na razini silabusa. Uporište je modela u konceptu holističkog poimanja razvoja i obrazovanja novinara kao cjelovitog ljudskog bića, a Vukić ga opisuje kao mogući put prema kvalitetnijem novinarstvu i razvoju vrsnog novinarskog kadra u zemlji.

Autorica svoju studiju dijeli u tri cjeline. U prvoj razlaže problem istraživanja novinarskih vještina u okviru novinarskog obrazovanja u Hrvatskoj kroz dvije aktualne krize – krizu novinarstva i krizu obrazovanja. U pregledu relevantne literature autorica izdvaja uzroke krize novinarstva u Hrvatskoj, koja je, između ostalog, posljedica nezadovoljavajućeg obrazovanja novinara. Uzroke krize obrazovanja u zemlji, koja za posljedicu ima krizu svijesti i identiteta mladih ljudi, Vukić nalazi u zaostajanju monističke osnove pedagogijske

znanosti za pluralnim pristupom, u dugotrajnom uvođenju bolonjskih načela u visoko-školsko obrazovanje, inertnosti obrazovnog sustava, ali i u utjecaju politike na njega.

U drugoj cjelini Vukić daje kritički pregled postojećih definicija novinarstva, za koje kaže da su preuske jer su, kao prvo, usredotočene na novinarski proizvod umjesto na onoga koji taj proizvod stvara te, kao drugo, obuhvaćaju samo dio novinarskih poslova, iako novinarske aktivnosti daleko premašuju puko prikupljanje, pisanje, uređivanje i distribuciju informacija. Vukić ističe kako je prvi zahtjev profesionalizacije novinarstva u zemlji visoka razina novinarskog obrazovanja, koja treba postati uvjet zaposlenju u struci, te zakonsko priznavanje novinarstva kao profesije.

Treća je cjelina knjige najopsežnija. U njoj autorica donosi definiciju i načela holističkog obrazovanja, koje je podloga za njezinu studiju. Za razliku od mehanicističkog, u sredi-štu holističkog obrazovanja jest student kao cjelovito ljudsko biće. Na studente, smatra autorica, ne treba gledati kao na buduće radnike, već kao na ljude, te im treba omogućiti individualni razvoj kreativnosti i sposobnosti. Holizam na nastavničko zanimanje gleda kao na poziv, a nastavnici naročito pomažu studentima u razvoju njihova pristupa znanju i učenju. Prije definiranja temeljnih pojmova novinarskog obrazovanja iz holističke per-spektive autorica donosi pregled sustava obrazovanja novinara te istraživanja novinarskih kompetencija u Hrvatskoj i pojedinim dijelovima svijeta, uglavnom u Europi.

Vukić u knjizi detaljno razlaže svoj prijedlog za reformu obrazovanja novinara u Hrvat-skoj. Model novinarske ličnosti osposobljava novinara da živi novinarstvo, da samostalno i odgovorno cijeli život uči o svojoj profesiji, da je intuitivan, znatiželjan i kreativan. Model počiva na ideji da se učenje o novinarstvu treba preusmjeriti na novinara kao pojedinca koji se treba razviti kao cjelovita novinarska ličnost: na osobnoj, međuljudskoj, društvenoj i stručnoj razini. Svoj osebujni model Vukić je operacionalizirala izradom primjera silabusa za fiktivni kolegij *Kreiranje vijesti*. Iako uz silabus nisu ponuđene konkretne smjernice za implementaciju modela u samoj nastavi, neke od njih implicitno su naznačene.

Konačno, Vukić provodi strukturno-komparativnu analizu sadržaja svih aktualnih nastav-nih planova, programa i silabusa obveznih kolegija visokoškolskih studijskih programa koji obrazuju novinare u Hrvatskoj. Zadatak je bio provjeriti postojanje holističkih aspe-kata, principa i vrsti učenja u sadržaju spomenutih pedagoških dokumenata. Analizom te građe nije moguće dobiti sveobuhvatni uvid u to koliko su holistički elementi praktično uključeni u svakodnevno učenje i komunikaciju između nastavnika i studenata, kao niti jesu li prisutni u nastavi unatoč tome što nisu istaknuti u silabusima. No, istraživanje poka-zuje da aktualni sustav obrazovanja novinara gotovo uopće ne prati koncepte medijskog, dok tek djelomično prati koncepte obrazovnog pluralizma. Dodavanjem raznoraznih kva-lifikacija i proširivanjem kompetencija potrebnih za izvođenje aktivnosti koje izlaze iz do-mene novinarskog zanimanja, relativizira se novinarsko zanimanje u Hrvatskoj. Nastavni programi za obrazovanje novinara u Hrvatskoj vide inteligenciju kao najvažniju novinar-sku sposobnost, a novinarsko znanje kao najvažniju novinarsku kompetenciju. Fokus je na razvijanju logičko-matematičkih mentalnih sposobnosti, koje su šest puta zastupljenije nego poticanje samosvijesti kod studenata. Ne postoji zaseban kolegij koji potiče razvoj sposobnosti kritičkog mišljenja, a zastupljenost elemenata koji razvijaju kreativnost je za-nemariva. Društveni aspekt razvoja studenata nedovoljno je naglašen, s obzirom na važnu funkciju novinarstva kao društvene djelatnosti. Vukić ističe da rješavanje krize novinarstva

neće biti moguće sve dok odgovornost prema temi, pojedincima i društvu te samostalnost u novinarskome radu ne budu više uključeni u obrazovanje novinara.

Ova knjiga doprinos je boljem poznavanju i razumijevanju visokoškolskog obrazovanja novinara u zemlji. Kako bi premostila jaz između novinarstva o kojem se uči i novinarstva koje se trenutno u redakcijama živi, Vukić predlaže originalno rješenje za obrazovanje i odgoj budućih novinara kao cjelovitih ljudskih bića.

Uspješnoj implementaciji njezina modela obrazovanja novinara u Hrvatskoj trebalo bi, međutim, prethoditi ispitivanje kvalitete visokoškolskog obrazovanja novinara iz perspektive nastavnika i samih studenata, odnosno njihovih očekivanja i potreba. Osim toga, knjiga ne donosi program provođenja ovakvog modela, iako bez sumnje utire put drukčijem obrazovanju novinara i razumijevanju novinarske profesije.

Petra Kovačević

INFORMACIJE

INFORMATION

Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Tuzli u saradnji s Misijom OSCE-a u BiH organizuje

DEVETU REGIONALNU NAUČNU KONFERENCIJU
VJERODOSTOJNOST MEDIJA:
BORBA PROTIV LAŽNIH VIJESTI

Filozofski fakultet, Tuzla, 2. i 3. novembar 2018.

Konferencija **Vjerodostojnost medija** održava se kontinuirano od 2010. godine. U okviru dosadašnjih konferencija koje su održane u Zagrebu, Beogradu, Sarajevu, Dubrovniku i Mostaru otvorena su relevantna pitanja iz oblasti kredibiliteta medija i novinarstva, provedene su kvalitetne studije u ovoj oblasti, objavljeni su konferencijski zbornici i unaprijeđena saradnja medijskih istraživača u regionu. Na osnovu rezultata recentnih teorijskih i empirijskih istraživanja učesnici konferencije doprinose boljem razumijevanju savremenih medijskih fenomena nudeći preporuke i inicijative za poboljšanje kvaliteta novinarstva.

Tema ovogodišnje konferencije je **Borba protiv lažnih vijesti**. Neprovjerene vijesti i dezinformacije koje se brzo šire društvenim mrežama, kao i drugim online platformama ozbiljno ugrožavaju već narušeni kredibilitet novinarstva. Broj nevjerodostojnih web portala i neprovjerenih vijesti se brzo povećava. Pojedinci i grupe vide način za laku zaradu u širenju dezinformacija kojima će privući veliki broj klikova na atraktivan (često fiktivan sadržaj), a neki su zlonamjerno usmjereni na diskreditovanje pojedinaca, grupa, organizacija i institucija. Istovremeno, građani kao korisnici vijesti često nisu u stanju razlikovati nevjerodostojne od vjerodostojnih vijesti, dijelom zbog neodgovarajućih medijskih kompetencija, dijelom zbog površnog pristupa vijestima. Ovo ostavlja velike mogućnosti za manipulisanje javnim mnijenjem, a samim tim aktuelizuje i pitanje kvaliteta informacija kao jednog od uslova funkcionalnog demokratskog društva. Iako su medijska industrija i javne institucije u svijetu počeli realizovati projekte borbe protiv dezinformacija, pojedinci i grupe koje proizvode lažne vijesti koriste sve sofisticiranije taktike zbog čega je potrebno razviti dugoročnu strategiju i mehanizme za zaštitu kredibiliteta novinarstva u digitalnom dobu. Takva strategija zahtijeva sinergiju medija, javnih institucija, organizacija civilnog društva i kompanija.

Ciljevi konferencije su sljedeći:

>doprinijeti razvoju instrumenata za identifikaciju lažnih vijesti
>stvoriti mehanizme za borbu protiv širenja lažnih vijesti
>predstaviti prethodna iskustva i aktivnosti u borbi protiv dezinformacija i
>predložiti rješenja za zaštitu kredibiliteta novinarstva

Pozivamo naučnike/ice, istraživače/ice, stručnjake/inje i doktorande/ice da prijave učestvovanje i izlaganje o temama koje su u skladu s temom i ciljevima konferencije:

>Evropska medijska politika u oblasti zaštite vjerodostojnosti vijesti
>Strategije i taktike unapređenja kvaliteta novinarstva u digitalnoj eri
>Vjerodostojnost online vs. offline vijesti
>Kriteriji vrijednosti vijesti u digitalnom dobu
>Platforme i instrumenti za detektovanje lažnih informacija
>Utjecaj društvenih medija, mreža i *influensera* na novinarstvo
>Građanski aktivizam u borbi protiv dezinformacija

Apstrakti radova:
Struktura apstrakta: ime i prezime, zvanje i adresa (pošta, e-mail, telefon) autora; naslov rada; ključnih pet do šest riječi; sadržaj apstrakta (300-500 riječi).
Rok za dostavu apstrakata: 1. oktobar 2018.
Obavještenje o rezultatima izbora apstrakata radova koji će biti prezentovati na konferenciji: **10. oktobra 2018.**
Program konferencije: 15. oktobra 2018.

Adresa za upite, prijave i dostavljanje apstrakata: **vjerodostojnostmedija2018@gmail.com**

Organizacijski detalji:
>učesnici konferencije ne plaćaju kotizaciju
>organizator će izlagačima osigurati hotelski smještaj
>organizator će izlagačima osigurati ishranu
>učesnici snose troškove puta

Zbornik radova:
Recenzirani radovi s konferencije bit će objavljeni u zborniku u junu 2019. godine. Radovi trebaju biti pisani latinicom, na bosanskom, hrvatskom, srpskom, crnogorskom ili engleskom jeziku. Maksimalan obim rada je 6000 riječi (Font Times New Roman, 12 pt, 1,5 prored). Rezime rada može sadržavati do 150 riječi s popisom ključnih riječi (maksimalno šest). Detaljne upute o stilu referiranja i citiranja bit će naknadno objavljene.
Rok za dostavljanje finalnih radova za objavljivanje u zborniku: **1. februar 2019.**

Važni datumi:
Rok za dostavljanje apstrakata: 1. oktobar 2018.
Obavještenje o rezultatima izbora apstrakata radova: 10. oktobar 2018.
Program konferencije: 15.oktobar 2018.
Konferencija: 2.-3. novembar 2018.
Rok za dostavljanje finalnih radova: 1. februar 2019.
Obavještenje o rezultatima recenziranja: 1. april 2019.
Izdavanje Zbornika odabranih radova: juni 2019.

Konferenciju će finansijski podržati Misija OSCE-a u BiH.

CALL FOR PAPERS

ECREA Journalism Studies Section Conference

Vienna, Austria, February 14-15, 2019.
Hosted by the Journalism Studies Center,
Department of Communication, University of Vienna

Breaking Binaries:
Exploring the Diverse Meanings of Journalism
in Contemporary Societies

The field of journalism is undergoing some dramatic transformations in the early 21st century, a development which is widely discussed among scholars. These transformations, which are to varying degrees of political, economic, social, cultural and technological nature, have increasingly drawn into question some long-held assumptions and expectations of journalistic work. In response, journalism studies scholars have begun to question some established truths of their own. Slowly, these efforts are resulting in far more complex visions of what journalism is, what audiences expect it to be and also what it perhaps should be from a normative point of view.

To address the transformations of a more complex and dynamic journalistic field, this conference invites in particular theoretical and empirical research to address the breaking up of long-established dichotomies, or binaries, in journalism studies. For example, it seems much harder to differentiate between soft and hard news in a time of a burgeoning variety of journalistic formats. Similarly, boundaries between amateur and professional journalistic work are being eroded, and established definitions of journalism and who counts as a journalist are questioned. Further, the old divide between online and off-line is no longer tenable in light of the increasing platformization of journalism. In addition, the re-emergence of the relevance of the audience in both journalistic work and journalism studies calls for work that goes beyond simplistic distinctions of issues such as trust or distrust. Journalism's relevance in society is also increasingly challenged, with public stakeholders and audiences questioning the legitimacy of journalism. Here, it appears important to examine how audiences and public stakeholders define journalism, what they expect from it, and how they distinguish between legitimate (good) and illegitimate (bad) journalism. While we may see an overall quantification of methodologies of journalism studies due to the availability of unprecedented amounts of data, there is also an increasing need to break up the often still-entrenched binary between qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Further, in an increasingly globalized environment, binaries of 'the West' and 'beyond the West' may no longer be adequate.

The organizers therefore call for papers to address how journalism studies can help to address the increasingly complex journalistic field, and to propose theoretical and empirical ways that go beyond previous, simplistic binaries that have at times defined the field. In addition to papers dealing with the conference theme, we invite papers which study cultural, political, economic, social, technological and professional aspects of journalism and news work in a broad sense. We welcome submissions from all theoretical, epistemological and methodological perspectives.

The conference will feature traditional paper presentations, high density sessions and coherent panels.

Traditional paper presentations: Traditional paper presentations will take place in panels consisting of four to five papers.

High density sessions: Participants present their research on a poster, which will be put up in the hall way. The session starts with an introduction round, where each presenter introduces her poster in a brief talk. After these talks the audience is invited to visit the posters and discuss the work with the researchers.

Coherent panels: A limited number of slots will be available for coherent panels where one topic is addressed in four to five presentations, followed by a respondent. Preference will be given to panels with presenters from diverse backgrounds and affiliations.

How to submit:
Submissions can be sent to ecreajournalism2019@univie.ac.at no later than September 28, 2018. Please include in the email (1) the title of your paper, (2) an abstract of no more than 400 words, (3) names and affiliations of the authors, (4) an indication whether you want your paper to be considered for a high density session.

To submit a panel proposal, a 300-word rationale should be sent alongside a 150 word explanation per presentation, as well as the names and affiliations of presenters and respondent.

>All submissions will undergo scholarly peer-review.
>Only one proposal per first author can be accepted.
>Notifications of acceptance will be issued in late October.

More information can be found on our website: **ecreajournalism2019.univie.ac.at.**

Please contact the conference organizing committee with questions at **ecreajournalism2019@univie.ac.at.**

Upute suradnicima

Interdisciplinarni časopis *Medijske studije* otvara prostor za međunarodnu znanstvenu i stručnu raspravu o medijima, komunikacijama, novinarstvu te odnosima s javnošću unutar kulturnog, povijesnog, političkog i/ili ekonomskog konteksta. Na suradnju su pozvani autori čiji radovi (prilozi) ispunjavaju kriterij relevantnosti i znanstvene izvrsnosti. Radovi ne smiju biti djelomično ili u cijelosti već objavljeni, ne smiju biti u procesu objavljivanja u nekom drugom časopisu, zborniku, knjizi i sl., niti smiju biti prijevod takvih radova. Za sve navedeno autori preuzimaju odgovornost. Uvjet za objavu rada u časopisu jesu dvije anonimne, pozitivne recenzije međunarodnih medijskih stručnjaka.

Radovi se šalju isključivo u DOC formatu putem Open Journal System portala (https://hrcak.srce.hr/ojs/index.php/medijske-studije). Zbog anonimnih recenzija u posebnom dokumentu treba poslati ime, odnosno imena autora/autorica s mjestom zaposlenja, podacima za kontakt (adresa/telefon/e-adresa) te kratku biografiju.

Radovi moraju biti napisani na hrvatskom ili engleskom jeziku, fontom Times New Roman, veličina 12, prored 1,5. Sve stranice trebaju biti numerirane. Na prvoj stranici trebaju biti ispisani naslov rada te sažetak koji upućuje na zadaće i cilj rada, metode istraživanja te najvažnije rezultate (100 do 150 riječi s popisom ključnih 5 do 6 riječi), sve na hrvatskom i na engleskom jeziku. Na dnu stranice u bilješci možete navesti zahvale kao i detalje o projektu (naziv i broj), ukoliko je članak nastao kao dio nekog projekta. Očekivani opseg rada (uključujući bilješke, bibliografiju i mjesta za grafičke priloge) je između 5000 i 8000 riječi. Citirani izvori navode se u tekstu (a ne u bilješkama) u skraćenom obliku, npr. (Dahlgren, 2009: 67) ili (Gillespie i Toynbee, 2006). Kod više bibliografskih jedinica istog autora iz iste godine, navodi se: (2006a), (2006b), (2006c) itd. Na kraju teksta pod naslovom *Literatura* navodi se samo citirana literatura, abecednim redom. Obavezno navedite DOI broj uz svaku bibliografsku jedinicu koja ga ima.

Knjige: autor (godina) *naslov*. mjesto: izdavač.

Dahlgren, Peter (2009) *Media and Political Engagement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ćapeta, Tamara i Rodin, Siniša (2011) *Osnove prava Europske unije*. Zagreb: Narodne novine.

Članci u časopisima: autor (godina) naslov. *časopis* godište (broj): stranice.

McQuail, Denis (2003) Public Service Broadcasting: Both Free and Accountable. *The Public/Javnost* 10 (3): 13-28.

Poglavlje u knjizi ili članak u zborniku: autor (godina) naslov, stranice, u: urednici knjige (ur.) *naslov*. mjesto: izdavač.

Tongue, Carole (2002) Public Service Broadcasting: A Study of 8 OECD Countries, str. 107-142, u: Collins, Philip (ur.) *Culture or Anarchy? The Future of Public Service Broadcasting*. London: Social Market Foundation.

Ciboci, Lana, Jakopović, Hrvoje, Opačak, Suzana, Raguž, Anja i Skelin, Petra (2011) Djeca u dnevnim novinama: analiza izvještavanja o djeci u 2010., str. 103-166, u: Ciboci, Lana, Kanižaj, Igor i Labaš, Danijel (ur.) *Djeca medija: od marginalizacije do senzacije*. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska.

Dokumenti s interneta: autor ili institucija ili naziv mrežne stranice (godina) *Naslov*. Ime projekta ili dokumenta ako postoji. link (DD.MM.GGGG. = datum kada ste pristupili poveznici).

Ridgeout, Victoria, Foehr, Ulla i Roberts, Donald (2010) *Generation M²: Media in the Lives of 8- to 18- Years Olds*. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. http://kff.org/other/poll-finding/report-generation-m2-media-in-the-lives/ (28.10.2013.).

Ofcom (2013) *Radio: The Listener's Perspective: A Research Report for Ofcom*. http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/radio-research/ressearch-findings13/listeners-perspective.pdf (20.11.2013.).

UNICEF, Ured za Hrvatsku (2011) *Mišljenja i stavovi djece i mladih u Hrvatskoj*. http://www.unicef.hr/upload/file/351/175805/FILENAME/StavovidjeceimladihuHrvatskoj.pdf (19.11.2013.).

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Notes for Authors

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Manuscripts should be written in either Croatian or English, using Times New Roman font; size 12; 1.5 line spacing; all pages should be numbered appropriately. The title page shall consist of the article's full title and abstract, which sufficiently states the purpose, goals, methodologies, and the most important results (100-150 words, noting the 5-6 key words) in both Croatian and English of the submitted piece. In the footnote please add further description of the research, acknowledge contributions from non-authors and/or list funding sources. If the research was conducted under a project, please add a project number and if applicable include a code or identifier of the project. The main text of the article (including notes, references, and illustrations) shall be between 5,000 and 8,000 words. References must be incorporated into the text (not in end note format) and must follow the Harvard Style of Referencing. References should be cited in the text as follows: (author, date: page). An alphabetical references section should follow the text. If there are more references by the same author published in the same year, letters should be added to the citation: a, b, c, etc. (e.g. 2006a; 2006b).

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Dahlgren, Peter (2009) *Media and Political Engagement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ćapeta, Tamara and Rodin, Siniša (2011) *Osnove prava Europske unije (Introduction to European Union Law)*. Zagreb: Narodne novine.

Journal Articles: author (year) title (English translation). *journal* volume (number): pages.

McQuail, Denis (2003) Public Service Broadcasting: Both Free and Accountable. *The Public/Javnost* 10 (3): 13-28.

Book Chapter: author (year) title (English translation), pages in editors (ed./eds) *title* [*English translation*]. place: publisher.

Tongue, Carole (2002) Public Service Broadcasting: A Study of 8 OECD Countries, pp. 107-142 in Collins, Philip (ed.) *Culture or Anarchy? The Future of Public Service Broadcasting*. London: Social Market Foundation.

Ciboci, Lana, Jakopović, Hrvoje, Opačak, Suzana, Raguž, Anja and Skelin, Petra (2011) Djeca u dnevnim novinama. Analiza izvještavanja o djeci u 2010. (Children in newspapers. Analysis of Reporting on Children in 2010), pp. 103-166 in Ciboci, Lana, Kanižaj, Igor and Labaš, Danijel (eds) *Djeca medija. Od marginalizacije do senzacije (Children of the Media. From Marginalisation to Sensation)*. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska.

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Ridgeout, Victoria, Foehr, Ulla and Roberts, Donald (2010) *Generation M^2: Media in the Lives of 8- to 18- Years Olds*. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. http://kff.org/other/poll-finding/report-generation-m2-media-in-the-lives/ (28.10.2013).

UNICEF, Croatian Office (2011) *Mišljenja i stavovi djece i mladih u Hrvatskoj (Opinions and Attitudes of Children and Youth in Croatia)*. http://www.unicef.hr/upload/file/351/175805/FILENAME/StavovidjeceimladihuHrvatskoj.pdf (19.11.2013).

Ofcom (2013) *Radio: The Listener's Perspective: A Research Report for Ofcom*. http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/radio-research/ressearch-findings13/listeners-perspective.pdf (20.11.2013).

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